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ABSTRACT 
Due to concerns regarding auditor independence and the importance of good 
corporate governance for business, especially in the wake of corporate scandals 
and collapses, the relationship between auditor and corporate governance has 
become more important. Therefore, this study examines the impact of 
governance characteristics and non-audit fees on audit quality proxied by the 
audit fees in the UK before and after the recent economic crisis. It utilises the 
data from a sample of 384 FTSE All Share listed companies in 2007 and 2010. 
This study provides evidence that before the economic crisis audit committee 
diligence, audit committee commitment, management share ownership and non-
executive share ownership had a significant impact on audit fees. In the post- 
economic crisis, none of the audit committee characteristics exhibits a 
significant relationship with audit fees, while non-executive director 
shareholding and management shareholding remain significant. The increasing 
levels of compliance with Codes of Corporate Governance and listing 
requirements, especially since the economic crisis, may be the reason why 
governance characteristics have lost their explanatory power. The finding also 
indicates a positive relationship between audit and non-audit services pre and 
post economic crisis. Detailed analysis shows that non-audit services supplied 
pursuant to legislation, taxation and other non-audit services have a significant 
positive relationship with audit fees. Therefore, it provides evidence to reject the 
notion of a total prohibition of non-audit services, as the provision of non-audit 
services does not seem to affect auditor independence.  
Being comprehensive in its scope and methods employed to measure these 
characteristics, this study offers a major contribution to the understanding of the 
association between various governance characteristics and financial reporting 
quality in two economic environments; before and after economic crisis. 
Another major contribution is that this study is the first to utilise published data 
in investigating the impact of individual components of non-audit services on 
audit pricing as this published information only became available in 2006.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Audit Pricing and Corporate Governance 
In the wake of numerous corporate scandals and collapses (e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom and Lehman Brothers in the US and Northern Rock and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland in the UK), interest in the quality of corporate governance has 
increased dramatically. As part of this concern the attention of corporate 
stakeholders has increasingly focused on the quality of financial disclosures, a 
key component of which is the statutory audit and, consequently, audit pricing. 
A survey involving 40 Fortune 500 companies indicated that in 2004, the audit 
fees charged by the big four accounting firms had increased significantly and 
that much of this increase in fees was attributed to the additional work mandated 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Taub, 2005). Another study by Griffin and Lont 
(2007) also documents a significant positive relationship between residual audit 
fees following the introduction of the SOX and proxies for incremental audit risk 
and audit effort. In New Zealand, new regulation, effective from 1st July 2012, 
requires individual audit partners to be licensed and audit firms to be registered. 
According to Hay (2012), this requirement will increase average audit fees as 
bad auditors who are not qualified will drop out of the system and audit quality 
will rise as part of the same process. As a result of such regulation auditing firms 
are increasingly under pressure to deliver a high standard of auditing, while also 
doing so in the most efficient and effective way. 
Companies, on the other hand, could minimise the cost of auditing by enhancing 
their internal control systems. Traditional arguments have suggested that an 
effective and reliable internal control system could go some way to reducing the 
amount of testing and investigation needed by auditors and therefore could 
reduce the costs of auditing (Collier and Gregory, 1996). However, higher 
standards of internal governance could also mean a higher degree of 
commitment towards the welfare of shareholders and this could lead to the 
purchase of higher quality audit services since a higher quality audit means a 
higher level of verification of accounting records and assurance of transparency 
2 
 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). The possibility that higher standards of internal governance 
may actually have either a positive or negative impact on audit fees raises an 
important empirical question deserving of research attention.  In other words, 
how do companies’ governance characteristics influence the pricing of audit 
contracts?   
There are a number of components of internal governance that could constitute 
good internal control in a company.  The composition of the board of directors 
has long been viewed as a key organ of governance in shareholder-owned 
companies.  More specifically, governance regulators consistently assert that 
appropriately led and independent boards are a pre-requisite for good 
governance (Cadbury, 1992; Combined Code, 1999; 2003; 2006; 2008; UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010).  More recently, regulators have focused on 
the existence and specific characteristics of audit committees in seeking to 
enhance the quality of the external audit process.  In particular, current 
governance regulation, both in the UK and in the US, stresses the importance of 
independent, effective and diligent audit committees for enhancing the quality 
and transparency of corporate financial disclosure (e.g. The Combined Code 
(2006), Smith Guidance (2003), Turnbull Guidance (2005) in the UK and 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the US)  In addition to board and audit committee 
characteristics, the nature of a company’s ownership structure may influence the 
extent of the audit undertaken and, consequently, the fee charged.  In particular, 
companies whose managers possess significant ownership stakes may not have 
so much need for extensive audits while companies with significant external 
blockholder ownership may also require a less extensive audit since large 
blockholders are more likely to be able to more directly monitor managerial 
behaviour (Chan et al., 1993; O’Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; 
Mitra et al., 2007).  The statutory audit is a monitoring mechanism available to 
shareholders in addition to the internal governance mechanisms mentioned 
above. An understanding of the relationship between internal governance 
characteristics and the statutory audit is valuable since these two mechanisms 
can complement each other in achieving better corporate governance.  The 
objective of this thesis is to achieve such an understanding. 
3 
 
1.2  Motivation for the Study  
Following the increase in concern regarding corporate governance and the 
contribution of external auditors to ensuring the transparency of financial 
statements, understanding the relationship between relevant governance 
characteristics and audit quality, typically proxied by audit fees, is becoming 
more relevant. However, there are not many studies done in the UK 
investigating the relationship between governance characteristics and audit 
pricing. Most of the previous UK studies use data from the 1990s, especially 
around the release of the Cadbury Report in 1992. For example, O’Sullivan 
(1999) investigates the impact of board and audit committee characteristics on 
audit pricing, using data from 146 large UK listed companies at the end of the 
1995 financial year. This study, therefore, utilises data from the post-Cadbury 
period. The Cadbury report outlined a number of recommendations around the 
separation of the role of chief executive and chairman in an organisation, greater 
use of non-executive directors, clearer selection processes for non-executive 
directors, greater transparency of financial reporting, and the need for improved 
internal controls. O’Sullivan (1999) found no evidence that board and audit 
committee characteristics influence auditors’ pricing decisions. The author 
suggests that any fee reductions expected due to improved board monitoring 
may be counterbalanced by the increase in audit effort and assurances desired by 
non-executive directors. In a subsequent study, O’Sullivan (2000) investigates 
the impact of board and ownership structure on audit fees in the pre-Cadbury 
period, utilising data from 402 quoted companies in 1992. In contrast to the 
result of his post-Cadbury study, it is found that the proportion of non-executive 
directors has a significant positive impact on audit fees while audit fees are 
negatively related to the proportion of equity owned by executive directors. 
However, the results of another pre-Cadbury study of the impact of board 
composition variables on audit pricing, by  Peel and Clatworthy (2001), shows 
that a range of board composition variables were insignificantly related to audit 
fees. 
In response to the controversial failure of Enron in 2002 in the US, UK 
regulators established the Smith Committee in 2003. There have been significant 
changes to UK corporate governance following the recommendations of the 
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Smith Report (2003), especially with regard to recommendations concerning 
audit committee effectiveness. The recommendations include: all audit 
committee members should be independent directors, at least one of whom 
should have recent and relevant financial experience; the audit committee should 
have primary responsibility for all aspects of the company’s relationship with the 
external auditors; the committee should make an annual report to shareholders, 
to include an explanation as to how the auditor’s objectivity and independence is 
maintained in cases where the auditor is also employed to provide non-audit 
services to the company. In addition, the report (Smith Report, 2003) also 
recommended that audit committees should have at least three members (two in 
the case of smaller companies); members should not serve for more than two 
three-year terms; and there should be a minimum of three meetings per year. 
Subsequent revisions of the Combined Code in 2006 and 2008 as well as the UK 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010 and 2012 have basically carried forward 
the existing recommendations for audit committees as recommended by the 
Smith Report (2003). 
Two other recent studies have investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees in the UK. The first study, by Zaman et al. (2011), 
examines the influence of audit committee effectiveness, a proxy for governance 
quality, on audit and non-audit fees, using a new composite measure comprising 
audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and size. However, the study 
only involves a sample of companies listed on the FTSE 350. Utilising Data 
from 135 companies (540 company year observations) between the years 2001-
2004, they found enough evidence to conclude that audit committee 
effectiveness (ACE) has a significant and positive impact on audit fees after 
controlling for board characteristics. As the Smith Report was only published in 
2003, Zaman et al. (2011) do not really capture the effect of governance change 
following the recommendations of the Smith Report (2003), especially with 
regard to audit committee characteristics. In another UK study, Adelopo et al. 
(2012) examine the impact of ownership structure on audit pricing using the 
number of Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS) for 209 listed companies on 
FTSE 350 in 2005 and 2006. Although Adelopo et al. (2012) use a bigger 
sample size than Zaman et al. (2011) and focus on a period after the introduction 
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of the Smith (2003) induced reforms, the study focuses only on the impact of 
ownership structure particularly Multiple Large Shareholders and audit 
committee activity on auditor remuneration. Adelopo et al. (2012) found that the 
majority of listed firms in the UK have multiple large shareholders and their 
one-way ANOVA result showed that there are statistically significant 
differences in the audit fees, firm size and audit committee activities of the firms 
under study when they are categorised into “widely held”, “concentrated” and 
“highly concentrated” firms. 
 
Many studies in the US have studied the relationship between governance 
characteristics and audit pricing.  For example, Carcello et al. (2002) based their 
study of audit pricing and board characteristics on data from 1992-1993;  Abbott 
et al. (2003) focused on the impact of audit committee characteristics and non-
audit fees on audit pricing using data from 2001; Lee and Mande (2005) focused 
on audit committees using 2000 data; Mitra et al. (2007) focused on ownership 
and audit pricing using 2000 data;  Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) focused on 
audit fees using 2001-2003 data; Ittonen et al. (2008) focused on audit 
committees and used 2006 data; Abbott et al. (2009)  focused on audit 
committees and non-audit fees using 2001 data while Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) focused on audit committees using 2000-2002 data.  
Although there are similarities between the US and UK markets, there are also 
important differences, especially with regard to the regulatory framework in 
respect of auditing and governance. Past studies (e.g. Beekes and Brown, 2006; 
Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Conyon, 2000; and Doidge et al., 2007) highlighted 
that there are indeed differences between the US, Australia and the UK 
environment in terms of corporate governance. The key difference between UK 
and US corporate governance practice is their focus on corporate governance. 
This is highlighted by Ethiopis Tafara, Director at the Office of International 
Affairs of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in his speech delivered 
at the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London, United 
Kingdom, on January 9, 2007. 
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“The US corporate governance system is commonly held out as the 
exemplar of the ‘regulator-led’ approach to corporate governance, in 
which the SEC and the exchanges are responsible for implementing and 
enforcing good corporate governance standards. By contrast, in the UK 
shareholders are given the autonomy and the authority to decide what 
corporate governance measures are necessary and appropriate to protect 
their interests.” 
This means that as compared to US corporate governance, which is more 
legislative in nature, UK corporate governance is based on self-regulation. UK 
listed companies are encouraged to comply with the recommendations of the 
Combined Code, but are also at liberty not to do so provided appropriate 
explanation is provided in the annual report (Gafran and O’Sullivan, 2013). Due 
to this fact, there will be more variations in governance practice in the UK as 
listed companies have more freedom to choose any governance practice as long 
as in their opinion it will be beneficial to the company and the shareholders. This 
is supported by Zaman et al. (2011) who suggest that there is greater variation in 
board composition in the UK than in the US, while Peasnell et al. (2005) point 
out that audit committees are not mandatory in the UK. Collier and Zaman 
(2005) also document significant differences in national requirements and 
recommendations relating to audit committees for the two countries. This 
variation in the UK allows the researcher to capture more meaningfully the 
relationship between governance characteristics, especially the board of 
directors, audit committee and ownership structure, with the external governance 
mechanism, namely the auditor, than in studies on the US, where  there is strict 
regulation. This is supported by Aguilera et al. (2006), who suggest that results 
from US studies may not be totally applicable to a different setting such as the 
UK.  
Recent corporate scandals and failures have also increased concern about the 
independence of auditors providing non-audit services to their audit clients. As a 
result, the issues of independence in appearance and independence in fact are 
subject to increased discussion and investigation (e.g. Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; 
Lim and Tan, 2008; Krishnan et al., 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). The provision 
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of non-audit services may tarnish the independence of the auditor in terms of 
giving judgments on whether the financial statements are a true and fair view 
and in disclosing any risk or possible going concern issues. In addressing these 
independence issues many parties have suggested total prohibition of provision 
of non-audit services by auditors to their audit clients. As a result of this 
concern, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) has issued consultation on this 
matter, surveying the opinions of many parties.  In response to this, the 
accounting profession has formed a working group to investigate and discuss 
this matter and has come up with many suggestions to improve the independence 
of the auditor, including improvements in the way non-audit fees are disclosed in 
financial statements. The shareholders of FTSE 100 companies in the UK, for 
example, are reported to oppose a total ban on non-audit services and believe 
that total prohibition will in fact have a negative impact on company 
performance (Christodoulou, 2010).  
At European level, the European Commission launched its Green Paper on audit 
policy (European Commission, 2010) and raised the question whether the role of 
auditors can be enhanced to mitigate any future financial risk. Following this 
discussion, on 30 November 2011 the European Commission presented its 
proposals regarding the statutory audit of public-interest entities (European 
Commission, 2011). A maximum term of audit engagement of six years, which 
can be extended to nine if joint audits are performed, and a prohibition against 
providing non-audit services to audit clients are key elements of the proposals. 
Quick (2012) concludes that the provision of non-audit services might affect 
independence in appearance negatively; however, a total ban would not be 
necessary. In addition, he suggests that limiting the proportion of fees an audit 
firm can receive from a single client as well as a cap on non-audit fees seem to 
be desirable. So, the relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees to find 
out whether the provision of non-audit fees actually has a negative relationship 
with audit fees is a really interesting area for investigation. It is also suggested 
by the working group (Working Group on Provision of Non-audit Services by 
Audit Firms to Listed Audit Clients, 2010) that the way non-audit fees are 
presented in financial statements invites unnecessary criticism as some 
compulsory audits are treated as non-audit services (ICAS, 2010). The new 
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disclosure requirements introduced by the Companies (Disclosure of Auditor 
Remuneration and Liability Agreements) Regulations 2005, later superseded by 
the Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) 
Regulations 2008, require companies to disclose details of audit fees paid to the 
auditor. With this detailed disclosure, further investigation to find individual 
relationships between audit fees and specific components of non-audit fees will 
be possible. 
Furthermore, since this study commenced, the world economy has undergone an 
unprecedented economic crisis (Rose and Spiegel, 2009). A recent report (Bank 
of England, 2009) indicates that the economic crisis started in 2008 in UK and a 
slow recovery started in 2009. It is reported that UK real GDP fell by 5.5% 
between 2008 quarter 1 and 2009 quarter 2 (Bank of England, 2009). From early 
2010 world economic recovery stabilised, the situation on the global financial 
markets calmed down and crisis measures started to be withdrawn (Berg, 2012).  
A recent study (D.H. Erkens et al., 2012) shows that corporate governance had 
an effect on financial firms during the economic crisis. The result of the study 
shows that firms with more independent boards and greater institutional 
ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Based on 
agency theory, management will increase earnings management in order to 
convey a better picture of the company during a crisis period so that they get 
better rewards. Therefore, the audit risk during this period would increase, hence 
affecting the audit scope and the audit fees charged by the auditor. On the other 
hand, with the economic crisis highlighting the weaknesses of corporate 
governance, the regulator requires the company to increase the effectiveness of 
their internal governance characteristics for survival of the business. These new 
requirements will strengthen internal control of the business and therefore 
reduce audit risk and consequently reduce the audit fees charged by the auditors 
to their audit clients. It was therefore decided that the scope of the study should 
be extended to capture data post-crisis, that is, to the year 2010, so as to 
investigate whether the financial crisis has had an impact on the nature and 
extent of the internal governance-audit fee relationship.  
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1.3  Research Objectives 
To address the gap that exists in prior literature on audit pricing and governance 
characteristics, the aim of this study is to investigate the impact of companies’ 
internal governance characteristics and auditor independence on audit quality, 
proxied by the audit fees paid by listed companies in the United Kingdom. At 
the end of the research, the following research objectives should have been 
achieved:  
1) Analyse the impact of an effective board of directors on audit fees. 
2) Analyse the impact of an effective audit committee on audit fees. 
3) Analyse the impact of ownership structure on audit fees. 
4)  Establish the relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees. 
5) Analyse the impact of economic crisis on the relationship between 
governance characteristics and audit fees. 
6) Analyse the impact of economic crisis on the relationship between non-
audit and audit fees. 
These research objectives will be expressed as hypotheses which will be tested 
with secondary data collected and analysed appropriately in chapter 6. 
1.4 Contribution of the Study 
This study extends and contributes to prior literature in a number of ways. First, 
this study incorporates more corporate governance characteristics as compared 
to previous studies. Therefore it contributes to the body of knowledge by 
providing a detailed examination of the association between a comprehensive 
range of corporate governance characteristics and audit fees. This study includes 
details of board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ownership 
structure. To investigate the relationship between audit fees and board 
characteristics, variables are used to measure board size, board independence 
(measured by CEO duality, percentage of non-executive directors and 
percentage of independent non-executive directors) and board activity (measured 
by number of board meetings). For Audit committee characteristics, this study 
includes audit committee size, audit committee activity (measured by number of 
audit committee meetings), audit committee commitment (measured by 
10 
 
weighted average attendance of audit committee members), audit committee 
independence (measured by percentage of independent non-executive directors 
on audit committee), audit committee expertise (measured by percentage of audit 
committee with financial expertise, percentage of audit committee with 
accounting expertise and percentage of audit committee with supervisory 
expertise) and also a composite variable measuring audit committee 
effectiveness, calculated using earlier variables. For ownership structure, the 
percentage of block ownership, number of blockholders, percentage of executive 
share ownership and percentage of non-executive share ownership are used to 
measure ownership. Most of the prior studies in the UK (e.g. O’Sullivan, 1999; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Peel and Clatworthy, 2001) used data from the 1990s to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
audit fees. Even though these studies took governance characteristics into 
account, in particular board characteristics, none of them included details on 
audit committee characteristics.  Later, Zaman et al. (2011) and Adelopo et al. 
(2012) investigated the relationship between governance characteristics and 
audit fees. However, neither of these studies included details of both board and 
audit committee characteristics. Zaman et al. (2011) focused solely on the 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and audit fees, using a new 
composite comprising audit committee independence, expertise, diligence and 
size, while Adelopo et al. (2012) focused more on the ownership structure, 
especially Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS) and audit fees. 
The second contribution of the study is the inclusion of smaller companies, 
which were ignored in previous studies. The final sample of this study is made 
up of 384 companies listed on FTSE all shares, including FTSE small capital. 
Therefore, this research uses a bigger sample than previous studies, hence 
increasing the generalisability of the results. Zaman et al. (2011), for example, 
only utilised data on 135 companies from the FTSE 350, while Adelopo et al. 
(2012) used data from 209 companies, also from the FTSE 350.  
Third, this study investigates the relationship between audit fees and the 
individual components of non-audit fees, which was previously not possible 
using published data. There are new requirements (The Companies (Disclosure 
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of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) Regulations 2005) for 
companies to disclose details of the audit and non-audit fees paid to the auditor. 
Because of these new requirements, information is available on the amount of 
non-audit fees purchased from the incumbent auditor in specified categories.  As 
a result, the study investigates which components of non-audit fees contribute, 
positively or negatively, to the relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
fees. This could shed some light on whether the provision of non-audit fees 
really affects the independence of the auditor. The independence of the auditor 
normally relates to the provision of management advice to their audit client and 
not the provision of essential accounting services that enable listed companies to 
comply with legal and regulatory requirements. Beattie et al. (1996) concluded 
that the profession is inviting unnecessary criticism by bundling essential 
compliances services with a limited amount of consultancy work into a single 
disclosure figure and it would be advantageous to show a split figure. As these 
regulations came into force immediately: for financial years beginning on or 
after 1
st
 October 2005, the use of 2007 data will provide reliable information 
with which to investigate the relationship between audit fees and specific types 
of non-audit services.  
Fourth, unlike almost all prior studies, this study includes financial institutions.  
It will therefore offer additional insights on a company sector which has been 
under severe governance scrutiny following the collapse of many banking and 
financial institutions during the recent financial crisis in the UK.  It will also 
allow me to obtain further insights on the impact of the increased regulation of 
companies on the governance-audit pricing relationship. Finance companies 
(excluding investment companies) represent 18.7% of the sample firms.  
The fifth contribution of this study is that in addition to 2007 data, 2010 data 
representing the post-financial crisis period is included.  This allows an 
interesting investigation of the impact of the financial crisis on the relationship 
between internal governance characteristics and audit fees. A comparative 
analysis between 2007 (pre-economic crisis) and 2010 (post-economic crisis) 
should reveal whether the relationship between corporate governance and audit 
quality is stronger in the post than pre-economic crisis period or vice versa. This 
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also could increase understanding on corporate governance and how it is applied 
in different economic environments.  
Finally, this study explores in detail the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and audit fees as well as the relationship between 
non-audit fees and audit fees. Therefore, this study also contributes to 
understanding issues of auditor independence and corporate governance 
effectiveness in the UK, especially following current discussions among the 
public policy and regulatory bodies surrounding these two issues. 
1.5  Structure of Study 
This chapter has discussed the motivation and background of the study as well as 
identifying how the study will contribute to existing academic knowledge in the 
area.  Chapter two discusses the regulation of corporate governance and auditing 
in the UK, including the development of corporate governance regulation in the 
UK since the Cadbury report. Chapter three provides a comprehensive review of 
prior research in the field of audit pricing and corporate governance. At the end 
of the discussion, a table is presented to summarise the key studies since 1990. 
This is followed by discussion in Chapter four of the theoretical underpinning of 
the study and hypotheses development. There is also discussion on control 
variables used in the study which are normally included in other audit pricing 
studies. Chapter five outlines the research methodology adopted in this study 
and develops a number of testable hypotheses. First, the research methods are 
described and justified.  This includes explanation of the rationale and 
importance of the selected sample and details of how it differs from samples 
used in previous UK studies.  Chapter six presents and discusses the empirical 
results. It starts with descriptive statistics and correlation analysis for the 
variables concerned and then presents the multivariate results, with a discussion 
of the findings in the context of the hypotheses outlined in chapter three.  
Chapter seven presents a summary of this research study and draws conclusions 
and implications. This chapter also highlights the study's potential limitations 
and provides recommendations both for practitioners and policy-makers as well 
as suggesting avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: Corporate Governance and Auditing in the UK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to give background on UK Corporate 
Governance and auditing. The chapter first provides a definition of corporate 
governance, followed by background on corporate governance and auditing in 
the UK. The UK corporate governance approach which is more a principle-
based or “comply or explain” approach and the advantages of the approach are 
also discussed. Then, the development of corporate governance and auditing in 
the UK is highlighted, from the setting up of the Cadbury Committee in 1992 to 
the latest developments. Finally, the research gap due to these developments is 
identified. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Discussion of Corporate Governance has become more frequent due to the 
increase in high profile corporate failures involving the alleged misbehaviour of 
management in carrying out their agency duties in managing the business. 
Despite the widespread use of the term, corporate governance has no generally 
accepted definition (Rezaee, 2009). The reason for this is that the term is widely 
used across many disciplines, such as management, law, behavioural sciences 
and humanities (Adelopo and Jallow, 2010). Both the private and public sector 
are concerned about the quality of corporate governance. However, regulators 
tend to narrow down the definition, especially in an economic context, by 
referring to corporate governance as an entire system of controls, financial and 
otherwise, which ensure that a firm is directed in the right way and towards the 
right direction (Cadbury, 1992).  Despite the diverse definitions and meanings 
attributed to the term, the importance of corporate governance is an undeniable 
fact.  
Narrowing the focus of governance down to shareholder-owned corporations, it 
is generally accepted that two types of governance mechanisms are available in 
seeking to ensure that managers pursue shareholders’ objectives in their 
administration of companies – internal governance and external governance. 
First, external control mechanisms include the regulatory framework, which has 
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produced many important corporate governance reports, such as the Cadbury 
Report (1992), the Hampel Report (1998), the Higgs Report (2003), the Smith 
Report (2003) and the Walker Report (2010).  The second external governance 
mechanism is the market for corporate control – in other words, poorly 
performing companies face increased likelihood of being taken over by another 
company.  The third external control mechanism is the existence of the 
managerial labour market, which focuses on such issues as retention, removal 
and also management image related to poor performance. Another important 
external governance mechanism available to the shareholders is the external 
audit.  In addition, a number of internal governance mechanisms also seek to 
strengthen the quality of corporate governance. These include ownership 
structure, the board of directors, audit committees and companies’ internal audit 
function. This study will focus more on the relationship between internal 
governance and monitoring mechanisms as the combination of strong internal 
mechanisms with effective monitoring mechanisms constitutes strong overall 
governance.  
2.2.1 Corporate Governance and Auditing in the UK  
Good corporate governance is very important as high quality corporate 
governance helps to underpin long-term company performance. The Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) claims that the UK has some of the highest standards 
of corporate governance in the world, which makes the UK market attractive to 
new investment (FRC 2010). The UK Approach to Corporate Governance 
(2010) points out that the key aspect of corporate governance in the UK is that a   
single board is collectively responsible for the sustainable success of the 
company, which means that checks and balances are needed. These checks and 
balances include the separation of Chairman and Chief Executive positions, 
balance of executive and independent non-executive directors, strong 
independent audit and remuneration committees, and finally, an annual 
evaluation by the board of its performance. It is very important to ensure that 
systems of appointment and remuneration are transparent. Besides that, there 
should be effective rights for shareholders, who should be encouraged to engage 
with the companies in which they invest. In addition, the external auditor will act 
as a complementary safeguard for the company. The auditor will act as a public 
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watchdog to ensure that the financial statements prepared by management are 
free of material misstatement and errors. The financial statements prepared by 
the management will be audited by the external auditor to assess whether 
relevant accounting methods and procedures have been followed and whether 
the company account is a true and fair view. 
In contrast to the rule-based corporate governance practice in the US, the UK 
approach to corporate governance is more principle based, which could help the 
UK remain competitive in the global market. This fact was highlighted by the Rt 
Hon Nick Anstee, Lord Mayor of the City of London, in 2010, in his foreward to 
the UK Approach to Corporate Governance report (2010). The Mayor wrote: 
 “The UK’s system of business regulation, which is principles rather than rules 
based, also reduces the cost to global businesses of introducing procedures to 
comply with detailed regulations, many of which unnecessarily constrain 
business practice and innovation. Of course, there continues to be public and 
political pressure for better regulation of the City and this must be accepted and 
acted upon. However, better regulation should be part of the framework for 
economic growth, directed at the next crisis rather than the last. Excessive 
regulation could damage the spirit of innovation that the UK economy needs.” 
Corporate governance in the UK is guided by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, which was first issued in 1992. The series of Codes, published almost 
every two years, has been instrumental in spreading best practice among listed 
companies in the UK. The Combined Codes set out good practice covering 
issues such as board composition and effectiveness, the role of board 
committees, risk management, remuneration and relations with the shareholders. 
Corporate governance in the UK is based on the “comply or explain” principle 
and this is different from the rule-based corporate governance practices in the 
US. Practically all listed companies are required under the UK Listing Rules 
either to comply with the provisions of the Code or explain to investors in their 
next annual report why they have not done so. The shareholders also could play 
a role in monitoring the company’s direction. If shareholders are not satisfied 
with the non-compliance and the explanation given by the company, they can 
use their powers, including the power to appoint and remove directors, to hold 
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the company to account. To complement the Combined Codes and enhance the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in UK, the Stewardship Code was 
introduced in 2010. Investors are encouraged to sign up to the Stewardship 
Code, which sets standards for their monitoring of and engaging with the 
companies in which they invest. 
There are a number of advantages to this “comply or explain” approach. First, its 
inherent flexibility means that it is possible to set more demanding standards 
than can be done through hard rules. Experience has shown that the vast 
majority of companies set such standards as part of good corporate governance 
in maintaining the company’s survival (FRC, 2010). This is proved by a report 
by Governance Metrics International in September 2009 that the UK ranked 
second in a table showing average governance performance by companies in 
different countries (FRC 2010).   
Second, it is proportionate and capable of dealing with a wide variety of 
circumstances. This means that there is a relative lack of prescription as to how a 
company’s board organises itself and exercises its responsibilities; however, 
companies are provided with some guidance to manage their corporate 
governance. The UK Corporate Governance Codes identifies good governance 
practices but companies can choose to adopt a different approach if that is more 
appropriate to their circumstances. This flexibility encourages the spirit of 
innovation which is needed by the UK economy to grow and compete in the 
global market. 
Third, any non-compliance with recommendations in the Codes will be reported 
in the annual report. This shows that the key relationship is between the 
company and its shareholders, not between the company and the securities 
regulator or stock exchange. In other words, the decision on whether a 
company's governance is adequate is taken by those in whose interest the board 
is meant to act (FRC 2010). This is because the shareholders have voting rights 
and rights to information, set out in company law and the Listing Rules, which 
enable them to hold the board to account. In addition, boards and shareholders 
are encouraged to engage in dialogue on corporate governance matters to ensure 
high quality corporate governance will be in place that could benefit everyone. 
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The Financial Reporting Council highlighted certain reasons why this approach 
is chosen by the UK. First, a regulatory framework that aims to improve 
standards of corporate governance is more likely to succeed if it recognises that 
governance should support, not constrain, entrepreneurial leadership of the 
company, while ensuring risk is properly managed. Thus a degree of flexibility 
in the way companies adopt and adapt governance practices is required. This is 
because effective corporate governance should be implemented in a way that fits 
the culture and organisation of the individual company. This can vary 
enormously from company to company, depending on factors such as size, 
ownership structure and the complexity of its activities. In addition, it is 
important that boards see good governance as a means to improve their 
performance, not just as a compliance exercise. This could motivate a healthy 
culture towards success and survival of the business.  
Finally, the FRC highlighted that an assessment of whether the company’s 
governance practices are effective in underpinning the sustainable success of the 
company should be made by the intended beneficiaries - i.e. the shareholders. 
This is important as well-informed and engaged investors are able to take a 
pragmatic approach about how to apply best practice in a way that is in the best 
long-term interests of the company. To ensure that the investors have the 
information they need to make that assessment, companies are required to 
disclose in their annual report any non-compliance with best practice together 
with the reasons for non-compliance.  
To ensure the relevance of the codes, they are revised and updated every two 
years. Any changes are subject to extensive consultation and dialogue with the 
market (FRC 2013). The most recent editions of the Codes were published in 
September 2012. In addition to the UK Corporate Governance Code, the FRC 
also publishes a series of guidance notes intended to assist companies in 
addressing specific aspects of governance and accountability. They cover board 
effectiveness, risk management and internal control, the role of audit 
committees, and assessing and reporting on whether the business is a going 
concern. 
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2.2.2 Development of Corporate Governance and Auditing in the UK  
Initial corporate governance developments in the UK began in the early 1990s in 
the wake of corporate scandals such as Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell. 
Financial reporting irregularities led to the establishment of the Committee on 
the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, led by Sir Adrian Cadbury and 
subsequently the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. Following this, a 
number of other governance reports and codes have been produced. This chapter 
will discuss the development of corporate governance in the UK from early 
1990s to the most recent development. It is important to understand and be 
aware of these developments as when pricing their service auditor normally take 
into consideration the corporate governance quality of a company to avoid  or 
reduce audit risk. The compliance to the relevant corporate governance codes by 
companies would reflect good quality corporate governance practice. 
The Cadbury Committee Report (1992)  
The committee was set up as a result of increasing concerns and dissatisfaction 
among public towards corporate misbehaviour. Public confidence in governance 
of the corporations is declining as a result of the top management dominance and 
lack of transparency in the accounting and auditing practices.  
The recommendations of the committee covered various aspects of the 
corporation including the structure and composition of the main board, structure 
and operations of key board standing and ad hoc committees, the role of non-
executive directors and the reporting and control mechanisms in corporate 
entities in the UK. Basically the report covers subjects covering the board 
structure, non-executive directors, executive directors and reporting and 
controls.  
On the topic of structure and composition of the board, the committee 
recommended that the board should meet regularly, retain full and effective 
control over the company and monitor the executive management. There should 
be a balance of power and responsibilities at the top of the company with no 
individual having unfettered powers of decision-making. The roles of the 
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chairman and chief executive of the organisation should be vested in different 
individuals, but with clearly defined roles and responsibilities for each office. 
This is to prevent boardroom tussles and power play by achieving a balance of 
power and compensating controls within the board itself. The board should have 
a set of matters reserved for its attention.  
On the issue of non-executive directors, the committee recommended that they 
should bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance 
and resources. They should form the majority of the membership of the board 
and be independent of the management. They should be appointed for a 
specified term without automatic reappointment. On executive directors, the 
committee recommended that directors’ service contracts should not exceed 
three years without shareholders’ approval and executive director’ pay should be 
subject to the recommendations of a remuneration committee made up wholly or 
mainly of non-executive directors. There should be full and clear disclosure of 
directors’ total emoluments and those of the chairman and highest-paid UK 
director, including pension contributions and stock options. Separate figures 
should be given for salary and performance-related elements and the basis on 
which performance is measured should be explained. On reporting and control, it 
recommended that the board should establish an Audit Committee of at least 
three non-executive directors with written terms of reference that deal clearly 
with its authority and duties.  
The Greenbury Committee (1995)  
The report was issued following public concern and the outcry over excessive 
directors’ remuneration, and huge payments for poor performance and ridiculous 
severance payment packages popularly referred to variously as “golden 
handshakes”, “golden parachutes”, “golden handcuffs” etc. Equally, executive 
share options especially in certain privatised utility companies were becoming 
excessive and questionable. The committee also produced a Code of Best 
Practice which deals with the following issues:  
1. The establishment, membership and status of remuneration 
committees  
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2. The determination of remuneration policy for executive directors and 
other senior executives  
3. The disclosure and approval of the details of remuneration policy and  
4. The length of service contracts and the determination of 
compensation when these are terminated.  
The code of best practice is to be implemented by listed companies but the 
‘comply or explain’ non-compliance mechanism is also applied. With regards to 
the establishment of a remuneration committee, Greenbury suggested that all 
public companies should have a standing remuneration committee comprising of 
wholly non-executive directors with a minimum of three members with clearly 
defined terms of reference. For all aspect of remuneration, full disclosures that 
form part of the information in the financial statements of public companies are 
recommended. This disclosure should include all elements of total level of 
remuneration, disaggregating total remuneration into all its component parts. 
Therefore the annual bonus scheme and long-term incentive schemes including 
executive share options are all to be disclosed for every director in the company. 
Further, the measures of performance which are to be used in the determination 
of the reward packages and the relationship between these rewards and the long 
term objectives of the firm are all to be disclosed.  
The Hampel Report 1998  
The Hampel committee was established in November 1995 by Sir Sydney 
Lipworth, the chairman of the Financial Reporting Council. Hampel Report was 
published in 1998 and it endorses most of the recommendations of the Cadbury 
and Greenbury Reports. The  area of concern includes board structure, the 
separation of the roles of the chairman from the chief executive, board balance 
and the role of the non-executive directors on the board. The role of institutional 
investors in governance, the relationship with shareholders and the role of 
auditors in Corporate Governance also highlighted in the report. The committee 
believes that stakeholders’ interests should be protected but not at the expense 
and survival of the business (BBC News, 1998).  
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The Turnbull Report (1999)  
The Turnbull Committee was set up by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales to provide guidelines on the implementation of the internal 
control requirements of the Combined Code 1998. The Turnbull Report (1999) 
focused on three main provisions of the Combined Code concerning  a sound 
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investments and company 
assets, and the need for the directors to conduct a review of the effectiveness of 
the group’s system of internal control annually and to report to shareholders that 
they have done so. The report asserted the responsibility of the directors in 
respect of internal control and risk management. It emphasised that directors 
need to ascertain that appropriate internal control procedures are in place and 
that they are working. The nature and kind of risks facing the organisation do 
change and directors need to be aware of these and review the procedures in 
place to be certain of their adequacy and relevance in view of the nature of new 
risks confronting the organisation.  
The Higgs Committee Report (2003)  
The Higgs Committee reported on the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors. This is in response to  corporate turbulence especially the the collapse 
of big companies in the USA, Enron and WorldCom. The report supports most 
of the earlier recommendations contained in the Combined Code and made 
additional recommendations such as requesting listed companies to disclose in 
their annual reports the number of meetings of the board and its committees as 
well as the attendance record of the individual directors. It endorsed the 
recommendation that the position of the chief executive and chairman of the 
board should be separated, non-executive directors should meet as a group at 
least once a year without executive directors being present and annual reports 
should indicate that such a meeting had been held. 
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The Smith Committee Report (2003) and Guidance on Audit Committees 
(2010) and (2012) 
Smith Committee Reports (2003) was released around the time Higgs Report is 
made available, in January 2003. The committee reported on five main areas of 
the Audit Committee which cover it’s purpose, membership, relationship with 
the board, roles and responsibilities and communications with shareholders. The 
committee emphasised the important role of the Audit Committee in the bigger 
picture of Corporate Governance as the audit committee which is independent of 
the management could protect shareholders’ interests better.The following 
recommendations to be included in the next Combined Code are proposed; 
a. All audit committee members should be independent directors 
b. At least one of whom should have recent and relevant financial 
experience 
c. The audit committee should have primary responsibility for all aspects of 
the company’s relationship with the external auditors 
d. The committee should make an annual report to shareholders, to include 
an explanation as to how the auditor’s objectivity and independence is 
maintained in cases where the auditor is also employed to provide non-
audit services to the company. 
e. Audit committees should have at least three members (two in the case of 
smaller companies) 
f. Audit committee members should not serve for more than two three-year 
terms, and 
g. There should be a minimum of three meetings per year. (2003). 
Subsequent revisions of the Combined Code in 2006 and 2008 as well as the UK 
Corporate Governance Code in 2010 and 2012 have basically carried forward 
the existing recommendations for audit committees as recommended by the 
Smith Report (2003). The latest revision of the report is known as Guidance on 
Audit Committees (2012). This guidance incorporates additional wording 
intended to help the implemention of the recommendations of the Sharman 
Inquiry on going concern.  
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The Combined Code (2003), (2006) and (2008) and UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010 and (2012) 
Since its first edition in 1998, the Combined Code has been updated on a regular 
basis in line with developments in the corporate environment and changes in the 
global Corporate Governance guidelines that are deemed necessary in the 
context of the UK. The “Comply or Explain” approach is still applied. The new 
editions of the Combined Codes normally come with some amendments to the 
previous ones. For example, the Combined Codes 2003 replaces the Combined 
Code issued by the Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance in June 1998. 
It derives from a review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors 
by Derek Higgs (Higgs, 2003) and a review of audit committees by a group led 
by Sir Robert Smith (Smith, 2003). The new Code calls for the following 
changes:  
a. A separation of the roles of the Chairman and Chief Executive. The 
Chairman should satisfy the criteria for independence on appointment, 
but should not, thereafter, be considered independent when assessing the 
balance of board membership; 
b. A Board of at least half independent NEDs. The Code defines 
independence as recommended by the Higgs Report;  
c. Candidates for Board selection to be drawn from a wider pool;  
d. The Board, its committees and directors to be subject to an annual 
performance review;  
e. At least one member of the audit committee to have recent and relevant 
financial experience; and  
f. In contrast to the Higgs Report, the revised Code permits the Chairman 
to chair the nominations committee, except where the committee is 
considering the appointment of the chairman’s successor.  
 
Two major changes is introduced in the Combined Code (2008) as compared to 
Combined Code (2006). Firstly, it removes the restriction on an individual 
chairing more than one FTSE 100 company. Secondly, for listed companies 
outside the FTSE 350, it allows the company chairman to sit on the Audit 
Committee where he or she was considered independent on appointment 
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(Combined Code, 2008). The UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the 
Combined Code) was updated in June 2010 following an extensive review 
carried out by the FRC in parallel with Sir David Walker’s review of corporate 
governance in the financial sector. Among the changes as compared to the 
Combined Codes 2008 are: 
a. To encourage boards to be well balanced and avoid “group think”, there 
are new principles on the composition and selection of the board, 
including the need to appoint members on merit, against objective 
criteria, and with due regard for the benefits of diversity, including 
gender diversity.  
b. To promote proper debate in the boardroom, there are new principles on 
the leadership of the chairman, the responsibility of the nonexecutive 
directors to provide constructive challenge, and the time commitment 
expected of all directors.  
c. To help enhance the board’s performance and awareness of its strengths 
and weaknesses, the chairman should hold regular development reviews 
with each director and board evaluation reviews in FTSE 350 companies 
should be externally facilitated at least every three years.  
d. To increase accountability to shareholders, all directors of FTSE 350 
companies should be re-elected annually and chairmen are encouraged to 
report personally on how the principles relating to the leadership and 
effectiveness of the board have been applied.  
e. To improve risk management, the company‘s business model should be 
explained and the board should be responsible for determining the nature 
and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take.  
f. Performance-related pay should be aligned to the long-term interests of 
the company and its risk policies and systems.  
It is also reported that Implementation of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
by listed companies has generally been good. FRC reports high rates of 
compliance with most provisions of the Code by companies of all sizes. There 
has been an encouraging response to the changes made to the Code in 2010 
where eighty percent of FTSE 350 companies put all their directors up for re-
election, while more companies are bringing in external advisers to assist with 
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evaluation of the board’s effectiveness. In addition, many company chairmen 
and committee chairs make a personal statement in the annual report. It is also 
reported that it was clear from a series of meetings with directors and others held 
earlier in the following year that boards are now paying considerable attention to 
understanding and overseeing the main risks facing the business, as required by 
the Code. 
The revised Code (2012) issued in September 2012 followed a consultation 
exercise seeking views on whether to amend the UK Corporate Governance 
Code and the associated Guidance on Audit committees. The main changes to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code included that boards should confirm that 
the annual report and accounts taken as a whole are fair, balanced and 
understandable, that audit committees should report more fully on their 
activities, and that FTSE 350 companies should put the external audit contract 
out to tender at least every ten years. In addition, companies are also required to 
report on their boardroom diversity policies. As with all existing provisions of 
the Code, these additions are subject to the “comply or explain” approach. 
The companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability 
Agreements) Regulations 2005  
Following the corporate scandals of earlier in the decade, including Enron and 
WorldCom, the regulation of auditors in the UK was  reviewed and  one aspect 
of that review was the provision of non-audit services by a company auditor. 
The Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) Regulations 2005 were 
made on 25
 st
 August 2005 after consultation with a range of stakeholders. They 
were laid before parliament on 31
 st
 August 2005 and came into force on 1
st
  
October 2005. Section 4 of the regulations clearly state that the notes to the 
account of a company shall disclose the amount of any remuneration receivable 
for auditing of the accounts and the supply of other services.    
In addition, schedule 2 of the act details out the services to be disclosed in the 
company annual report:  
a. The auditing of accounts of associates of the company pursuant to  
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b. legislation (including that of countries and territories outside Great 
Britain). 
a. Other services supplied pursuant to such legislation. 
b. Other services relating to taxation. 
c. Services relating to information technology. 
d. Internal audit services. 
e. Valuation and actuarial services. 
f. Services relating to litigation. 
g. Services relating to recruitment and remuneration. 
h. Services relating to corporate finance transactions entered into or proposed 
to be entered into by or on behalf of the company or any of its associates. 
i. All other services. 
On 6th of April 2008, the Companies (Disclosure of  Auditor Remuneration and 
Liability Agreements) Regulations 2008 were coming into force. These 
regulations require companies to disclose  in their annual accounts the  amounts 
payable for the services they and their associates have purchased from their 
auditors and their associates. They also require companies to disclose whether 
they have entered into a liability limitation agreement with their auditors, and if 
so, to provide certain information about that agreement. They replace the 
existing Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration) Regulations 2005 (SI 
2005/2417).  
On 1 October 2011 new regulations (Companies (Disclosure of Auditor 
Remuneration) Regulations 2005 ) for how companies report the fees they have 
paid their auditor came into force. To help businesses of all sizes disclose the 
right sums, ICAEW has published detailed guidance. The  companies are legally 
required to disclose the amount of fees they pay auditors, with large companies 
and groups also being required to provide detailed break-downs of the amount of 
money spent on audit and non-audit services. This fact is made clear by Dr Nigel 
Sleigh-Johnson, Head of ICAEW’s Financial Reporting Faculty, who said: 
“All UK companies are legally required to disclose the amount of money 
they have paid their auditor in their annual reports, with large companies 
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also being required to provide a detailed breakdown of the amount paid 
by the type of service bought. 
“The new legislation changes the way non-audit services are classified.. 
As it is not always straightforward to work out which audit firm services 
fall into which categories from the legal text, ICAEW’s Financial 
Reporting Faculty has issued a technical release that provides detailed 
guidance to help UK companies determine how to break down and 
present the information in accordance with the new legal requirements.” 
Detailed explanation on the purpose of the regulation which is to require the 
companies to disclose services (both audit and non-audit services) provided by 
their auditor, and the fees paid for those services, in notes to the company’s 
annual published accounts is provided in the explanatory memorandum of the 
act. The new Schedule is intended to work in parallel with the Ethical Standards 
for Auditors produced by the Auditing Practices Board. The standards require 
auditors to undertake an analysis of threats to their independence (including 
from the provision of non-audit services) and to put in place any necessary 
safeguards in order to reduce those threats to an acceptable level. 
UK Stewardship Code (2010) and Revised in 2012  
The UK Stewardship Code was published in July 2010 with the aim to enhance 
the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help 
improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of 
governance responsibilities. The Code set out good practice on engagement with 
investee companies to which the FRC believes institutional investors should 
aspire and operates on a 'comply or explain' basis. The FSA requires UK 
authorised asset managers to report on whether or not they apply the Code and to 
disclose on their websites how they have applied the Code. Since December 
2010 all UK-authorised Asset Managers are required under the FSA's Conduct 
of Business Rules (FSA, 2010) to produce a statement of commitment to the 
Stewardship Code or explain why it is not appropriate to their business model. 
The FRC sees the UK Stewardship Code as complementary to the UK Corporate 
Governance Code for listed companies. 
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The new Stewardship Code, published in September 2012, has been more 
extensively revised than the UK Corporate Governance Code, although the 
seven principles of the Code are unchanged. The main changes to the 
Stewardship Code include: clarification of the respective responsibilities of asset 
managers and asset owners for stewardship, and for stewardship activities that 
they have chosen to outsource; and clearer reporting requirements, including on 
the policy on stock lending.  
Asset managers are also encouraged to have the processes that support their 
stewardship activities independently verified, to provide greater assurance to 
their clients. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
published in November 2012 a revised edition of the Stewardship Supplement to 
its guidance on assurance reporting (AAF 01/06) to enable assurance to be 
carried out against the revised Code. Table 1.1 on page 29 summarises the 
development of corporate governance since the early 1990s.
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Table 2.1: Development of Corporate Governance in the UK 
Year Reports or Codes Details 
1992 Cadbury Report Outlined a number of recommendations around the separation of the role of 
chief executive and chairman in an organisation, more balance in the 
composition of the board of directors, clearer selection processes for non-
executive directors, greater transparency of financial reporting, and the need for 
good internal controls. 
1995 Greenbury Report Extensive disclosure in Annual Reports on remuneration and recommended the 
establishment of a remuneration committee comprised of non-executive 
directors 
1996 Hampel Report Review of the extent to which the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports had been 
implemented and whether the objectives had been met. 
1998 Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance (1998) 
Covered areas relating to structure and operation of the board, directors’ 
remuneration, accountability and audit, relations with institutional shareholders, 
and the responsibilities of institutional shareholders. Also required companies to 
provide a statement in their Annual Report on how they have applied the Code 
Principle and Code Provisions relating to internal control 
1999 Turnbull Guidance Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code and 
requirement for the board to review the system of internal control and risk 
management. 
2001 Myners Review To consider whether there were factors distorting the investment decision-
making of institutions. It included suggestions for the improvement of 
communication between investors and companies and encouraged institutional 
investors to consider their responsibilities as owners and how they should 
exercise their rights on behalf of beneficiaries. 
2002 Directors’ Remuneration Report 
Regulations 
Increased the amount of information shareholders are given on directors’ 
remuneration, including specific disclosures relating to performance. 
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2003  Higgs Report 
 
 
 
 Smith Report 
 
 
 Tyson Report   
                            
 Revised Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance. 
 The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (requirement for at 
least half of board to be independent NEDs) 
 
 
 Guidance on Audit Committees. Provides guidance on role and 
responsibilities of audit committees and focus on independence of external 
auditors and level of non-audit services provided. 
 
 
 Recruitment and development of non-executive directors  
 
 Changes to the Code following recommendations from Smith Report and 
Tyson Report. 
2005 Internal Control: Revised 
Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code 
Produced by Turnbull Review Group 
 
 
2005 
 
The companies (Disclosure of  
Auditor Remuneration and 
Liability Agreements) 
Regulations 2005- superseded 
by The companies (Disclosure of  
Auditor Remuneration and 
Liability Agreements) 
Regulations 2008 
Requires company to disclose details of the audit and non-audit fees paid to the 
auditor. 
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2006 Revised Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance  
Changes to the remuneration committee, nomination committee and 
institutional shareholders’ right to withhold their votes. 
2008 Revised Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance 
Changes include removal of the restriction in provision on an individual 
chairing more than one FTSE 100 company and to allow the company chairman 
of a smaller company (not FTSE 350) to be a member of, but not chair, the 
audit committee provided that he or she was considered independent on 
appointment. 
 
2009 Financial Reporting Council’s 
guidance entitled ‘Going 
concern and liquidity risk: 
Guidance for directors of UK 
companies 2009 
Guidance on going concern for directors of UK companies to assist them with 
their assessment of going concern and in evaluating the nature and extent of 
disclosures. 
2009 Walker Review Number of recommendations incorporated into the renamed 2010 UK corporate 
Governance Code 
2010 Revised Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance now 
called the UK Corporate 
Governance Code 2010 
 
 
 
Proposed new additions to those main principles include: 
 The chairman will be responsible for leadership of the board and for 
ensuring its effectiveness. 
 A ‘fit for purpose’ obligation on the composition of boards to enable them to 
discharge duties and responsibilities effectively. 
 An obligation on non-executive directors to constructively challenge and 
help develop proposals on strategy. 
 Requirement for Directors to allocate sufficient time to perform their 
responsibilities effectively. 
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UK Stewardship Code (2010)  
 
Aimed to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and 
companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient 
exercise of governance responsibilities. The Code set out good practice on 
engagement with investee companies. 
2011 FRC’s Guidance on Board 
Effectiveness 
Provide guidance on section A and B of the Code around leadership and board 
effectiveness. 
2012 Revisions to the Corporate 
Governance Code and Guidance 
on Audit Committees 
Seeks views on changes to the UK Corporate Governance Code and to the 
accompanying Guidance on Audit Committees (“the Guidance”). Consultation 
on changes to the Stewardship Code. 
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2.2.3 The Impact of  Governance and Non-Audit Development on Audit Pricing  
The Cadbury Report (1992) was issued in response to UK governance failures such 
as Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell. The Cadbury Report outlined a number of 
recommendations around the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman 
in an organisation, more balance in the composition of the board of directors, clearer 
selection processes for non-executive directors, greater transparency of financial 
reporting, and the need for good internal controls. The Cadbury Report inspired 
researchers to study the relationship between audit pricing and corporate 
governance in more detail. Prior to the Cadbury period, most of the audit pricing 
studies investigated the relationship between audit fees and the presence of the 
board or audit committee. Using 1989-1991 data from 315 FTSE companies in the 
UK, Collier and  Gregory (1996) investigated the relationship between audit fees 
and the presence of audit committee. They found that the relationship between size-
related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee is positive and significant. 
Utilising data from the pre-Cadbury period, O’Sullivan (2000) investigated the 
impact of board characteristics on audit fees using data from 402 quoted companies 
in 1992. The finding was that the proportion of non-executive directors has a 
significant positive impact on audit fees. The author suggests that non-executive 
directors encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their own monitoring 
role. The same author was also interested in the relationship between board 
characteristics and audit fees, post-Cadbury period. O’Sullivan (1999) investigated 
the impact of board and audit committee characteristics on audit pricing, using data 
on 146 large UK listed companies at the end of the 1995 financial year. However, as 
compared to the study using pre-Cadbury data, this study found no evidence that 
board characteristics influence auditors’ pricing decisions. The author claims that 
the absence of a relationship between internal governance characteristics and audit 
fees in the study may be due to a number of reasons. First, improved governance 
characteristics are expected to have a dual impact on audit fees: while greater use of 
non-executives and audit committees is expected to indicate stronger internal 
controls and a reduced demand for audit testing, the increased independence of the 
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audit function from the control of senior executives may allow auditors to undertake 
more extensive audits and consequently charge higher fees. Second, as audit users’ 
expectations of non-executives’ monitoring responsibilities increase, non-executive 
directors are expected to transfer some of this responsibility to auditors by requiring 
auditors to undertake more thorough audits. Since the recommendations of Cadbury 
(1992) have been widely adopted by UK listed companies, the variation between 
companies in respect of governance characteristics is likely to be small, therefore 
weakening the power of their empirical tests. O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) 
compared the pricing of audits in 117 UK mutual and proprietary insurance 
companies  (including audit committees and non-audit fees) in 1992. The study 
found that the existence of an audit committee has a positive impact on audit fees 
paid by companies but audit fees are not sensitive to the composition of the audit 
committee.  
In 2003, two reports, namely the Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report (2003), 
as well as a Revision of the UK Combined Code for Corporate Governance (2003), 
were issued, mainly in response to US corporate failures such as Enron, WorldCom 
and Tyco and associated concerns over auditor independence. The infamous Enron 
scandal in 2002 prompted a global shift to re-regulation in the form of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) (2002), which introduced major changes to the US audit, financial 
reporting and corporate governance regimes. As discussed earlier in regard to 
development of corporate governance in UK, unlike the US approach of regulation 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to corporate failure, the UK Combined 
Code for Corporate Governance (2003) sticks with the “Comply or Explain” 
principle. This is to encourage the innovation needed for economic growth and give 
the shareholders, as the real owners of the company, more power than the regulator 
to monitor the company. Additional requirements were introduced, such as at least 
half of the board should be independent non executive directors (NEDs) and annual 
board and director evaluation. To address the issue of auditor independence, the 
Smith Report (2003) provides guidance on the role and responsibilities of audit 
committees in dealing with external auditors. The guidance focuses on the external 
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auditors’ independence and the level of non-audit services provided by them, in 
other words requiring much closer engagement between the audit committee of a 
company and its auditors, thus creating a much more significant role for the audit 
committee in the audit process.  
The developments in this area inspired Zaman et al. (2011) to examine the influence 
of audit committee effectiveness, a proxy for governance quality on audit fees and 
non-audit fees, using a new composite measure comprising audit committee 
independence, expertise, diligence and size. This study involved 135 companies 
listed on FTSE 350 on the London Stock Exchange in 2001-2004. They found 
enough evidence to conclude that audit committee effectiveness (ACE) has 
significant positive impact on audit fees after controlling for board characteristics 
only for larger clients. Their results indicate that effective audit committees 
undertake more monitoring, which results in wider audit scope and higher audit 
fees. Contrary to their expectations, the association between ACE and NASF was 
found to be positive and significant, especially for larger clients. This suggests that 
larger clients are more likely to purchase non-audit services (NAS) even in the 
presence of an effective audit committee, probably due to the complexity of their 
activities.  
On the other hand, post-Enron prohibitions on the provision of certain types of NAS 
led to large reductions in the amount of NAS provided by incumbent auditors 
(Beattie, 2012). Beattie et al. (2009) reported that a study by Deloitte (2009) 
documented a significant reduction in the percentage of NAS provision to audit fees 
provided by auditor to their audit client from 300% in 2001 to 75% in 2008. The 
study concluded that both regulatory changes and voluntary choices made by 
companies seeking to avoid criticism are the reasons for the significant reduction. 
The reason for substantial reduction in NAS is provided by Beattie and Fearnley 
(2009). Using questionaire responses from 446 qualifying UK companies,  Beattie 
and Fearnley (2009) identified four main drivers of the changes to the non-audit 
regime on the decisions of UK listed company finance directors, audit committee 
chairs and audit partners, in 2007. First, enhanced role of the audit committee in 
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developing a policy for NAS purchase, as introduced by the Combined Code (2003) 
and the Smith Report (2003), has made audit committees more conscious of the 
importance of auditor independence and therefore reluctant to buy services from 
their auditor. Second, less visible driver is the risk to the directors of a challenge 
from activist investors and from adverse publicity where the level of NAS appears 
too high or the services disclosed appear inappropriate. Third, the requirement for 
auditors to comply with ES 5 has restricted their ability to provide many services, 
regardless of client need. Fouth, the UK’s audit inspection regime has created an 
environment where breaches of ethical standards or inaccurate reporting of the 
breakdown of NAS are likely to be discovered, providing a further deterrent to NAS 
provision by the auditors. Beattie and Fearnley (2009) concluded that the additional 
restrictions have had an adversely impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
financial reporting and auditing process, as auditors have less knowledge and 
understanding of the business. 
Following concern over auditor independence, on 30 November 2011 the European 
Commission presented its proposals regarding the statutory audit of public-interest 
entities (European Commission, 2011). The proposal focuses on audit tenure as well 
as prohibition of providing non-audit services to audit clients. At UK level, the FRC 
has taken this issue seriously. One of the key changes in the UK Corporate 
governance Code (2012) is that FTSE 350 companies should put the external audit 
contract out to tender at least every ten years. However, this new requirement leads 
to many problems. It is reported (FRC 2013) that audit firms are facing fee 
pressures in the current economic environment, as evidenced by substantial 
reductions in audit fees as a consequence of audit tenders, particularly in respect of 
large listed entities. Responding to these pressures, audit firms are seeking 
efficiencies by reducing overall audit hours (FRC 2013). It is reported in the FRC’s 
audit quality inspection report (FRC 2013) that reductions in audit hours may be 
achieved through the application of higher materiality levels, which reduces the size 
of the sample tested, and by reducing the extent of testing in areas of low audit risk. 
Audit firms have also been found to use samples that do not cover the entire period 
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or the total population, increasing the level of judgmental sampling, and in the 
context of group audits there have been instances where materiality applicable to 
business components has been increased, thus the number of business components 
subjected to full audit procedures has been reduced. The FRC has consequently 
raised concerns regarding the position of audit committees. They stress the fact that 
audit committees also have an important role to play in this area. It is suggested that 
where fee reductions have been offered, audit committees should scrutinise the 
proposed scope of the audit, including the determination of materiality, the attention 
to be given to each business component and to the significant audit risks identified. 
It is also suggested that if there are significant changes in these areas following fee 
reduction, audit committees should carefully consider whether the overall level of 
work to be performed is likely to be sufficient to identify material misstatements 
and also to ensure that audit quality is not compromised.  
It is observed that over the past decades, corporate governance and auditing have 
developed well especially since controversial collapse of Enron in 2002. These 
involve changes to the supply of audit and non-audit services, with restrictions on 
the non-audit services that can be offered by auditors. At the same time, corporate 
governance developments have increased the scope and the role of the board of 
directors and, more importantly, audit committees in dealing with auditors. 
Following the development of corporate governance, the literature in audit pricing is 
also developed. The earlier UK studies (e.g. O’Sullivan, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000) 
have examined the relationship of governance characteristics and audit fees in the 
pre or post Cadbury period. Literature review shows that there is still a little number 
of studies investigating the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and audit fees after Smith Report (2003).  The quite similar study is 
done by Zaman et al. (2011) who investigate the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and audit fees before or around the time of the Smith 
Report (2003) using data of 135 FTSE 350 listed companies in 2001 to 2004. 
Another study (Adelopo et al., 2012) utilised data of 209 FTSE 350 companies for 
year end 2005/2006 but only focus on the relationship between the number of 
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multiple large shareholders and audit committee activity on audit fees. Given this 
background, this study aims to fill the gap in the literature. As compared to Zaman 
et al. (2011), this study contributes to the literature as more comprehensive 
measurements and scope of governance characteristics; including board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ownership are used. In addition, 
this study utilises  bigger sample companies from FTSE All Shares listed companies 
(384 companies) in 2007 and 2010 (768 observations). The use of more 
contemporary data could capture the impact of the recommendations by Smith 
Report (2003) and Higgs Report (2003) better as compared to Zaman et al. (2011). 
Another gap identified is that there is no study investigating the relationship 
between audit fees and detail component of non-audit services using published data. 
This is because, prior to 2005, this information is not publicly available.  Therefore, 
this study makes another major contribution by using published data of detail 
components of non-audit services which are available since the enactment of the 
Companies Act (Disclosure of  Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) 
Regulations in  2005.  
2.3 Chapter Summary 
The chapter begins with a brief introduction to corporate governance in the UK. The 
importance of high quality corporate governance for long-term company 
performance is highlighted and the UK approach to corporate governance is 
explained. Basically, unlike the rule-based corporate governance practised in the 
US, corporate governance in the UK is more principle based and the approach is 
“comply or explain”. Corporate governance in the UK is guided by the UK 
Corporate Governance Codes, which were first issued in 1992 and have been  
revised and updated almost every two years since. The second part of the chapter 
discusses the principles of corporate governance practice in the UK and the “comply 
or explain” approach. The advantages of the approach are discussed and the reasons 
for the adoption of this approach are explained. 
The chapter continues by outlining the development of corporate governance in the 
UK. The fact that corporate governance development in the UK, starting with the 
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establishment of the Cadbury Committee in 1992, was initiated due to corporate 
scandals such as Polly Peck, BCCI and Maxwell is highlighted. Details are provided 
of the reports produced from 1992 to 2012, including, first, the Cadbury Committee 
Report (1992), followed by The Greenbury Committee report (1995) and later, the 
Hampel Committee report (1998) and the Turnbull Report (1999). In 2003, The 
Higgs Committee Report was published in the wake of other infamous scandals and 
corporate collapses involving Enron and WorldCom in the US. In the same year, the 
Smith Committee Report was published in the UK. The report emphasised the 
important role of the Audit Committee in the bigger picture of Corporate 
Governance. The latest revision of the report is known as Guidance on Audit 
Committees (2012). The Combined Codes, first published in 1998, are then 
discussed. It is highlighted that the Codes have been updated on a regular basis in 
line with developments in the corporate environment locally and globally. The 
regulation of auditors in the UK was also reviewed in light of the same corporate 
scandals that happened in the early years of the decade. The Companies (Disclosure 
of Auditor Remuneration and Liability agreements) Regulation 2005 came into 
force on 1
st
 October 2005, focusing on the provision of non-audit services by a 
company auditor. This regulation requires detailed disclosure of non-audit services 
provided by the auditor to their audit client. The revision of the act was published in 
6
th
 of April 2008 with additional requirements for companies to disclose in the 
annual accounts the amounts payable for the services they and their associates have 
purchased from their auditors and their associates and whether the company have 
entered into a liability agreement with their auditors and if so to provide certain 
information about the agreement. Another revision came into force on 1
st
 October 
2011 and, to help companies to disclose the right sums, ICAEW published detailed 
guidance. The replacement schedule is intended to enable clearer disclosure of fees 
for audit and non-audit services and to work in parallel with the ethical Standards 
for Auditors produced by the Auditing Practice Board (APB). The standards require 
auditors to undertake an analysis of threats to their independence and to put in place 
any necessary safeguards in order to reduce these to an acceptable level. To enhance 
the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies and to help 
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improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance 
responsibilities, the UK Stewardship Code was published in July 2010. FRC sees 
the UK Stewardship Code as complementary to the UK Corporate Governance 
Code for listed companies. The latest revision to the codes was published in 
September 2012. 
The next part of the chapter discusses how developments in corporate governance in 
the UK have affected auditing and audit pricing. Before the Cadbury Report (1992) 
most of the audit pricing literature investigated the relationship between audit 
pricing and existence of an audit committee or the board of directors (eg: Collier 
and Gregory, 1996). After the release of the Cadbury Report in 1992, which 
highlighted the importance of non-executive directors on the board of directors and 
also the audit committee, researchers start investigating the relationship between 
governance characteristics and audit fees (eg: O’Sullivan, 1999 and Zaman et al., 
2011). The development in corporate governance in the UK has increased the role 
of the board and also audit committees in ensuring the success and long term 
survival of the business. At the same time, rules have been tightened regarding non-
audit services that can be offered by auditors to their audit clients, to ensure the 
auditor’s independence. With the changes in both the supply of audit services 
(auditor side) and demand for audit services (company side), a new study is greatly 
needed in order to consider both of these factors and assess whether the relationship 
identified by earlier studies that used data post Cadbury Report (1992) (eg: 
O’Sullivan, 1999) and later data from around the time of the Smith Report (2003) 
(eg: Zaman et al., 2011) still stands. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of the chapter is to review prior literature on audit pricing, corporate 
governance and also non-audit service. The discussion starts with a review of 
general audit pricing studies since the seminal paper of Simunic (1980). This 
discussion is followed by a review of corporate governance and audit pricing 
literature. The second part of the chapter provides a discussion on non-audit fees 
and audit pricing. The discussion starts with the general non-audit fees literature. 
Independence issues related to the provision of non-audit service are also 
highlighted. The chapter then provides a review on prior non-audit fees and audit 
fees studies. At the end of the chapter, the gap in audit pricing literature is 
identified. 
3.2 Audit Pricing Literature 
As the issue of corporate failure continues to attract attention and controversy, the 
role of auditors has come under increased scrutiny, especially due to their apparent 
inability to foresee and warn about impending failures, and the study of audit fees, 
specifically their determinants, becomes more relevant and current.  According to 
Hay et al. (2006), there are two main reasons why researchers study the 
determinants of audit fees: (i) to evaluate the competitiveness of audit markets, and, 
(ii) to examine issues of contracting and independence related to the audit process, 
for example, low-balling, and the impact of non-audit services on audit pricing. 
Regardless of the purpose of the study, Hay et al. (2006) found that a common 
methodology has been developed in the course of the publication of over 100 
journal articles examining the determinants of audit fees. Both auditors and their 
client companies can benefit from improved knowledge in this area. As for clients, 
better knowledge could assist them in negotiating audit fees and controlling the 
internal aspects that influence the amount of the audit fee (Meshari, 2008). On the 
other hand, it could also help the auditors to price their audit services appropriately 
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(Gist, 1992).  Low et al. (1990, p. 292) further underline the value of audit fee 
studies: 
“The strength of the audit fees model is in its objectivity and its relevance to 
the audit function. Fees are, and should be, a direct measure of the audit effort 
expended in response to the risks involved in audit engagements. This basis of 
fees determination is decidedly fair to both auditors and their clients because it 
provides an objective benchmark for fees negotiation and is directly related to 
the services rendered”  
The primary work in studying the determinants of audit and non-audit fees was 
conducted by Simunic (1980). Using 397 responses from a survey of publicly held 
corporations in the US conducted in 1977, he developed and tested a model to 
explain the relationship between audit fees and many different variables.  The 
dependent variable of his study is measured by the amount of current year’s 
external auditor fees. The factors initially identified as determining audit fees 
include: 
a. Size (measured by total assets); 
b. Complexity (measured by no. of consolidated subsidiaries; no. of two-digit 
SIC industries in which auditee operates; and foreign assets divided by total 
assets at year end). 
c. Industry; 
d. Audit risk (measured by net income divided by total assets; dummy variable 
for loss incurred during the year; and instance of the company receiving a 
subject to or qualified audit opinion during the year); 
e. Audit tenure (no. of years); 
f. Auditor type or identity (big eight or not) 
The hypotheses of his study were tested by obtaining least-squares’ estimates of the 
coefficients of the variables in the following linear regression function: 
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FEE / ASSETS 
e
 =b0 + b1SUBS+ b2DIVERS+ b3 FORGN + b4RECV +b5INV +    
b6PROFIT + b7LOSS + b8SUBJ + b9TIME + b10AUDITOR + u 
Where: 
FEE / ASSETS = the ratio of current year’s external audit fee/total assets 
SUBS =number of consolidated subsidiaries 
DIVERS=number of two-digit SIC industries in which auditee operates, less one 
FORGN=foreign assets + total assets at year-end 
RECV=accounts, loans and notes receivable + total assets at year-end 
INV=inventories + total assets at year-end 
PROFIT = net income + total assets 
LOSS =dummy variable (1,0) where (1) if auditee incurred loss in any three 
fiscal years 
SUBJ=dummy variable (1,0) where (1) if auditee received a “subject to” 
qualified opinion  
TIME  =number of years auditee has used current auditor 
AUDITOR=dummy variable (1,0) where (1) if auditor is a Big Eight audit firm 
The study found that the audit fee is a function of auditee size, complexity, risk and 
the relative elasticity of demand for both audit and non-audit services.The model he 
developed has been and continues to be used widely and has been significantly 
expanded, with the addition of new variables by many researchers over the past 30 
years. His model is widely used not only in Anglo-Saxon countries but also in other 
parts of the world. Studies of the determinants of audit fees have been conducted, 
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for example, in India (Simon et al., 1986), Singapore (Low et al., 1990), Hong Kong 
(Simon et al., 1992), Malaysia (Simon et al., 1992), South Africa (Simon, 1995), 
Bangladesh (Karim and Moizer, 1996), The Netherlands (Langendijk, 1997), 
Norway (Firth, 1997), Japan (Taylor, 1997), Pakistan (Simon and Taylor, 1997), 
South Korea (Taylor et al., 1999), Finland (Nieme, 2002), Nigeria (Taylor and 
Simon, 2003), Indonesia (Basioudis and Fifi, 2004), Italy (Cameran, 2005), Kuwait 
(Meshari, 2008) and China (Wang et al., 2009). 
In their meta-analysis of many existing audit fee studies up to the year 2001, Hay et 
al. (2006) summarised the determinants of audit fees into three main attributes: (i) 
client attributes, (ii) auditor attributes, and (iii) other attributes. The most traditional 
determinants of audit fees that relate to client companies are client size, complexity 
and audit risk. As well as audit client characteristics, auditor attributes could be 
associated with higher or lower audit fees. Common audit pricing models normally 
seek to recognise “auditor effect” by including variables representing the quality of 
the auditor (normally measured by whether the audit firm is categorised as Big or 
non-Big), length of audit tenure and also the location of the audit firm. Other factors 
which may affect audit pricing are engagement related matters. These include 
factors such as report lag, ‘busy season reporting’ and, very importantly, the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services by the same accounting firm. Discussion 
on these general determinants is provided in the hypotheses development chapter as 
this study uses these determinants as control variables to assess the impact of 
governance characteristics and non-audit fees on audit fees. 
As the audit pricing literature developed over the years, new variables were added 
to the model initially introduced by Simunic (1980). Ten years after Simunic 
(1980), Turpen et al. (1990) examined whether auditing firms differentially price the 
audits of new clients, using data from 146 public companies between 1982-1984 in 
the USA. The study found that audit fees for new clients are significantly lower than 
those for continuing engagements when controlling for the influence of other audit 
fee determinants. The additional tests indicate that this differential persists into the 
second year following a change of auditor. 
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In the UK, Chan et al. (1993) investigated the applicability of the existing audit fee 
models in the UK context. The study added three new variables to the study, namely 
the Herfindahl diversification index, ownership control and audit location. Using 
data from 985 quoted companies in 1989 in the UK, they found that the results were 
consistent with previous research, particularly in relation to the effect on audit fee of 
auditee size and number of subsidiaries. In addition, a Big Eight premium was also 
observed for both large and small size auditees. However, not all the new variables 
introduced were significant in explaining audit fees. In the same year, Chan et al. 
(1993) further investigated the determinants of audit fees in the UK, using more 
variables. The study involved 280 quoted companies in 1987. The principal 
explanatory variables were found to be auditee size, return on shareholders’ equity, 
the number of subsidiaries, the lag between the year end and the date of the audit 
report, size of the auditor, ameasure of auditee diversification, the ownership 
structure of the auditee, and whether the auditor was based in London, with the last 
three being new variables introduced in this study. Pong and Whittington (1994) 
used data on 577 UK listed companies between the year 1981 and the year 1988 to 
examine the theoretical rationale for empirical models of audit fees extant in the 
literature in the context of UK companies. It was found that auditee size is an 
important audit fee determinant. In addition, complexity, as measured by number of 
subsidiaries also had a positive and statistically significant effect on audit fees. 
However, profit had an effect which was sensitive to model specification. Small 
loss-making auditee firms received a discount on their audit fee but larger loss-
making firms were charged a premium by their auditors. They also found that big 8 
audit firms were, on average, more expensive than non-big 8 firms. 
Brinn et al. (1994) tested whether earlier findings on audit fees can be generalised to 
the unquoted sector. Utilising data from 154 UK companies (independent and 
subsidiary unquoted)  in electrical/electronic for the year 1988 the study found that 
the most significant factors affecting the audit fees of unquoted companies are 
auditee size and complexity. Chaney et al. (2004) investigated audit pricing among 
private firms in the UK using 1994-1998 data from 15,484 private firms with annual 
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turnover greater than 750,000. It was found that private firms do not pay such a 
large Big 5 premium on average and client firms choosing Big 5 auditors generally 
would have faced higher fees had they chosen non-Big 5 auditors, given the firm-
specific characteristics. Auditees in their setting do not, on average, view Big 5 
auditors as superior in terms of the perceived quality of the services provided to a 
degree significant enough to warrant a fee premium. Cullinan (1997) on the other 
hand examined the generalisability of the audit fee model by applying the model in 
the pension plan audit context. The study used 1991 data from 1110 US pension 
funds and found no differences in fee structures between Big Six and non-Big Six 
firms. This result indicates that auditor change does not affect pension plan audit 
fees. Hackenbrack et al. (2000) studied audit pricing in a municipal market. 
Utilising year 1995 data from 675 municipal audits in eight south-eastern states of 
the US the study found that Municipalities covered by the statute paid higher audit 
fees, engaged larger audit firms and firms with larger municipal audit client bases.  
They were also more likely to be recognised for excellence in financial reporting 
than municipalities not covered by statute. Results support the claim that audit 
selection criteria emphasising technical competence over low audit fee should result 
in selection of an auditor that will produce relatively high audit quality. 
Some studies relate audit pricing with Agency theory. Nikkinen and Sahlstrom 
(2004) examined whether agency theory provides a general framework for audit 
pricing. Their study involved seven countries: Denmark, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sweden and the UK, and used1992-2000 data from the 
largest firms in these countries. A negative relationship was found between audit 
fees and manager ownership and a positive relationship between audit fees and free 
cash flow in several countries. Therefore it was concluded that Agency theory can 
be used, at least to some extent, to explain audit fees internationally. Moreover, 
agency theory explains audit fees similarly across countries, while control variables 
have different impact on audit fees. Using data from 16,771 company-year 
observations from the year 2000-2006 in the US, excluding financial and insurance 
companies, Griffin et al. (2010) provided further evidence on whether audit fees 
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vary in relation to agency problems that can arise in companies with excess free 
cash flow. It was found that agency problems of companies with high free cash flow 
and low growth opportunities induce auditors of companies in the United States to 
raise audit fees to compensate for the additional effort. High FCF companies with 
high growth prospects have higher audit fees and debt level moderates the increase 
in fees, while dividend pay-out and share repurchase do not have any effect on 
increases in fees. 
Following the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), researchers started 
to relate audit pricing to SOX. Griffin and Lont (2007) analysed residual increases 
in audit fees following SOX. The study used data from 25,851 firm-year 
observations over five years (2000-2005) which were audited by Big 4 or Big 5 
audit firms in the US. The study found a significant relationship between residual 
audit fees and incremental audit risk, audit effort and auditor changes, and these 
factors are noticeably more influential in the period following SOX that includes the 
implementation of section 404 on internal control. Hoitash et al. (2008) extended 
prior research on audit risk adjustment by examining the association of audit pricing 
with internal control problems disclosed under sections 404 and 302 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study utilised data from 962 US companies from 
November 2004-October 2005. It was found that Audit fees are positively 
associated with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of 
implementation of section 404. In the case of broadly-based accelerated filers, audit 
pricing for companies with internal control problems varies by problem severity. In 
addition, companies disclosing internal control problems under section 302 continue 
to pay higher fees the following year, even if no problems are disclosed under 
section 405. Bedard et al. (2008) examined the association of audit fees with 
disclosures regarding internal control effectiveness under section 302 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. The study utilised year 2003 to 2004 data from 4952 
firm-year observations in US. It was found that companies disclosing problems 
under section 302 pay higher audit fees. Fees are adjusted for risk associated with 
problem severity, but relative risk adjustment did not change between 2003 and 
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2004. They also found a significant fee increase for “clean” companies in 2004, 
although there was no change in regulation for non-accelerated filers in that year. It 
also emerged that in 2004, Big 4 audit fees were higher for both continuing and new 
clients and only companies switching away from Big 4 firms experienced a 
reduction in their audit fees. Ettredge et al. (2007) studied the relationship between 
higher audit fees and auditor dismissals in the period immediately subsequent to the 
implementation of SOX. Their study involved 428 companies which announced 
auditor dismissals from Jan 2004 through to December 2004. It was found that 
clients paying higher fees were more likely to dismiss their auditors and dismissals 
were associated with small companies, companies with going concern reports and 
companies that later reported material weaknesses in their internal control. 
Dismissing clients, in particular those hiring new non-Big 4 auditors experienced 
smaller fee increases than non-switching clients in the following year.  
 
The introduction of a new auditing standard could affect the audit pricing decision 
and some studies have investigated such effects. Doogar et al. (2010) studied the 
impact of Auditing standard no 5 (AS5) on audit fees as compared to AS2, the old 
standard. For this purpose, data for the years 2005-2008 were utilised from 3,023 
public companies that were Big Four accelerated filer auditees, whose financial and 
audit fee data were available in the compustat and AuditAnalytics databases. It was 
found that AS5 audit fees are aligned with auditee fraud risk, but not AS2 audit fees. 
Relative to AS2 bench mark level, AS5 audit fees are on average lower for all 
auditees and are lower for lower-fraud-risk auditees but greater for higher-fraud-risk 
auditees. On the other hand, the adoption of new financial reporting standards could 
also affect audit pricing. Kim et al. (2012) examined the impact of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on audit fees. They concluded that 
generally mandatory IFRS adoption has led to increases in audit fees. They found 
however that IFRS-related audit fee premiums increase with the increase in audit 
complexity brought about by IFRS adoption, and decrease with improvements in 
financial reporting quality arising from IFRS adoption. 
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Having two auditors auditing the same company might have an impact on the 
pricing of audit services. Motivated by this, Thinggard and Kiertzner (2008) 
examined the audit fees paid by listed companies in Copanhagen, where listed 
companies are required to have two external auditors. Their study used 2002 data on 
126 companies in Denmark. The results indicate that having two significant, 
independent auditors in a competitive environment is likely to reduce total audit 
fees, albeit only for larger companies, where the payoff from competition might be 
worthwhile. So, it might be of interest to other countries to consider two auditors as 
a solution to the auditor independence issue. 
 
Recently more lines of inquiry have been added to the audit pricing literature. For 
example, an interesting study was carried out by Hay and Knechel (2010) in which 
they investigated the effect of advertising and solicitation on audit fees as prior 
research suggests that the auditing crisis could be caused by deregulation, which 
allows firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients and encourages firms 
to be more commercial. For this study, data from all public listed companies in New 
Zealand from 1980 to 2001 were utilised. It was found that advertising is associated 
with increases in fees while solicitation corresponds to decreasing audit fees. This 
finding indicates an increase in competition among accounting firms.  
As the economic crisis has become a hot global issue, audit pricing researchers have 
started relating the economic crisis to   audit pricing. Following the severe economic 
crisis that affected the US, Ettredge et al. (2011) investigated audit fee pressure 
during the period from 2007 to 2009 to assess the impact of fee pressure on audit 
effort. The sample consisted of 1897 firms in 2006 and 1926 firms in 2008. The 
study found that 49.6% of clients successfully exerted fee pressure on their auditors. 
They also found that fee pressure is positively associated with reporting losses, 
increases in size and complexity and disclosures of material weaknesses in internal 
control over financial reporting. They concluded that clients that successfully exert 
fee pressure are more likely to have accounting misstatements and have higher 
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levels of discretionary accruals in 2008 and these results are driven by smaller 
auditors.  
Another audit pricing issue emerged in an Australian study in terms of audit fee 
benefits arising from the execution of deed of cross guarantee (DXG), which 
relieves wholly owned subsidiaries from financial reporting, auditing and other 
requirements. Using data from 1317 listed companies in Australia for the financial 
year 2007, the study found positive and persistent statistical significance of the 
DXG in audit fee determination and established that DXG groups consistently pay 
higher audit fees than non-DXG groups, irrespective of firm size or audit 
complexity. 
As a conclusion, there has been sound general development of audit pricing studies 
since Simunic’s (1980) seminal paper. Appendix 1 summarises audit-pricing studies 
since the 1990s. One of the variables identified by previous studies and that has an 
impact on audit pricing is corporate governance. Hay et al. (2006) and Hay et al. 
(2012) concluded that more audit pricing and governance studies are needed. The 
other important variable that appears in most of the previous studies is non-audit 
fees. As the objective of this research is to assess the impact of corporate 
governance (including ownership structure) and non-audit fees on audit fees, 
detailed discussion on the relationship between these two characteristics and audit 
pricing will be provided later in this chapter. 
3.3 Corporate Governance and Audit Pricing Literature 
Prior studies (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dennis and Mc Connel, 2003) has 
noted that good corporate governance is beneficial to the company. To be effective 
corporate governance should possess certain characteristics. As internal corporate 
governance is expected to be interrelated with the monitoring role of the external 
auditor in monitoring management behavior and safeguarding the shareholders, the 
characteristics of corporate governance can also be associated with audit pricing.  
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Hayes et al. (2005) describes four theories that may explain the demand of audit 
services. The first theory is Policeman theory where an auditor is needed for fraud 
detection and prevention. Second theory is Lending Credibility theory where 
audited financial statements are used by management to enhance the stakeholders’ 
faith in management’s stewardship. The third theory, Theory of Inspired Confidence 
explains that audit services is the direct consequence of the participation of outside 
stakeholders in the company.The last theory, Agency theory point out that a 
reputable auditor is appointed not only in the interest of the third parties, but also in 
the interest of management.  
Discussion of corporate governance in the context of audit pricing normally 
involves two different perspectives, the supply and demand sides of audit services. 
Looking at the demand side of the audit service, good governance could be reflected 
in a higher demand for good quality audits, which could give rise to higher audit 
fees. This is highlighted by Hay and Knechel (2004) as they argued that the demand 
effect may lead to increased audit fees as independent directors may demand more 
auditing in order to fulfil their responsibilities, protect their reputations and 
discharge their responsibilities of due diligence. Looking at the supply of the audit 
service by the auditor, improved corporate governance could reflect a good control 
environment within a company hence requires a reduced audit, which could then be 
translated into lower audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 1996). Prior studies suggest 
that the firm’s internal control mechanism has a significant impact on control risk 
and audit scope as audit fee determinants (e.g. Wallace, 1986).   Hence, a weak 
internal control mechanism results in higher control risk and to reduce audit risk to 
an acceptable level more substantive audit work will be needed and this results in 
higher audit fees (Desender et al., 2009). In seeking to review existing evidence, the 
discussion of prior literature on corporate governance and audit pricing is divided 
into three main governance issues: board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics and ownership structure.  
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3.3.1 Board Characteristics and Audit Fees 
Board Composition and Independence 
The relationship between board characteristics and audit fees has begun to attract 
interest from audit fee researchers (e.g. O’Sullivan, 1999; Peel and Clathworthy, 
2001). In the early 2000s, few studies had looked at the issue (e.g. O’Sullivan, 1999; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Peel and Clatworthy, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002 and Tsui et al., 
2001). More recently, there has been slightly more research interest (e.g.  Bliss et 
al., 2007; Boo and Sharma, 2008; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2010). The board 
characteristic most frequently studied is the composition or independence of board 
members as successive governance reforms since the 1990s have emphasised the 
monitoring potential of non-executive board members (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 
1998 and Higgs, 2003, Combined Codes, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008; UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010).  
The role of independent outside directors becomes crucial in monitoring the 
management as Agency theory suggests that boards dominated by inside directors 
may intentionally provide self-serving accounts of managerial actions to enhance 
their status with the firm’s chief executive officer (Fama 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Since outside directors are independent of management they are expected to allow 
an effective and impartial governance system to operate within the corporation 
(Abdul Rahman, 2006).  
Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998), and Higgs (2003) and various editions of the 
Combined Code and the current UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) have all 
emphasised the importance of non-executive representation on the board of 
directors as a means of ensuring greater independence and impartiality in board 
decision-making. Carcello et al. (2002) describe three factors which may motivate 
independent directors to prevent and detect any opportunistic reporting behaviour 
by management. First, the directors may seek to protect their reputations as experts 
in monitoring, because the market for directors punishes those associated with 
corporate failure or poor performance. Second, from a legal liability perspective, 
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directors who fail to exercise reasonable care in discharging their monitoring 
responsibilities are liable to be subject to severe sanctions. Third, shareholders often 
suffer significant losses in the wake of financial reporting problems, so directors 
seeking to protect shareholder wealth may seek a higher quality audit service. Past 
studies found evidence of an inverse relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors and fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996).  
O’Sullivan (1999) examined the impact of board/audit committee characteristics on 
audit fees paid by large UK companies in the post-Cadbury period. Using 
comprehensive analysis of financial statements for the year 1995 of a sample of 146 
largest non-financial companies quoted on the London International Stock 
Exchange the study found that board composition variables had no significant 
impact on the audit fees paid. The study (O’Sullivan, 1999, p 261-262) provides 
detailed reasons for the insignificant relationship found in the study. 
“First, even though increased non-executive representation and audit 
committee membership is perceived to result in better governance on behalf 
of shareholders, such reforms may have a dual impact on audit pricing. 
While internal governance reforms are expected to signal better internal 
controls and consequently lower audit fees, the introduction of increased 
independence is also expected to encourage auditors to increase effort and 
ultimately fees. Non-executives serving on boards and audit committees may 
encourage increased testing by auditors so as to minimise the likelihood of 
future financial problems for the firm and avoid subsequent criticism being 
directed at them. Of course, the net impact of both these pressures may result 
in individual mechanisms of governance having a negligible impact on the 
audit fee. Second, even though we have taken care to conduct our analysis at 
least three years after the Cadbury (1992) recommendations, it is unclear 
how long auditors may require firms to have appropriate internal governance 
mechanisms in place prior to offering an audit fee reduction. A useful 
extension of our study may be to monitor the relationship between audit fees 
and internal governance characteristics over a longer period of time. 
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Especially useful might be a study of the impact of internal governance 
changes on the audit fee. Third, since we have undertaken our analysis post-
Cadbury, we are unable to investigate the impact of internal governance 
changes on the audit fee. For example, we do not know whether companies 
possessing few nonexecutive directors and CEO/chairman duality paid 
higher audit fees prior to the Cadbury recommendations. Our results may 
indicate that the widespread adoption of the minimum governance 
characteristics recommended by Cadbury (1992) serves to eliminate fee 
reductions that had previously been received by ‘better’ governed 
companies. Of course the widespread compliance with the Cadbury (1992) 
recommendations is expected to reduce the variation in board composition 
and leadership and consequently reduce the power of the empirical tests. An 
interesting extension of our study may be to undertake an examination of the 
relationship between board composition and audit pricing utilizing pre-
Cadbury data.” 
As a result, shortly afterwards, O’Sullivan conducted another study (O’Sullivan, 
2000), to investigate the impact of board composition and ownership on audit fees 
prior to the adoption of the recommendations of the Cadbury report (1992). This 
time data from a sample of 402 quoted companies in UK was utilised. Contrary to 
the result post Cadbury (1992), this study found that the proportion of non-executive 
directors had a significant positive impact on audit fees. This result suggests that 
non-executive directors encourage more intensive audits as a complement to their 
own monitoring role. According to O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002), increasing the 
non-executive representation on the board of directors has the capacity for 
improving the quality of the audit process in the following three respects:  
a. External auditors are able to discuss matters arising from the audit process 
with non-executive representative board members, free from managerial 
influence. This is especially important if auditors seek to question certain 
aspects of the preparation of the financial statements by management or 
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require further (more costly) testing in order to reach an opinion on the 
quality of financial statements. 
b. In negotiations with the external auditor, non-executives are expected to 
place greater emphasis on the extent and quality of the audit rather than on 
the cost, compared to executive directors. 
c. Non-executives are expected to favour more extensive auditing in order to 
complement their own monitoring responsibilities since they share with 
auditors the objective of identifying and rectifying reporting errors made by 
managers, deliberately or otherwise. 
Peel and Clatworthy also extended post-Cadbury study by investigating the 
relationship between internal governance structure and audit fees. As an internal 
governance mechanism, non-executive directors could contribute to higher quality 
auditing in many ways. Contrary to the findings of O’Sullivan (2000), Peel and 
Clatworthy (2001) found an insignificant relationship between board composition 
(measured by percentage of non-executive directors to total directors) and audit 
fees. The study utilised data on 132 listed UK firms for 1992. They concluded that 
there is no systematic evidence that auditors (both pre and post-Cadbury) recognise 
board governance characteristics in pricing their audit. A possible explanation for 
this difference could be the different sample size used by the two studies; while 
O’Sullivan based his conclusions on 406 quoted companies, Peel and Clatworthy 
based theirs on a much smaller sample of 132 companies. 
Tsui et al. (2001) examined the relationship between a firm’s internal monitoring 
mechanism and its impact on audit fees in Hong Kong. Using data from 650 non-
financial companies in Hong Kong between the years 1994 and 1996, they found 
that the independence of corporate boards (measured by chief executive officer and 
chairman being separate individuals) is an important factor in auditors’ assessment 
of control risk and the determination of audit fees. 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos (2010) investigated the relationship between audit 
pricing, quality of earnings and board independence in Greece, utilising data from 
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248 firm year observations (from 97 companies listed on Athens Stock Exchange) 
for a five year period (2000-2004). The study found a positive association between 
board independence and audit pricing (meaning strong governance is related to 
increased need for quality assurance services). The study also documented a 
positive association between audit pricing and earnings management for small size 
companies. The study assumed this to be an indicator of a potential red flag. 
 
Desender et al. (2009) investigated whether the relationship between board 
characteristics and the demand for external audit was different for firms with 
dispersed ownership compared to firms with controlled ownership. Using data on 
247 French and Spanish listed companies in 2007 the study found that ownership 
structure has a significant influence on the relationship between the demand for 
external audit and board characteristics. For widely held-firms, they found that 
board independence and CEO duality are significantly related to audit fees; 
however, the relationship between board characteristics and audit fees was found to 
be insignificant in closely-held firms. 
A recent UK study by Zaman et al. (2011) incorporated board composition variables 
into the audit pricing model. The study recognised that the composition of the 
board/audit committee is an important factor that may affect audit quality. It was 
found that proportion of independent non-executive directors has a significant 
relationship with audit fees when the composite measure of audit committee 
effectiveness is substituted with the independent variables relating to audit 
committee effectiveness. 
Board Leadership 
Another corporate governance issue that has received increasing attention is board 
leadership. Most studies use CEO duality to reflect board leadership. CEO duality 
means that the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors: a situation that is 
common in the US. Coles et al. (2001) found 80% cases of role duality among their 
sample of US firms. However, CEO duality is not as common in the UK as the US 
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and has become even less popular recently. Conyon (1994) reported 23% CEO 
duality in the UK in 1993, whilst O’Sullivan (1999) reported 15% for the year 1995 
and Zaman et al. (2011) reported a significant reduction by 2004, with only 3% of 
their 135 sample firms having the same person occupying these two important 
positions. The continuous reduction in the CEO duality case is a result of the 
recommendation of the codes of corporate governance (e.g. UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010). Section A.2.1 of the code highlighted that the roles of 
chairman and chief executive should not be fulfilled by the same individual and the 
division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief executive should be 
clearly established, set out in writing and agreed by the board.  
Stewardship theory argues that CEO duality may enhance board effectiveness. 
Solomon (1993) contended that the firm managers’ influence in setting board 
agendas and the flow of information are stronger when the firm adopts CEO duality. 
Another study agreed that CEO duality helps in decision-making as it permits a 
sharper focus on company objectives and also promotes more rapid implementation 
of operational decisions (Stewart, 1991). In the same vein, Dahya et al. (1996) 
stated that CEO duality helps the CEO to understand the strategic vision of the firm 
better due to minimal board interference. Further suppor is given by Rechner and 
Dalton (1991), who claimed that CEO duality may lead to improvement of the 
firm’s performance as a result of clear unfettered leadership of the board. 
However, CEO duality removes the ‘checks and balances’, hence resulting in a 
decrease in vigilance regarding the operation of the firm (Abdul Rahman, 2006). 
CEO duality can be wrongly used for personal gain due to greed and corruption at 
the expense of other stakeholders in the firm. The case of Enron is a real-life 
example of this situation, where Kenneth Lay was both the CEO and Chairman until 
2001. Therefore, separation of these two positions provides the essential ‘checks 
and balances’ needed to improve accountability ad transparency of the board. It is 
also argued that CEO duality upsets the balance of power among the top 
management team. In other words, CEO duality restricts the board’s effectiveness in 
controlling managerial initiatives and in decision-making since duality is assumed 
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to increase information asymmetry between the CEO and the board (Boyd et al., 
2005, Desender et al., 2009).  Fosberg and Nelson (1999) state that firms with 
separated, clear-cut leadership perform significantly better in the areas of strategy 
formulation and implementation. This is supported by Farber (2005), who found 
that fraud firms have a higher percentage of duality, which makes it difficult for 
insecure directors to be honest when evaluating firm performance, thereby leading 
to long term organisational drift (Carver, 2006).  
Bliss (2011) examined whether CEO duality affects the association between board 
independence and demand for higher quality audits proxied by audit fee. Using data 
from 950 Australian public listed companies in 2003 the study found that the 
positive association between board independence and audit fee proxied for audit 
quality is only present in firms without CEO duality. He suggested that CEO duality 
constrains board independence. The finding is supported by a study in Europe 
(Desender et al., 2009). Partitioning their sample size into widely-held firms and 
closely-held firms, Desender et al. (2009), who utilised data on 247 French and 
Spanish listed companies in 2007, found that CEO duality is a significant 
determinant of audit fee only in widely-held firms. In the presence of a dominant 
CEO, non-executive directors are expected to have reduced influence in seeking an 
intensive audit (Desender et al., 2009) and as a result companies with CEO duality 
are more likely to have lower demand for external audit services (O’Sullivan, 2000), 
hence audit fees will be lower. On the other hand, most of the earlier UK studies, for 
example, O’Sullivan (1999), Peel and Clatworthy (2001) and O’Sullivan (2000), 
failed to find any significant relationship between CEO-duality and audit fees. 
Contrary to the other UK studies Zaman et al. (2011) documented a significant 
positive relationship between CEO duality and audit fees when using CEO duality 
as one of their control variables to assess the relationship between audit committee 
effectiveness and audit fees. 
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Board Size 
The effect of board size on the monitoring ability of the board of directors has also 
been discussed. Some researchers have argued that larger boards have greater 
capability to monitor the actions of top management as it is difficult for CEOs to 
dominate larger boards (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Supporting this view, Singh and 
Harianto (1989) argued that larger boards can make it difficult for the CEO to 
obtain consensus for taking actions that will harm shareholders’ interests. However, 
there are disadvantages associated with larger boards. Prior studies have identified 
that larger board size is associated with decreased board ability to control 
management, difficult communication among directors, poorer decision making and 
poorer processing of information (Vafeas, 1999). In addition, larger boards increase 
the time taken to make decisions and bureaucratic problems create more hindrance 
(Xie et al., 2003). In addition, Jensen (1993) argued that large boards are less 
effective in their oversight duties relative to smaller board and are susceptible to 
CEO domination over board matters. Jensen (1993, p. 865) states that: ‘as groups 
increase in size they become less effective because the coordination and process 
problems overwhelm the advantages from having more people to draw on’.  
In contrast, it is suggested that smaller boards may be more effective as they might 
be more able to make timely strategic decisions (Goodstein et al., 1994). In addition, 
Fieger and Brown (2000), for example, found that smaller board size and outside 
representation is conducive to an active board with high level of involvement in 
strategic formulation. Other studies found that smaller board size, particularly 
amongst large US industrial corporations, is associated with better firm performance 
(Yermack, 1996). 
In conclusion, regarding optimum board size, the board should not be so big that its 
ability to control management is reduced and communication among directors is 
difficult, leading to poorer decision making and poorer processing of information, 
and should not be so small that it can be easily dominated by the CEO.  
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Many changes have occurred in terms of board composition in UK listed companies 
post the Cadbury Report. Dahya et al. (2002), in a study involving a sample of 460 
UK publicly quoted companies, documented the increase in non-executive directors 
on UK boards, indicating that the percentage rose from 35.3% pre Cadbury to 46% 
post Cadbury Report. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) reported that the median board size 
of UK companies is 7, while Renneboog and Trojanwoski (2005) reported a median 
board size of 9.  
The association of board size and audit fees has been investigated in the US (Boo 
and Sharma, 2008; Chan et al., 2012). Boo and Sharma (2008) examined the 
relationship between internal governance characteristics, external audit monitoring 
proxied by audit fees and regulatory oversight, using 2001 data from 469 large 
listed companies comprising 252 finance companies and 217 companies from non-
regulated industries. Their studies were motivated by the call by DeFond and 
Francis (2005) to develop theoretical explanations regarding how and why the board 
and audit committee influence the financial reporting and audit processes. Cohen et 
al. (2004) and DeFond and Francis (2005) examined how industry regulation 
influences corporate governance practices. The coefficient value of variables 
measuring board/audit committee size is insignificant in their model 2; however, 
after introducing an interaction term for board size and regulated companies, the 
coefficient of the interaction term SIZE–REG (board/audit committee size by 
regulatory oversight) is negative and significant (p < 0.01). This result is also 
consistent with their expectation from their Hypothesis 3, which posits that 
regulatory oversight diminishes the association between size of board/audit 
committee and audit fees. As a whole the study concluded that the association 
between audit fees and board/audit committee independence and size is weaker for 
regulated companies.  
In an attempt to examine whether independent audit committee members’ board 
tenure affects audit fees, Chan et al. (2012) included both board size and audit 
committee size among their controlling variables. Utilising data from1524 firm-year 
observations of US firms for the years 2005 and 2006 the study found that board 
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independence and board size are positively associated with audit fees. These 
findings suggest that high-quality boards demand more audit effort from external 
auditors. 
Board Activity or Board Dilligence 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012, Section A.1.1) highlights the 
importance of board meetings. It is clearly stated that the board should meet 
sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties effectively. There should be a formal 
schedule of matters specifically reserved for its decision. This is important as 
meeting frequency could reflect board effectiveness as boards that meet frequently 
are likely to be better informed and more diligent in performing their duties 
(Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006). This fact is supported by earlier researchers, 
such as Conger et al. (1998) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). In the same vein, Evans 
and Weir (1995) concluded that a board of directors that has frequent meetings has 
more time to identify and discuss problems and this is expected to lead to superior 
performance of the company. Another study correlated board meeting frequency 
with annual report timeliness (Tauringana et al., 2008) in Kenya. The study found a 
significant negative relationship between frequency of board meetings and 
timeliness of the annual report, indicating that companies which hold meetings 
frequently publish their annual reports earlier, thereby enhancing the company’s 
performance and providing evidence of an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. Despite the fact that number of board meetings is important in 
measuring board effectiveness, not many audit fee researchers have included this 
variable in their audit pricing model.  
Among the researchers who have considered board activity or diligence in an audit 
pricing study are Carcello et al. (2002). Carcello et al. (2002) used number of board 
meetings held to measure the diligence of the board, since the behaviour of 
individual board members surrounding such meetings, which includes preparation 
before meetings, attentiveness and participation during meetings, and post-meeting 
follow-up, is not observable by the public. Based on an analysis of 258 companies 
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from Fortune 1000 in the US in the year 1992 to 1993, Carcello et al. (2002) 
confirmed that high frequency of board meetings could indicate a higher level of 
control in the company, leading to higher audit fees.  
In UK, Zaman et al. (2011) used number of board meetings to control for board 
effectiveness in their audit pricing model. Utilising panel data (2001-2004) of a 
sample from 135 FTSE-350 the study found a significant positive relationship 
between audit fees and number of board meetings per year. 
3.3.2 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees 
Unlike board characteristics, which have received comparatively little attention 
from audit pricing researchers, audit committee characteristics is a well researched 
area.In the 1990s, researchers started investigating the relationship between the 
existence of an audit committee and audit fees. Collier and Gregory (1996) 
investigated this relationship to establish whether audit committees are effective in 
ensuring audit quality by protecting the auditors from fee cuts which might affect 
audit quality. For this purpose, data from 315 FTSE UK companies from the year 
1989 to 1991 was utilised. The study found evidence that the relationship between 
size-related audit fees and presence of an audit committee is positive and 
significant. O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) compared the pricing of audits in mutual 
and proprietary insurance companies. Utilising data from 117 UK insurance 
companies in 1992 they found that the existence of an audit committee has a 
positive impact on audit fees paid by companies. Redmayne et al. (2011) examined 
the association between the existence of an audit committee and audit fees in New 
Zealand public sector entities for the period 1998–2000, when audit committee 
formation was voluntary. The study found enough evidence to associate audit 
committees with lower audit fees and interaction with audit risk in public-benefit 
entities but found a positive association between audit committees and audit fees 
(but no significant interaction terms) in profit-oriented public sector entities.  
 O’Sullivan (1999) extended the research area to include audit committee 
characteristics in his audit pricing model. The study includes two variables for audit 
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committee characteristics: audit committee size and audit committee independence, 
measured respectively by number of members on the audit committee and a binary 
variable to represent the existence of executive directors on audit committee. The 
study, however, failed to find any evidence of a relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and audit fees. In the US, Boo and Sharma (2008) 
examined the relationship between audit committee independence and audit 
committee size for regulated and non-regulated companies. The study found the 
association between audit fees and audit committee independence and size to be 
weaker for regulated companies. 
Besides studying the impact of board characteristics, Carcello et al. (2002) also 
investigated the relationship between audit committee independence, diligence and 
expertise and audit fees. The researchers simply replaced their measures of board 
independence, diligence and expertise with comparable audit committee measures. 
The study found enough evidence to conclude that audit fee has a positive 
relationship with audit committee independence and audit committee expertise 
diligence but not with number of audit committee meetings. The study also 
combined both types of variables in one audit pricing model and found that all 
board variables remained significant, while none of the audit committee variables 
were significantly related to audit fees. They concluded that audit committee 
variables provide no incremental explanatory power when board variables are 
included in the model. 
Abbott et al. (2003) examined the association between audit committee 
characteristics and audit fees, using US data for 2001. Their study included three 
audit committee variables: audit committee independence, audit committee 
expertise and audit committee meeting frequency. They found that audit fees are 
higher when firms have an independent audit committee. A similar result was found 
for firms with at least one accounting or financial expert on the audit committee as 
opposed to firms without accounting or financial experts on the audit committee. 
Their result indicated that directors’ independence and their competence can both 
increase audit scope. This is because audit committee members with accounting 
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experience are more likely to understand the importance of external auditing and 
make judgments consistent with those that an auditor would make. This argument is 
supported by Knapp (1987), who suggests that auditors are more likely to discuss 
accounting issues with knowledgeable audit committees. Therefore, audit 
committees’ accounting or financial expertise can induce audit effort. In addition, 
audit committee expertise could enhance and maintain the relationship with the 
auditor. Lee at al. (2004) found that the financial expertise of audit committee 
members is inversely related to auditor resignation. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) also examined the relationship between audit fees and audit committee 
financial expertise. The study partitions the financial expertise into accounting 
financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. The study utilised data of 
801 firm-year observations (2000-2002) of S&P 500 US companies other than 
financial institutions and companies not audited by Big 4 audit firms. The study 
found that audit fee is negatively related to accounting financial expertise but not to 
non-accounting financial expertise.  
Some audit pricing studies have used a composite measure of audit committee 
effectiveness. Lee and Mande (2005), for example, examined the relationship 
between audit committee characteristics and audit fees using a composite measure 
of audit committee effectiveness (to be considered effective an audit committee 
must be fully independent and meet at least four times a year). The composite proxy 
captures the interaction between independence and diligence and potentially could 
provide greater explanatory power than the individual component attributes. The 
study also included audit committee expertise (financial expertise) in the audit 
pricing model. Using a sample of US firms listed on New York Stock Exchange in 
2000, the study found that audit fees are positively related to audit committee 
independence and diligence.  
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) investigated the effect of board and audit committee 
characteristics on audit fees. Using data on US Fortune 500 companies for 2001–
2003 the study documented positive associations between audit fees and board 
independence, size and activity and also audit committee independence, expertise 
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and size. Likewise, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) examined the association 
between board and audit committee characteristics and audit fees, based on 
Australian data in 2000. They found that audit fees are positively related to board 
independence and audit committee diligence. Rainsbury et al. (2009) examined the 
association between the qualities of audit committees and external audit fees in an 
environment where the formation of audit committees was unregulated. Utilising 
data on 87 companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in 2001 the study 
found that the quality of the audit committee (audit committee independence and 
expertise) has little impact on the level of fees paid to external auditors. The result 
suggests that the benefits of “Best practice” audit committees may be less than 
anticipated by regulators and policy makers. 
Motivated by gender differences in human behaviour, and recent findings in 
corporate finance literature, Ittonen et al. (2008) examined the association between 
female audit committee representation and audit fees among S&P firms listed on the 
major US Stock Exchange. Using 2006 data on these companies the study found 
that firms with female audit committee representation have significantly lower audit 
fees.Their study is considered novel in the sense that it was the first study to 
introduce gender diversity into corporate governance and audit pricing studies. A 
few years after this study, the regulators started to recogniseg the importance of 
board diversity, including gender diversity, to effectiveness of boards and audit 
committees (see UK Corporate Governance Code, 2012). 
Prior to SOX, the audit committee’s responsibility regarding the audit and the 
preparation of the financial statements was to act in an advisory role to management 
and to the external auditor. Following the enactment of SOX(2002), the structure of 
the audit committee changed and its role and responsibility for oversight of the 
external auditor were expanded. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) extended previous 
research by examining the association between audit committee characteristics and 
auditor related decisions following the mandated changes in the committee’s 
composition and responsibilities. The study examined the association between audit 
committee characteristics and auditors’ compensation and dismissals following the 
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enactment of SOX. Using data from a 2004 sample of 2393 companies with a total 
of 8306 audit committee members, the study found that audit committee size and 
diligence are associated with higher audit fees. The study also documented a 
positive association between level of assurance and proportion of experts on the 
audit committee. Inconsistent with previous studies, this study found that  experts 
with supervisory expertise demand higher quality audits. They conjectured that the 
lack of actual experience among those with supervisory expertise might cause them 
to purchase additional audit services. Alternatively, familiarity of accounting 
financial experts with the audit negotiation process enables them to negotiate a high 
level of assurance at a lower cost. However, when examining engagements that 
follow dismissals, their evidence is consistent with the prior literature finding that 
experts with accounting experience seek to hire high quality auditors while those 
with supervisory experience are more willing to appoint lower quality auditors. 
Eagel et al. (2010) examined the relation between audit committee compensation 
and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process in the US.  Data 
from 3295 firm-year observations covering the period between 2000-2004, 
excluding utilities and financial institutions, were utilised for this study. The study 
documented a positive correlation between total compensation and cash retainers 
paid to audit committees and audit fees and also the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, suggesting a positive link between audit committee compensation and the audit 
committee’s demand for financial reporting process monitoring. 
Masli et al.’s (2010) examination of the potential benefits of Internal Control 
Monitoring Technology was an innovative contribution to audit pricing literature. 
Using i-Data from 139 firm year observations of firms announcing SOX-related 
ICM technology initiatives over a four-year period (2003-2006) in the US, the study 
found implementation of internal control monitoring technology to be associated 
with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller increases in audit fees and 
smaller increases in audit delays during the post-SOX time period. 
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Gul and Goodwin (2010) examined whether a firm’s short-term debt maturity 
structure is associated with auditor assessment of audit risk and consequently audit 
fees.  Data were derived from 9,632 firm year observations from 2003 to 2006, 
excluding financial companies. The study found that short-term debt is negatively 
related to audit fees for firms rated by Standard & Poor’s. This is consistent with the 
finding of more monitoring and better governance mechanisms in firms with higher 
short-term debt. Additionally the study found that credit rating quality is negatively 
related to audit fees, consistent with credit rating quality reflecting a firm’s liquidity 
risk, governance mechanisms, and monitoring from rating agencies.  The study also 
documented that the negative relationship between short-term debt and audit fees is 
stronger for firms with low-quality credit ratings. 
 
Chan et al. (2012) examined whether long board tenure among independent audit 
committee members affects audit fees. He examined 1524 year observations of US 
firms for the year 2005 to 2006. The study argues that there are two possible 
relationships between board tenure and audit fees. On the one hand, long board 
tenure audit committee members (defined as members with board tenure of 10 or 
more years) have greater incentive to protect their reputational capital by purchasing 
increased audit effort, which positively affects audit fees. On the other hand, audit 
pricing reflects audit committee quality. Long board tenure audit committee 
members may have less need for increased audit effort because they can effectively 
oversee the financial reporting process themselves, which negatively affects audit 
fees. The study documented a negative association between proportion of long 
board tenure of directors on the independent audit committee and audit fees.The 
result of the study is consistent with the notion that long board tenure among audit 
committee members results in lower audit efforts. 
3.3.3 Ownership Structure and Audit Fees 
Prior studies argued that there are two types of ownership and control structure: 
‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ systems (Frank and Mayer, 1995; Short et al., 1998). The 
classic ‘outsider’ systems are commonly found in the UK and US. The main 
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characteristic of this ‘outsider’ system is dispersed ownership of corporate equity 
amongst a large number of outside investors whereby the firms are controlled by the 
managers but owned by outside shareholders (corporate or individual shareholders). 
As the capital market works based on supply and demand, the shareholders control 
or discipline the action of the managers by selling their share ownership, causing the 
share price to go down. In this way, hostile takeovers might take place and most 
often there will be a change of management. The ‘insider’ system, on the other 
hand, is owned and controlled by identifiable and cohesive groups of ‘insiders’ who 
have longer-term stable relationships with the company. Included in this system is 
insider ownership whereby some of the company’s shares are owned by members of 
the board, the CEO or top management.  
Publicly traded firms in most countries are generally controlled by single and large 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). The controlling shareholder should have 
sufficient financial incentive to reduce his/her willingness to expropriate the wealth 
of outside investors and this relates to the amount of cash flow rights owned. The 
greater the concentration of cash flow rights (ownership) in the hand of largest 
blockholder, the greater his/her incentive to properly run the business (Abdul 
Rahman, 2006). However, concentrated ownership could cause a conflict of interest 
between majority and minority shareholders where expropriation of minority wealth 
by the controlling shareholders could happen. 
Previous empirical studies have documented mixed results on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Using data on 114 NYSE or 
AMEX-listed Corporations in which the majority shareholder owned at least 50.5% 
of the common stock, Holderness and Sheedan (1988) found that shareholding of 
large investors has positive relationship with firm performance. In the same vein, 
McConnell and Servales (1990) also documented a significant positive correlation 
between fraction of shares owned by large investors and firm performance in their 
sample of 1000 firms. The result implies that large shareholders may influence the 
company’s policies and may put pressure on companies to perform well. In 
addition, they also might develop close relationships with directors of the 
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companies to make the directors more accountable on the performance of the 
company. Similarly, examining 1301 publicly traded corporations in eight East 
Asian countries, Claessens et al. (2002) found a significant positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance, especially in 
countries with weaker governance. Therefore the study concluded that ownership 
structure plays an important role in structuring corporate governance mechanisms in 
those countries.  
In contrast, studying 511 large US corporations, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) failed to 
find a significant correlation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. The study deduced that concentrated ownership is endogenously 
determined by a set of firm-level characteristics in the contracting environment. 
Ownership structure is expected to affect agency costs or risk of organisation or its 
auditor. Some forms of ownership structure are considered to increase the auditor’s 
potential exposure to liability and thus increase audit fees. The three measurements 
most commonly used in early studies investigating the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit fees are dummy variables distinguishing between 
public versus private companies, stock versus mutual companies and the existence 
of a major external shareholder.  The variable with the strongest impact on audit 
fees is that which distinguishes between public versus private companies (Hay et al., 
2006). In their study, Hay et al. (2006) found that out of 12 studies using this 
measurement, 8 showed a significant positive relationship with audit fees. On the 
other hand, the existence of a major shareholder for a public company may indicate 
lower agency costs or stronger control (Desender et al., 2009; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006; Hay et al., 2006), with conflicting effects on audit fees.   
In the US, Mitra et al. (2007) examined the empirical relationship between 
ownership characteristics and audit fees. They performed their analysis based on the 
stockholder monitoring argument and proposed that large and sophisticated 
shareholders actively monitor and influence management’s accounting policy 
choice and its strategy for producing financial statement information. They argued 
that managers’ incentive to produce the type of accounting information and the 
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quality of such information depends on the level of their ownership interests in a 
firm. The study considers the effect of both supply and demand factors as there is 
possibly a conflicting relationship between ownership characteristics and audit fees. 
Based on the supply perspective the study argues that large and sophisticated 
shareholders normally actively monitor management and constrain its accounting 
flexibility to produce distorted financial statement information for self-serving 
interests. Therefore the adverse effect of agency problems and inherent risk of 
material misstatements in financial reporting diminish. For such a client, the 
auditor’s assessed audit risk becomes lower, leading to lower engagement efforts 
and/or ex-ante risk premiums and therefore audit fees. In addition, high ownership 
interests (i.e., greater alignment of manager-shareholder interests in a firm) induce 
managers to produce more value-relevant information rather than to 
opportunistically manage accounting numbers for self-serving interests. This has the 
effect of diminishing the inherent risk of material misstatements and therefore the 
overall audit risk and audit fees. On the other hand, the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit fees is likely to hold from the demand perspective as 
well. On one hand, large, sophisticated shareholders as a part of their monitoring 
may require firm managers to purchase high-quality audits as a safeguard against 
fraudulent financial reporting. On the other hand, managers may purchase a high-
quality audit service to increase the perceived credibility of reported financial 
information in an effort to attract investments from large and sophisticated 
shareholders. Furthermore, when their ownership interests are high, managers may 
be inclined to purchase high-quality and extensive audit coverage to create a 
positive perception about the reported financial numbers in order to derive various 
economic benefits. Based on these arguments the study concluded that audit fees are 
jointly determined by both the demand-related and supply-related factors. To find 
the answer to the question of which factor dominates the relationship between 
ownership structure and audit fees, they examined whether stock ownership by 
sophisticated and substantial shareholders and managerial personnel has a 
relationship with audit fees. For this purpose, four ownership constructs were used;  
a. Diffused institutional stock ownership (i.e., aggregate percentage ownership 
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by institutions who individually own less than 5% of the outstanding common 
stock),  
b. Institutional blockholder stock ownership (i.e., aggregate percentage 
ownership by institutions who individually own 5% or more of the 
outstanding common stock),  
c. Non-institutional blockholder stock ownership (i.e., aggregate percentage 
ownership by non-institutional shareholders who individually own 5% or 
more of the outstanding common stock), and  
d. Percentage of stock ownership by managerial personnel.  
Using a sample of 358 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-listed, non-regulated 
industrial firms that were audited by Big Five audit firms and had a fiscal year end 
on December 31, 2000, the study found that diffused institutional stock ownership is 
significantly and positively related to audit fees as a result of institutional investors’ 
demand for the purchase of high-quality audit service as a safeguard against 
fraudulent financial reporting or firms’ endeavour to purchase high-quality audits to 
attract institutional investment in common stock. Consistent with the notion that 
large and substantial shareholder monitoring reduces the inherent risk of material 
misstatements and audit risk, they found that institutional blockholder stock 
ownership is negatively related to audit fees. In addition, Mitra et al. (2007) 
documented that managerial stock ownership is negatively related to audit fees. The 
study suggests that managers with high ownership interests are less likely to engage 
in opportunistic reporting activities, reducing the inherent risk of misstatements in 
the financial reporting process. As a result, the auditor perceives a low level of audit 
risk, leading to a lower price premium and/or audit engagement efforts and therefore 
lower audit fees. The study did not find any evidence that non-institutional 
blockholder stock ownership affects audit fees. The main results of the study hold 
even when the effects of board-related and audit committee variables are factored 
into the analysis. 
In Europe, Desender et al. (2009) investigated how the ownership structure and the 
board of directors affect the demand for external audit. This study is interesting 
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because despite the existence of integration of financial markets, corporate 
financing and governance practices in Continental European countries like France 
or Spain are very different from practices in the US or UK. The study listed a few 
differences between Continental Europe and the Anglo-American system. First, the 
role of market forces in monitoring managers’ behaviour is weaker in France and 
Spain than in Anglo-American countries. Second, the contribution of financial 
markets in corporate financing is lower where external monitoring mechanisms such 
as takeovers, the market for managers and nonexecutive directors, remain marginal 
in the corporate governance process. Third, the French and Spanish environments 
are rather characterised by entrepreneurship culture and high managerial power: 
most public companies exhibit concentrated ownership and are controlled by large 
shareholders who directly monitor managers’ actions and the accounting production 
process as they generally dominate the board of directors. The study claimed that 
using French and Spanish firms allowed them to investigate the demand for audit by 
the board of directors in the context of a non-Anglo-Saxon institutional environment 
where firms are much more concentrated. In addition, focusing on companies from 
countries with a low litigation risk setting allowed them to investigate the 
importance of the director’s legal liability on the demand for audit. Referring to 
other prior literature like Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Hillman and Dalziel (2003), 
which described the two main functions of the Board of Directors as monitoring and 
providing resources (e.g. legitimacy, advice and counsel, links to other 
organisations, etc.), the study argued that: 
a. The ownership structure directly influences the priorities set by the board 
of directors, 
b. The demand for audit by the board of directors depends on the board’s 
primary focus.  
The study explained that the monitoring role of the board is most important in 
dispersed ownership companies as there is a great need to use the board of directors 
to monitor the managers. In contrast, when ownership is concentrated, large 
shareholders, who are already motivated to monitor management, have a lot of 
influence beyond the board, more access to valuable information and have 
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alternative corporate governance mechanisms to discipline the managers if 
necessary. Therefore, those boards with a strong focus on monitoring are more 
likely to favour a higher demand of audit compared to boards with a focus on 
providing resources to management. Based on 2007 data from 247 French and 
Spanish listed companies the study found that the ownership structure has a 
significant influence on the relationship between the demand for audit and board 
characteristics. Similar to the findings for Anglo-American companies the study 
found that board independence and CEO duality (i.e. the CEO also serves as 
Chairman of the Board) are significantly related to audit fees for firms with 
dispersed ownership. However, for closely held firms, the study did not find any 
significant relationship between board characteristics and the demand for external 
audit.  The result of the study implies that a firm’s ownership structure has an 
important influence on the behaviour of the board of directors. 
In the UK, the relationship between ownership structures and audit quality was 
investigated by O’Sullivan (2000) using data prior to the adoption of the Cadbury 
Report (1992). His study was motivated by Chan et al. (1993), who suggest that 
shareholders in companies with widely dispersed ownership are expected to place 
particular reliance on auditing as a means of monitoring managerial behaviour. The 
study argues that as ownership becomes more dispersed, direct monitoring by 
shareholders becomes more costly and greater reliance on the audit as a mechanism 
of governance is expected. In a more concentrated ownership, block shareholders 
possess a greater incentive to actively monitor managerial behaviour due to the size 
of their equity holdings and the likely cost to them of any non-value-maximising 
behaviour by managers. Such shareholders are expected to view the audit process as 
an important mechanism through which they can monitor managerial behaviour. 
Based on these arguments, the study expected higher audit fees both in companies 
with widely dispersed ownership (due to the appropriateness of auditor monitoring 
compared to other monitoring mechanisms and the bonding motivation of 
managers), and also in companies with large external blockholders (due to such 
blockholders having the financial incentives to ensure maximum monitoring is 
undertaken).  
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O’Sullivan (2000) also examined the impact of management share ownership on 
audit fees. The study refers to the argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders may be reconciled when 
managers possess an ownership interest in their companies. Managerial ownership 
serves to realign the interests of shareholders and managers, therefore reducing the 
need for intensive auditing. Furthermore, a significant portion of equity 
shareholding could reduce incentive for the management to issue misleading 
information to shareholders, so auditors are less likely to need to undertake 
additional testing.  This suggests that the extent of auditing and ultimately the audit 
fee will be negatively related to the degree of managerial ownership, but at higher 
ownership levels, auditing is expected to be more intensive, reflecting the increased 
likelihood of managerial entrenchment. Based on data of 402 quoted UK companies 
in 1992, the study found enough evidence to argue that audit fees are negatively 
related to the proportion of equity owned by executive directors. However, the study 
failed to document any evidence that large blockholder ownership (partitioned into 
% ownership by institutional investors and % ownership by non-institutional 
investors) has significant impact on audit fees. 
While previous studies in the UK (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2000) used proportion of total 
equity owned by institutional investors and proportion of total equity own by non-
institutional investors to measure block ownership, Adelopo et al. (2012) examined 
the impact of ownership structure on audit pricing using number of Multiple Large 
Shareholders (MLS-the number of large shareholders holding at least 3 percent of 
the total voting shares in a company). The study used the number of MLS to define 
ownership concentration in a firm and to categorise firms in their sample. It is 
indicated in Adelopo et al. (2012) that they use MLS to respond to the open call in 
Edmans and Manso (2009) to use MLS since the number of MLS matters in 
corporate monitoring as it is a relevant determinant of market efficiency or strength 
of corporate governance. The study is also an extension of Mitra et al.’s (2007) 
direct examination of the relationship between ownership structure as a part of 
corporate governance and the level of audit fees. The study partitioned the sample 
into three categories with equal ranges, i.e. firms where MLS ≤4 (diffused firms), 
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5≤MLS≤8 (concentrated firms) 9≤MLS≤12 (highly concentrated firms). The study 
found significant differences between audit fees, company size and committee 
meetings for each of these three groups using one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). The study also investigated the relationship between the number of 
MLS, Audit committee activity and audit fees in a multiple regression model that 
controlled for additional variables including firm-specific and governance variables. 
Hypothetically, they expect that when a firm has more MLS (concentrated firms), 
monitoring by active shareholders and monitoring by block-holders will increase, 
and this will most likely impact positively on internal control and mitigate 
misreporting. This is because the improvements in internal control should reduce 
audit risk, hence reducing audit fees. Their findings are consistent with this 
conjecture. Specifically, the study found that the number of MLS is significantly 
and negatively related to audit fees. This suggests that the higher the number of 
MLS, the higher the ownership concentration and the lower the audit fees paid to 
the external auditors. Table 3.1 summarises prior audit pricing and corporate 
governance studies since the 1990s.  
In conclusion, literature review on corporate governance and audit pricing in the UK 
shows that most studies have been done using 1990s data, around the Cadbury 
period. Since then, corporate governance in the UK has gone through rapid 
development especially with regards to board and audit committee effectiveness. 
Higgs Report (2003), Smith Report (2003) and consequently Combine Code (2003), 
have brought many changes to the corporate governance especially with regard to 
audit committee effectiveness. Therefore, this study aims to fulfil this gap. In the 
interim, the study contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between 
governance and audit pricing using more comprehensive characteristics including 
board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ownership structure.  In 
addition, the more comprehensive measurements of the characteristics are 
employed. There are two studies that use data in 2000s (Zaman et al., 2011; 
Adelopo et al., 2012). However, Adelopo et al. (2012) only focus on the impact of 
Multiple Large Shareholders and audit committee activity on audit fees. The quite 
similar study is done by Zaman et al. (2011). They have investigated the 
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relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees using a more recent 
data (2001-2004 UK-data). However, this study is different from Zaman et al. 
(2011) in a few ways. Firstly, this study consist more comprehensive governance 
characteristics including board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and 
ownership structure while Zaman et al. (2011) focus more on audit committee 
effectiveness and audit pricing. Secondly, Zaman et al. (2011) covers the period 
before and around Smith Report (2003), therefore the study cannot actually capture 
the effect of recommendation of Smith Report (2003). On the other hand, this study 
use data in 2007 and 2010 which capture the impact of the recommendation (Smith 
Report, 2003) on audit pricing. Thirdly, Zaman et al. (2011) use a very small sample 
size (135 FTSE 350 companies) to arrive at their conclusion while this study utilises 
data of 384 FTSE All Shares listed companies.Therefore, the conclusion from this 
study also covers the smaller companies listed on FTSE Small Capital which are 
ignored in earlier studies. Fourth, this study contributes to the literature since 
Financial Institutions which are ignored in Zaman et al. (2011) and the previous. 
The collapse of the UK Banking Institutions justifies the inclusion of this industry in 
the study. In addition, this study also investigates the impact of economic condition 
on the relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees by having a 
comparison between pre- and post-economic crisis on the relationship between 
governance characteristics and audit fees. 
 
77 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Empirical Studies Examining the Influence of Corporate Governance Characteristics on Audit Fees 
Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study(Country) Main Findings 
 
Collier and  Gregory (1996) 
 
(EAR) 
 
Seek to establish whether audit 
committees are effective in ensuring 
audit quality by protecting the auditors 
from fee cuts which might affect audit 
quality 
 
 
1989-1991 data from  315 FTSE 
companies 
 
(UK) 
 
 The relationship between size-related audit fees and the presence of 
an audit committee is positive and significant. 
 Insignificant negative relationship between risk-and complexity-
related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee. 
O’Sullivan (1999) 
 
(EAR) 
Examines the impact of board and audit 
committee characteristics on the audit 
fee paid by large UK companies in the 
post –Cadbury (1992) period. 
146 large UK listed companies at the 
end of the 1995 financial year 
 
 
(UK) 
 Results suggest that audit fees remain predominantly influenced by 
the size, complexity and risk of the audit client. 
 Companies operating in regulated industries pay lower audit fees. 
 No evidence that board and audit committee characteristics 
influence auditors’ pricing decisions  
 Any fee reductions expected due to improved board monitoring may 
be counterbalanced by the increase in audit effort and assurances 
desired by non-executive directors 
 
O’Sullivan (2000) 
 
(BAR) 
 
Examines the impact of board 
composition and ownership structure on 
audit quality in the UK prior to the 
adoption of Cadbury (1992) 
1992 data from 402 quoted  companies 
 
(UK) 
 The proportion of non-executive directors has a significant positive 
impact on audit fees 
 Audit fees are negatively related to the proportion of equity owned 
by executive directors 
 No evidence that ownership by large blockholders or 
CEO/chairman duality has a significant impact on audit fees. 
 
Peel and Clatworthy (2001) 
(CGIR) 
 
To present the results of a pre-Cadbury 
study of the impact of board 
composition variables on audit pricing 
1992 data from 132 listed firms, which 
were the first companies required to 
disclose consultancy fees under a 
change to UK disclosure requirements 
(UK) 
 
 It was found that, consistent with a post-Cadbury study of UK 
quoted firms (O'Sullivan, 1999), a range of board composition 
variables were insignificantly related to audit fees 
 Higher consultancy fees were found to be associated with higher 
audit fees. 
 While prior research has shown that the aggregated level of 
institutional and managerial ownership is negatively associated with 
audit fees, the study finds only directors' ownership has a significant 
impact. 
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Author(s) (Publication) Objective(s) of study Details of study(Country) Main Findings 
 
Felix et al. (2001) 
(JAR) 
 
 
This study investigates the effect of 
internal audit contribution on the 
external audit fee. 
 
 
Based on publicly available data and 
survey responses from internal and 
external auditors affiliated with 70 Non- 
financial service Fortune 1000 
companies, undertaken in 1997 
(USA) 
 
 Internal audit contribution is a significant determinant of the 
external audit fee.  
  Examination of the factors influencing internal audit contribution 
suggests that internal audit contribution is influenced by internal 
audit quality. 
 As inherent risk increases, the effect of internal audit availability on 
contribution diminishes, while the effect of coordination on 
contribution increases.  
 Overall, the findings suggest that internal audit contribution can 
result in reduced external audit fees, and that client firms can 
potentially affect internal audit contribution by investing in internal 
audit quality, managing availability, and facilitating coordination 
between the internal and external auditors. 
 
Tsui et al. (2001) 
 
(JAAF) 
 
The study examines the relationship 
between a firm's internal monitoring 
mechanism and its impact on the audit 
fee. 
650 non-financial companies in Hong 
Kong between 1994-1996 
(Hong Kong) 
 Independence of corporate boards (chief executive officer and 
chairman being separate individuals) is an important factor in 
auditors' assessment of control risk and the determination of audit 
fees. 
 The negative association between audit fees and independent 
corporate boards is stronger (weaker) for firms with low (high) 
growth opportunities. 
 
Carcello, et al. (2002) 
 
(CAR) 
Examines the relationship between three 
board characteristics (independence, 
diligence and expertise) and Big 6 audit 
fees  
 
Data from 258 companies from Fortune 
1000 companies in 1992-93 
(USA) 
 Significant positive relationship between audit fees and board 
independence, diligence and expertise. 
O’Sullivan, and Diacon 
(2002) 
 
(IJA) 
Compare the pricing of audits in mutual 
and proprietary insurance companies  
(including audit committees and non-
audit fees) 
 
1992 data from 117 UK insurance 
companies 
(UK) 
 
 
 
 
 Mutual insurers pay significantly lower audit fees compared to their 
proprietary counterparts 
 Existence of an audit committee has a positive impact on audit fees 
paid by companies. 
 Audit fees are not sensitive to the composition of audit committees. 
 There is weak evidence of the relationship between provision of 
non-audit service and audit fees. No evidence linking audit fees and 
nature of non-audit service. Company size and complexity are the 
most important determinants of audit pricing in insurance 
companies, with significant price reductions earned by insurers 
specializing in either general or life insurance business. 
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Larcker and Richardson 
(2004a) 
(JAR) 
 
 
To examine the relationship between 
the fees paid to audit firms for audit and 
non-audit services and the behavior of 
accounting accruals. 
2000-2001 data from 5,815 firm-years  
(USA) 
 
 The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive relation with 
the absolute value of accruals 
 Using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of firms with a 
homogenous regression structure reveals that the positive 
association only occurs for about 8.5% of the sample  
 Find consistent evidence of a negative relation between the level of 
fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to auditors and accruals (i.e., 
higher fees are associated with smaller accruals) 
 The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative relation is 
strongest for client firms with weak governance 
 
Abbott et al. (2003b) 
(CAR) 
 
Examine the association between audit 
committee characteristics and the ratio 
of non-audit service(NAS)  fees to audit 
fees 
 
538 companies filing proxies with SEC 
between Feb 5, 2001 and June 30 2001    
( excluding mutual funds and other 
financial registrants) 
(USA) 
 
 Audit committees comprised solely of independent directors 
meeting at least four times annually have significant negative 
association with the NAS fee ratio. 
Abbott  et al. (2003a) 
(AJPT) 
 
Examine the association between 
certain audit committee characteristics 
and audit fees.  
 
2001 data from 492 non-regulated, Big 
5-audited firms that filed annual proxy 
statements with the SEC between 
February 5, 2001 and June 30, 2001 
(USA) 
 Audit committee independence (defined as committees comprised 
solely of independent directors) and expertise (defined as 
committees that include at least one director with financial expertise 
per BRC recommendations) are significantly, positively associated 
with audit fees. 
 Meeting frequency (a threshold of four meetings per year) was not 
significantly associated with audit fees, indicating a relationship 
between these audit committee characteristics and a demand for 
increased audit coverage, reflected in higher fees.  
 
Lee et al. (2004) 
AJPT) 
Examines the relationship between 
audit committee and board 
independence and auditor resignations.  
Data from 190 firms with auditor 
resignations and a matched sample of 
190 firms with auditor dismissals during 
the period from 1996 to 2000. 
(USA) 
 Audit committee and board of director independence are both 
negatively associated with the likelihood of auditor resignation.  
 The financial expertise of the audit committee members is inversely 
related to auditor resignations 
 Audit committee independence is positively related with the quality 
(change of auditor from local or national to big audit firm) of the 
firm's successor auditor.  
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Lee and Mande (2005) 
(QJBE) 
 
Examines the association between the 
fees paid to the external auditor and 
effective audit committees 
2000 data from  792 firms from the 
Investor Responsibility Research 
Center’s (IRRC) database 
(US) 
 Effectiveness of audit committee, measured by composite of audit 
committee independence and diligence, is positively associated with 
audit fees. 
 Initial results also suggest that effective audit committees seek to 
increase audit quality by reducing the non-audit services provided 
by the external auditor.  
 Once the non-audit fee is modelled endogenously the results show 
that there is no statistically significant association between the non-
audit fees and audit committee effectiveness. 
 
Goodwin-Steward and Kent 
(2006) 
 
(A&F) 
 
Examines the association between audit 
fees, an effective audit committee and 
internal audit in an Australian setting. 
2000 data from 401 Australian public 
listed companies – combining survey 
and public data. 
 
(Australia) 
 
 Significant positive associations between the level of audit fees and 
the existence of an audit committee, the use of internal audit and 
audit committee meeting frequency. 
 Significant three-way interaction between audit committee 
independence, expertise and meeting frequency. 
 Additional analysis indicates that expertise is positively associated 
with audit fees only when meeting frequency and independence are 
low-consistent with audit committee members with accounting 
expertise demanding a higher level of assurance in these 
circumstances. 
 
Knechel and  Willekens  
(2006) 
(JBFA) 
Examines the role of risks and controls 
in the determination of audit fees 
 
2001 data from  50 Belgian companies 
that were listed on Euronext Brussels on 
December 31, 2001  
(Belgium) 
 
 
 Audit fees are higher when a company has an audit committee, 
discloses a relatively high level of financial risk management, and 
has a larger proportion of independent Board Members.  
 Audit fees are lower when a company discloses a relatively high 
level of compliance risk management.  
Mitra et al.. (2007) (RQFA) 
 
 
Examines the empirical relationship 
between ownership characteristics and 
audit fees 
2000 data from 358 New York Stock 
Exchange-listed firms audited by the 
Big Five auditors 
(USA) 
 Significantly positive relationship between diffused institutional 
stock ownership (i.e., having less than 5% individual shareholding) 
and audit fees 
  a significantly negative relationship between institutional  block-
holder ownership (i.e. having 5% or more individual shareholding ) 
and audit fees.  
 Managerial stock ownership is negatively associated with audit 
fees.  
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Mat Zain and Subramaniam 
(2007) 
(CGIR) 
 
 
To test the impact of audit committee 
and internal audit function 
characteristics on internal audit 
contribution to the financial statement 
audit. 
 
Data obtained from 76 questionnaires to 
chief internal auditors of companies 
listed on Malaysian stock exchange, 11 
in-depth interviews with chief internal 
auditors and publish data. 
(Malaysia) 
 Positive relationship between IA contribution to the financial 
statement audit and three  dimensions of audit committee 
characteristics, namely, the proportion of independent audit 
committee members, the extent of audit committee members’ 
experience and knowledge in auditing, accounting and finance and 
the frequency of meetings between the chief internal audit and the 
audit committee-high proportion of independent audit committee 
members with experience and knowledge in accounting, auditing 
and finance is able to enhance the efficacy of the IA function and 
encourages external auditors to rely more on the IA FUNCTION. 
 Positive relationship between the characteristics of IA function ( 
size of IA, the proportion of staff with prior experience in auditing) 
and IA contribution to the financial statement audit 
 Insignificant relationship between IA contribution to financial 
statement audit and external audit fees. 
 Found positive association between audit fees and client size, client 
complexity and risk and a negative relationship with profitability. 
 
  Vafeas and Waegelein 
(2007) 
(RQFA) 
 
 
Examines the relationship of measures 
of audit committee effectiveness and 
compensation incentives with corporate 
audit fees.  
 
2001–2003 data from Fortune 500 
companies Fortune 500 companies 
(USA) 
 Audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee 
member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, 
consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a 
complement to external auditors in monitoring management.  
 CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to 
audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating 
management.  
Boo and Sharma (2008) 
(A&F) 
Examines the relationship between 
internal governance, external audit 
monitoring and regulatory oversight  
2001 data from 469 large listed 
companies comprising 252 finance 
companies and 217 companies from 
non-regulated industries.  
(USA) 
 
 
 The association between audit fees and board / audit committee 
independence and size are weaker for regulated companies 
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Ittonen et al. (2008) 
(SSRN) 
Examines the association between 
female audit committee representation 
and audit fees 
2006 data from 407 S&P 500 firms 
listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges 
excluding financial institutions. 
(US) 
 Firms with female audit committee representation have significantly 
lower audit fees.  
Hay et al.(2008) 
IJA) 
Examines the relationship between 
controls and external auditing is one of 
substitution, or a complementary 
relationship. 
1995-2005 data from 83 listed company 
(excluding financial institution) 
(New Zealand) 
 Measures of internal auditing, corporate governance, and 
concentration of ownership are all positively related to audit fees 
(Messier et al.(2011) 
(AR) 
 
Examines how using the internal audit 
function (IAF) as a management ground 
(MTG) affects internal audit quality.  
2000-2005 data from 572 firm-year 
observations from 232 companies in 47 
different two-digit SIC code industries 
 (USA) 
 External audit fees are significantly higher for companies that use 
the CAE position as a MTG and evidence shows that this result is 
caused by external auditors concern with the internal auditors’ 
objectivity rather than a reduction in internal auditor competence. 
 
Abbott et al.(2009) 
 
SSRN 
Examines the association between audit 
committee characteristics  and audit 
fees  
262 non-regulated, big 5 audited firms 
that filed both 10-K and Proxy forms 
with SEC in 2001. 
(US) 
 Audit committees comprised solely of independent directors that 
meet at least four time annually are significantly, positively 
associated with audit fees 
 
Desender et al. (2009) 
(SMJ) 
Strategic Management 
Journal-Forthcoming 
Investigates how the ownership 
structure and the board of directors 
affect the demand for external audit. 
2007 data from 247 French and Spanish 
listed companies 
(France and Spain) 
 The ownership structure has a significant influence on the board’s 
priorities and the demand for audit.  
 For widely-held firms, they find that board independence and CEO 
duality are significantly related to the audit fees. 
 For closely-held firms, the relationship between board 
characteristics and the demand for external audit becomes 
insignificant. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) 
 
(JAAF) 
Examines the relation between audit 
fees and a key determinant of the audit 
committee’s effectiveness-that is, the 
financial expertise (accounting or non- 
accounting) of the audit committee. 
2000-2002 data for 801 firm-year 
observations (2000-2002) from S & P 500 
companies with exception of Financial 
institutions and companies not audited byy 
Big 4 audit firms.      (USA) 
 Audit pricing is negatively related to accounting financial expertise 
but not to non-financial expertise.  
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O’Sullivan (2009) 
(AF)  
Examines the impact of directors’ and 
officers’ (D&O) insurance on audit 
pricing in a large sample of UK 
companies. 
Data from 753 public companies listed 
on London Stock Exchange for the year 
1992. 
(UK) 
 It was found  that D&O insurance is associated with higher audit 
fees and also  confirms that insured companies are larger, more 
complex and present a greater audit risk (using a range of measures) 
than uninsured companies.  
 Further analysis suggests that the impact of D&O insurance on audit 
fees may be influenced by company size, auditor size, and the 
extent of non-executive presence on the company’s board. 
 
Rainsbury et al.(2009) 
(JCAE) 
Examines the association between the 
quality of audit committees on financial 
reporting quality and external audit fees 
in an environment where the formation 
of audit committees was unregulated 
 
Data from 87 listed companies on New 
Zealand Stock Exchange in 2001. 
(New Zealand) 
 Show no significant association between the quality of an audit 
committee and the quality of financial reporting. The results are 
robust to alternative measures of earnings quality.  
 The quality of audit committees has little impact on the level of fees 
paid to external auditors. 
 The results suggest that the benefits of ‘best practice’ audit 
committees may be less than anticipated by regulators and 
policymakers. 
 
Tengamnuay and Stapleton 
(2009) 
(JMG) 
Examines the perceptions of audit 
committee members, investors and 
analysts about the roles ACs perform 
and the importance of these roles 
623 survey responses from chairman, 
chair of ACS, CIAs,CFOs,CPAs, 
investors and financial analyst. 
(Thailand) 
 
 It was found that ACs placed greater emphasis on internal control 
systems, including internal audit and review of audit fees, than on 
roles associated with external audit and financial statements, 
indicative of an early stage in the process of evolutionary 
development. 
 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) 
 
(MAJ) 
 
Examines the association between audit 
committee characteristics and 
auditors’ compensation and dismissals 
following the enactment of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX). 
Data from 2,393 companies (8,306 audit 
committee members) in 2004 
(USA) 
 Audit committee size and diligence are associated with higher audit 
fees.  
 The proportion of experts on the audit committee is positively 
associated with the level of assurance. 
 Experts with supervisory experience demand higher quality audits 
(higher audit fees) as compared to accounting financial experts. 
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Engel et al. (2010) 
(JAE) 
Examine the relation between audit 
committee compensation and the 
demand for monitoring of the financial 
reporting process. 
Data from 3295 firm-year observations 
covering the period between 2000-2004 
excluding utilities and financial 
institutions. 
(USA) 
 Found positive correlation between total compensation and cash 
retainers paid to audit committees and audit fees and also the impact 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, suggesting a positive link between audit 
committee compensation and the audit committee’s demand for 
financial reporting process monitoring. 
Ho and Hutchinson (2010) 
(JIAAT) 
 
Examine the linkages between various 
internal audit characteristics and 
activities of Hong Kong firms and 
external audit fees. 
53 public listed companies on Hong 
Kong stock Exchange that responded to 
the survey in 2004. 
(Hong Kong) 
 
Lower audit fees associate with: Larger internal audit departments,  
Internal auditors who spend more time on examining financial 
statement and external audit related matters, Internal auditors who 
spend more time on system development and maintenance, Internal 
auditors who spend more time on reviewing operating efficiency and 
effectiveness including internal control, Internal auditors who spend 
more time on fraud investigations and special projects, Internal 
auditors who give external auditor more access to internal auditor’s 
working papers. 
 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos 
(2010) 
(AA) 
Investigates the relation between audit 
pricing, quality of earnings and board 
independence. 
Data from 248 firm year 
observation(from 97 companies listed 
on Athens Stock Exchange) for five 
years(2000-2004) 
(Greece) 
The results show a positive association between: 
 Board independence and audit pricing (means strong 
governance is related to increased needs for quality assurance 
services ) 
 Audit pricing and earnings management for a small size 
companies( might indicate potential red flag) 
Masli et al.(2010) 
(AR) 
Examining the potential benefits of 
Internal Control Monitoring 
Technology. 
Data from 139 firm year observations of 
firms announcing SOX-related ICM 
technology initiatives over a four-year 
period (2003-2006)  (USA) 
 Implementation of internal control monitoring technology is 
associated with lower likelihood of material weaknesses, smaller 
increase in audit fees and smaller increases in audit delays during 
the post-SOX time period. 
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Gul and Goodwin (2010) 
(AR) 
Examine whether a firm’s short-term 
debt maturity structure is associated 
with auditor assessment of audit risk 
and consequently audit fees 
Data from  9,632 firm years 
observations from  2003 to 2006 
excluding financial companies 
 
(USA) 
 Find that short-term debt is negatively related to audit fees for firms 
rated by Standard & Poor’s- consistent with more monitoring and 
better governance mechanisms in firms with higher short-term debt 
 Credit ratings quality is negatively related to audit fees, consistent 
with ratings quality reflecting a firm’s liquidity risk, governance 
mechanisms, and monitoring from rating agencies   
 Find that the negative relationship between short-term debt and 
audit fees is stronger for firms with low-quality credit ratings 
 
 
Zaman et al. (2011) 
(JBFA) 
Examine the influence of audit 
committee effectiveness a proxy for 
governance quality on audit fees and 
non-audit fees using a new composite 
measure comprising audit committee 
independence, expertise, diligence and 
size. 
Data from 135 companies (540 company 
year observations) of UK FTSE-350 in 
2001-2004 
(UK) 
 Provide evidence that audit committee effectiveness (ACE) has 
significant positive impact on audit fees after controlling for board 
characteristics. 
 Frequency of board meeting, LnTA(size), number of subsidiary 
company and BIG4 have significant  positive association with audit 
fees. 
 Major blockholder has negative relationship with audit fees. 
 ACE has positive association with Non-audit service fee(NASF)  
 NASF  is negatively associated with audit committee financial 
expertise and audit committee independence and positively 
associated with audit committee size. 
 Board meeting, CEO-duality, board independence, company size 
and BIG4 has positive association with NASF. 
 
 
Bliss  (2011) 
(A&F) 
Examines whether CEO duality affects 
the association between board 
independence and demand for higher 
quality audits, proxied by audit fee 
950 Australian  publicly listed 
companies in 2003 
(Australia) 
 There is a positive association between board independence and 
audit fees 
 Positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, 
thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence 
 Board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively 
associated with audit fees. 
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 Found that widely held firms are bigger in size, tend to pay more in 
audit fees and have more active audit committees. Results from 
multiple regression models confirm a significant negative 
relationship between audit fees and number of MLS. And  found a 
positive relationship between audit fees and audit committee 
activities 
Redmayne et al. (2011) 
(IJAu) 
Examines the association between the 
existence of an audit committee and 
audit fees 
New Zealand public sector entities for 
the period 1998–2000, when audit 
committee formation was voluntary 
(New Zealand) 
 There is a positive association between audit committees and audit 
fees (but no significant interaction terms)  in profit-oriented public 
sector entities 
 Audit committees are associated with lower audit fees and interact 
with audit risk in  public-benefit entities. 
Booth et al. (2012) 
(AFR) 
Examines the relation between audit 
fees and managerial incentives in the 
mutual fund industry 
6,543 funds in 2010 
(USA) 
 Audit fees are higher when managerial incentives with respect to 
reporting are poor. 
Gotti et al. (2012) 
(JAAF) 
Study whether managerial ownership 
and analyst coverage relate to audit fees 
Data of 7,214 firm-year observations for 
the period 2000 to 2007 
(USA) 
 Find that managerial equity holdings and analyst coverage are 
negatively associated with audit fees and that these associations are 
both statistically and economically significant 
Adelopo et al. (2012) 
(JAAR) 
 
Examines the impact of ownership 
structure on audit pricing using number 
of Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS). 
Data from 209 listed companies on 
FTSE 350 excluding financial 
institutions and utilities companies. 
(UK) 
 Found that majority of listed firms in the UK have multiple large 
shareholders.  
 One way-ANOVA result showed that there are statistically 
significant differences in the audit fees, firm size and audit 
committee activities of these firms when they are categorised into 
“widely held”, “concentrated” and “highly concentrated” firms.  
Chan et al. (2012) 
(A&F) 
Examines whether independent audit 
committee members’ board tenure 
affects audit fees 
1524 firm-year observations for years 
2005 and 2006  
(USA) 
 Audit fees are negatively associated with the proportion of long 
board tenure directors on the independent audit committee, 
consistent with the notion that audit committee members’ long 
board tenure results in lower audit effort. 
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3.4  Non-Audit Fees Literature 
3.4.1 Non-Audit Fees and Auditor Independence 
With Enron and other corporate scandals leading to a perceived failure of 
corporate governance, the issue of auditors simultaneously providing non-audit 
services became the focus of much discussion.  This is due to the fact that the 
responsible auditor (Arthur Andersen), who audited companies involved in the 
three biggest US bankruptcies (Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing), 
obtained more revenue from these companies from the provision of non-audit 
services (NAS) than from audit services. The over-reliance of audit firms on 
earnings from non-audit services is frequently cited as the reason why their 
independence as public “watch dogs” may be impaired and, as a result, it is 
claimed that drastic changes are needed to restore the confidence of the public. 
Such claims could be due to the fact that many accounting firms appeared to 
focus more on revenue generation and firm growth, especially in the 1980s, and 
sales of non-audit services became a major strategy for achieving firm growth 
(Vinatoru and Calota, 2009). 
Responding to the controversial scandals mentioned above, and in an attempt to 
restore public confidence in an accounting profession which has been badly 
damaged in the eyes of the public, the accounting professions in many countries 
have produced guidelines on the code of ethics for auditors (Che Ahmad et al., 
2006). This could, in one way or another, ensure the independence of auditors 
and hence protect the interests of investors. In the USA, the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was designed to safeguard  the interests of 
shareholders and they have brought about some fundamental changes for 
auditing firms and their clients regarding the joint provision of audit and non-
audit services (Davis and Hollie, 2004). Audit firms are now prohibited from 
providing certain non-audit services to their clients. The prohibited services 
include: information technology work, internal audit work and expert services. 
Prior to this, SEC rules only required listed companies to disclose the amount 
paid to the incumbent auditors for non-audit services (SEC, 2000).  
Before the Andersen scandal, many studies had attempted to investigate the 
issue of non-audit fees; however, the public only became aware of the 
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importance of such research from a public policy perspective after that case.  In 
the early 1990s it was revealed that many companies paid more to their auditor 
for non-audit services than for the audit service (Ezzamel et al., 1996) and 
disclosure of the breakdown of non-audit services was very limited.  A study in 
2005 by Bigus and Zimmerman (2008) also found that among German 
companies non-audit services accounted for 42% of total fees, earning them 
nearly as much revenue as audit services. In Switzerland, the mean of non-audit 
fees to total fees amounted to 37.4% for listed firms (Stefani, 2006 as cited in 
Bigus and Zimmerman, 2008) and for listed firms in the UK, at 67.5% in 2002, 
the figure was significantly higher (Beattie et al., 2003). These findings could 
explain the growing public concern regarding auditor independence.  
Following the requirement for disclosure of non-audit fees by the SEC, Frankel 
et al. (2002) carried out a US-based study of 3074 proxy statements on the 
SEC’s EdGAR database, with filing dates between February 5, 2001 and June 
15, 2001. It was found that non-audit fees are positively associated with the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals and negatively associated with share value 
on the date of fee disclosure. This could mean that shareholders are suspicious 
that the existence of non-audit fees might affect auditor independence. The 
results of Frankel et al. (2002) have stimulated great interest among other 
researchers regarding the association between non-audit and auditor 
independence. Hay et al. (2006) and Antle et al. (2006), however, failed to find 
any evidence that non-audit fees affect auditor independence. In contrast to the 
above findings, Wines (1994) reported results consistent with apparent 
independence impairment. Using a small matched sample of 29 financially 
distressed U.K. firms, Basioudis et al. (2006) also found that the magnitude both 
of audit fees and non-audit fees is significantly associated with the issuance of a 
going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinion. Contrary to findings of previous 
studies in the USA that documented no evidence of any impact of non-audit fees 
on auditor independence, Srinidhi and Gul (2007) found significant evidence to 
link the two variables based on their study using 2000 to 2001 data on 
financially distressed firms in the USA.  
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3.4.2 Non-Audit Fees and Audit Fees 
The non-audit services most commonly offered by audit firms as listed by Firth 
(1997) include tax consultancy, system consultancy, management advice, 
international business advice, human resource management and financial and 
investment consultancies. The relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees 
has attracted much interest among researchers since the 1980s (e.g., Simunic 
1984; Hillison and Kennelley, 1988; Firth 1997, Butterworth and Houghton, 
1995). Investigation of the reasons for the dramatic increase in non-audit fees is 
a really important research area and has become more important even than the 
audit fee itself. Simunic (1984) analysed the client's decision to purchase MAS 
and audit services when their production functions are interdependent and tested 
for the existence and pricing effects of such knowledge spillovers. The data for 
the study were taken from the 397 observations of publicly held U.S. companies, 
collected as a stratified random sample by Simunic (1980), which (1) used a Big 
Eight auditor; (2) responded to the question which asked for the dollar amount of 
MAS fees paid to the auditor during the fiscal year 1976 and 1977; and (3) 
reported assets of less than $3 billion. The final sample of the study included 263 
companies. The study found that the audit fees of clients who also purchase MAS 
from their auditors are significantly higher than audit fees of clients who do not 
do so. This result is consistent with the existence of efficiencies from joint 
production; however, the study also argues that while efficiencies from joint 
production may exist, this does not imply that joint performance of MAS and 
auditing is necessarily desirable. This is because efficiencies can be partially 
appropriated as rents to the CPA firm supplier, and hence can themselves create 
a threat to audit independence.  
McMeeking et al. (2006) stated that the big firm premium might be explained in 
terms of interdependence between the fees charged by auditors for audit and 
non-audit services.  Some researchers argue that a negative relationship could 
exist between audit fees and non-audit fees due to “knowledge spillover” 
(Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 1997; Whisenant et al., 2003). “Knowledge 
Spillover” is a synergy or external economy “arising from providing audit and 
NAS as joint products” (Abdel-Khalik, 1990). Obtaining the NAS from the 
incumbent auditor is cost efficient where it could reduce client search and 
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transaction costs. Abdel-Khalik (1990, p. 296) argues that any efficiencies 
flowing from knowledge spillover should result in lower costs if a single auditor 
supplies both services than if the two services are sourced from two different 
audit firms. In addition, an auditor offering both types of service develops a 
greater understanding of the client company and hence the amount of audit 
testing and investigation could be reduced, leading to lower audit fees. However, 
similar to  Palmrose (1986b), Abdel-Khalik (1990) finds audit fees do not differ 
significantly between clients purchasing audit services alone and those 
purchasing both audit and non-audit services. Firth (1997a) finds that audit and 
non-audit fees are positively related and contends that there is no apparent 
reason why this is so. More recent research which examined knowledge 
spillover using a simultaneous system of audit fee equations has also provided 
inconsistent results. While Whisenant et al. (2003) and Hay et al. (2006) 
reported no knowledge spillover, Antle et al. (2006) found evidence of 
knowledge spillover between audit and non-audit services. In an experimental 
setting, Joe and Vandervelde (2007) investigated whether knowledge gained 
from working on a non-audit task can be transferred to enhance the performance 
of the audit task. It was found that higher risk assessments were made by 
auditors who performed both services than were made by auditors who 
performed only audit services and had no access to the non-audit service 
working papers. The benefit from the “knowledge spillover” effect may be 
passed on by the auditor to their client in the form of reduced audit fees charges. 
On the other hand, in a competitive environment where client companies have 
more opportunity to change auditor and take advantage of the “low balling” 
associated with a newly appointed auditor, the auditor may try to avoid dismissal 
by reducing the audit fees and will recover the loss by increasing the NAS fees 
(Hillison & Kenneley, 1988). The situation whereby the auditor charges lower 
audit fees to gain more lucrative consultancy work from their client is called a 
“Loss leader” (Che Ahmad, 2006). 
Despite the above theories (knowledge spillover and loss leader theory), many 
studies have found that non-audit fees are positively related to audit fees. Out of 
19 studies from 1980–2003, 16 found a positive relationship, 1 showed an 
insignificant and 2 a significant negative relationship, and the overall meta-
91 
 
analysis confirmed the positive relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
fees (Hay et al., 2006). A number of explanations have been offered for this 
apparently counter-intuitive result. First, it was argued by Simunic (1984) and 
Firth (2002) that the joint supply of audit and NAS will reduce the price per unit 
of the audit service, which leads to an increased demand for additional services 
by client companies, assuming that the demand for audit services is price-elastic. 
This course of action will increase the total audit cost. Second, the positive 
relationship might be due to client specific event(s) which generate demand for 
consultancy services and subsequently necessitate additional auditing (Ezzamel 
et al., 2002; Firth, 2002). Specific events in a company such as mergers and 
acquisitions, share issues, implementation of new accounting and information 
systems, appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and corporate 
restructuring all require additional audit effort and consultancy services (Firth, 
2002). Third, those client companies requiring more NAS normally are 
problematic in general. Undertaking NAS provides the auditor with some insider 
knowledge of the riskiness of such companies and the auditor might charge 
higher fees to cover for the subsequent higher litigation risk. Fourth, monopoly 
power in service efficiency for non-audit services allows auditors to charge fee 
premiums (Hay et al., 2006). Accounting firms also sometimes promote 
themselves as “one stop” service providers (McMeeking et al. 2006). Regardless 
of the underlying explanation, a recent meta-analysis covering audit fee 
literature up to 2007 (Hay, 2012) confirms that audit fees and non-audit fees 
have a significant positive association and concludes that non-audit fees do not 
affect auditor independence. 
Whisenant et al. (2003) investigated whether the characteristics of clients, 
auditors and the auditor-client relationship simultaneously determine audit and 
non-audit fees. It was the first study incorporating simultaneous equation models 
into the pricing of audit services. The results of the study show that audit and 
non-audit services are endogenous. The findings also suggest that either no 
knowledge spillover occurs or equal knowledge spillover exists between audit 
and non-audit services. This study motivated McMeeking et al. (2006) to model 
both audit and non-audit fees in a simultaneous equation framework. The study 
found that the big firm premium disappears as compared to results using a single 
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equation model. It is suggested that the big firm premium might be associated 
with the provision of NAS to UK audit clients when the proper allowance is 
made for endogeneity. On the other hand, Wu (2006) presented a model in 
which markets for both audit services and non-audit services were oligopolistic. 
The empirical implication of the testing is that because of competition-crossover 
effects between the auditing and consulting service market, finding empirical 
evidence for a knowledge-spillover benefit is likely to be difficult. In the same 
manner, a study by Stein (2006) also found that knowledge spillover benefits 
may be difficult to assess because of the intermediating effect of competition 
cross over. Both studies recommended the inclusion of the control variable 
“market concentration” in audit fee regression to increase the power of empirical 
testing. 
In an earlier study in the US, Palmrose (1988) used questionnaire survey 
responses to study individual non-audit services as companies were not at that 
time required to disclose individual services. Palmrose (1988) broke up the non-
audit fees into Management advisory service (MAS)-Accounting service, MAS-
Non-accounting service and Tax service. From the analysis, Palmrose (1988) 
found tax services to be the most frequently purchased category when only one 
type of service was acquired. In the UK, Beattie et al. (1996) studied non-audit 
fees in detail by gathering data from the survey responses of finance directors of 
300 listed companies and 307 audit partners of listed companies in 1995. The 
study categorises non-audit fees into accounting advice, account preparation 
assistance, corporate tax, corporate finance, due diligence, and IT. It was found 
that corporate tax is the non-audit service most frequently purchased from the 
incumbent auditor, while corporate finance is the service most commonly 
purchased from elsewhere. Beattie et al. (1996) disclose that most of the non-
audit services provided by the auditors are not management consultancy work, 
but instead, essential accounting services that enable listed companies to comply 
with legal and regulatory requirements. They later concluded that the profession 
is inviting unnecessary criticism by bundling essential compliances services 
together with limited consultancy work into one disclosure figure and that it 
would be advantageous to show the split figures. The other study, by Ezzamel et 
al. (2002), categorised non-audit fees into tax services, finance services, 
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management consultancy, accounting, and other services. Using 193 survey 
responses gathered in 1995 from non-financial quoted companies, they also 
presented evidence that whilst management consultancy is not the most sought 
after service from a firm’s incumbent auditor, it is the most common service 
purchased from non-incumbent auditors.  
Analysing fee income for the years 1990 and 1999 (Beattie and Fearnley, 2002) 
identified three main types of non-audit fees: Accounting and Audit, Tax 
services and Consulting services, with consulting fees for 4% of the sample 
companies reported as exceeding audit fees for the year 1990. Levitt (2000) 
further asserted that among the then Big 5 consulting services represented 50% 
of their revenues, up from just 12% in 1977 (reported in DeFond et al., 2002: 6). 
Utilising information disclosed in proxy statements for the years 2000 and 2001 
for 562 firm year observations, Lai and Krishnan (2009) studied the linkage 
between market value of equity and the particular non-audit service of designing 
and developing a financial information system (FIS). They focused on this type 
of service as this service was singled out for disclosure and subsequently banned 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000). It was found that the 
market value of equity is greater for firms that purchase FIS-related services 
from their incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not. They concluded that 
despite the negative perception associated with non-audit services, investors 
regard FIS-related services as value-adding activities. Table 3.2 summarises the 
empirical studies examining the relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
fees since the 1990s. 
In conclusion, the literature review on audit fees and non-audit service 
relationship shows that the impact of non-audit fees on audit fees is 
inconclusive. Some researchers argue that a negative relationship could exist 
between audit fees and non-audit fees due to “knowledge spillover” (Simunic, 
1984; Antle et al., 1997; Whisenant et al., 2003) and Lost Leader theory (Che 
Ahmad, 2006). On the other hand, some researchers are supporting the positive 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit services (e.g. Ezzamel et al., 2002; 
Firth, 2002). Since Enron’s case, some development involving changes to the 
supply of audit and non-audit services have taken place.This is among the others 
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involving restrictions on the non-audit services that can be offered by the 
auditor. In addition, regulators are now debating on the issues of the total 
prohibition of non-audit services among auditor to their audit clients. Most of 
previous studies are done in the US (e.g Firth, 2002) while the recent UK studies 
(e.g Zaman et al.,2011) are concluded using the year 2001 to 2004 data of  a 
rather small sample size (135 FTSE 350 companies). Therefore, this study aims 
to fulfil the gap existing in the literature by investigating this relationship 
between audit fees and non-audit fees using a bigger sample size (384 FTSE All 
Shares) and more contemporary data (2007 and 2010 data) after the restriction 
on non-audit services is imposed among listed companies in the UK. The use of 
a more contemporary data (i.e. 2007 and 2010 data) could capture the effect of 
recommendation of Smith Report (2003) regarding the non-audit services 
received from company auditors and current debate on total prohibition of non-
audit services on the relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
fees.Therefore, the findings of this study could provide support for or against the 
total probihition of non-audit services. 
 Literature review also reveals an attempt to investigate the relationship between 
the detail component of non-audit fees and audit pricing exist since 1980s. The 
previous US studies (e.g. Palmrose, 1988) and the UK studies ( e.g. Beattie et 
al., 1996) have utilised questionnaire survey response to study the relationship 
between details non-audit services and audit fees. Questionnaires survey 
response is used due to unavailability of published data with regard to detail 
components of non-audit services before year 2005. Since year 2005, the UK 
listed companies are required to disclose detail non-audit services purchased 
from their auditors [The Companies Regulation (Disclosure of Auditor 
Remuneration and Liability agreements), 2005]. Therefore, this study aims to 
fulfil the gap. Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by 
investigating the relationship between detail non-audit services and audit fees 
using year 2007 and 2010 published data of 384 FTSE All Shares listed 
companies in the UK. 
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Table 3.2: A Summary of Empirical Studies Examining the Influence of Non-Audit Fees on Audit Fees since the 1990s1  
                                                          
1 Even though the table focuses on the analysis of literature starting from 1990, Simunic (1984) and Palmrose (1986) are included as these are the studies most 
commonly quoted by much of the audit pricing literature. 
 Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings  
 
Simunic (1984) 
 
(JAR) 
 
Analyses a client’s decision to purchase 
MAS and audit services when their 
production functions are interdependent 
as well as testing for the existence and 
pricing effects of knowledge spill-over. 
 
Data from 263 publicly-held companies in 
1977. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Audit fees of clients who purchase MAS from their 
auditors are significantly higher than audit fees of 
clients who do not do so. 
 While efficiencies from joint production may exist, this 
does not imply that joint performance of MAS and 
auditing is necessarily desirable. 
 
Palmrose (1986b) 
 
(JAR) 
 
Investigates the effect of non-audit 
services on the pricing of audit services. 
 
1980-1981 data from 298 public and 
closely-held companies with big 8 firms as 
the incumbent auditor. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
fees for audit services and fees for three categories of 
non-audit services (accounting-related MAS, non-
accounting MAS and tax). 
 
Abdel-Khalik (1990) 
 
(CAR) 
 
 
Provides a method to evaluate directly 
the cost (benefits) of knowledge spill-
over arising from purchasing MAS from 
the incumbent auditor 
 
 
84 survey responses from different audit 
regions in five states (excluding financial 
companies but includes private firms), 
study undertaken in early 1987. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Purchasing MAS from the incumbent auditor does not 
have an impact on audit fees. 
 
Davis et al. (1993)  
 
(AR) 
 
Investigates whether the provision of 
non-audit services results in knowledge 
spillover and audit production 
efficiencies that could produce 
economic rents for the auditor. 
 
98 clients of one large public accounting 
firm. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Finds a weak, positive relationship between tax services 
and audit effort measures and between accounting-
related consulting services and audit hours weighted by 
billing rate ratios. 
 Provides no empirical evidence that provision of non-
audit services will affect auditor objectivity. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Ezzamel,et al. (1996)  
 
(ABR) 
 
To report on the extent and nature of the 
provision of non-audit services to audit 
clients and to ascertain the association 
between fees for audit and for non-audit 
services in the UK. 
 
1992/93 data from 314 UK Quoted Firms 
 
 
(UK) 
 
 Income earned by audit firms from non-audit work for 
quoted clients averaged nearly 90% of the levels of audit 
fee earnings in 1992/93 –more than a quarter of clients 
paid more for non-audit services than for the audit 
 The extent of voluntary disclosure of the breakdown of 
non-audit services was limited and the existing 
disclosure requirement allowed considerable variety in 
the manner in which non-audit services fees incurred or 
paid abroad were disclosed. 
 There was a significant positive association between 
fees for audit and non-audit services, similar to that 
reported in the majority of US and Australian studies 
 Four of the nine interaction terms introduced were 
significant, implying that non-audit services fees may 
moderate the association between other explanatory 
variables and audit fees. 
 
Firth (1997b) 
 
(JBFA) 
 
Examination of audit fees paid by 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
 
 
Data on 157 listed companies on the Oslo 
stock exchange in 1991-1992 
 
(Norway) 
 
 
 Arthur Andersen and KPMC Peat Marwick have the 
largest market shares, together accounting for more than 
50% of audit fees, consultancy fees, and total fees. 
 75% of clients received consultancy services from their 
auditors. 
 There is a positive relationship between audit fees and 
consultancy fees. 
 
Firth (1997a) 
 
(CAR) 
A model is developed that seeks to 
explain a company's decision to 
purchase non-audit services from the 
auditor,  proposing that companies that 
face potentially high agency costs 
purchase relatively smaller amounts of 
non-audit services from their auditor. 
 
 
 
 
1992 and 1994 data on 500 largest British 
industrial, listed companies as ranked in 
The Times 1000 
 Results indicate that companies that have higher agency-
cost proxies are associated with smaller purchases of 
non-audit services from their auditors. 
 Director shareholdings, the shareholdings of the largest 
owner, and the debt-to total assets ratio affect the 
amount of consultancy services bought from the auditor. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Lennox (1999) 
(EAR) 
Investigates the effect of non-audit 
services on audit quality 
Data from 537 listed companies  in 1988-
1994  
 
(UK) 
 Following the announcement of the requirement to 
disclose non-audit fees, approximately 1/3 
of UK quoted companies disclosed before the 
requirement became effective. 
 Auditor size, directors’ shareholdings and non-audit 
fees were not significantly correlated 
with early disclosure. 
 Indicates a positive weakly significant relationship 
between disclosed non-audit fees and audit 
qualifications- suggests that when non-audit fees are 
disclosed, the provision of non-audit services does not 
reduce audit quality. 
Clatworthy et al. (2002) 
 
(JBFA) 
Investigate the market for audit services 
for UK National Health Service (NHS) 
trusts. 
459 NHS Trust for the year ended 31st 
March 1997 
(UK) 
 
 A negative association between audit and non-audit fees 
in the UK National Health Service sector consistent with 
knowledge spillover. 
Firth (2002) 
 
(JBFA) 
To examine the provision of non-audit 
services (also termed here as 
consultancy services) to audit clients 
using data from  UK 
1,112 observations of company listed on 
International Stock Exchange in 1996 
 Positive association between audit and non-audit fees 
observed in the UK is primarily driven by company 
specific events (e.g. mergers and acquisitions, 
restructuring, new finance, change in management) that 
result in the demand for more consultancy and audit 
services. 
O’Sullivan, and Diacon (2002) 
 
(IJA) 
Compare the pricing of audits in mutual 
and proprietary insurance companies  
(including audit committees and non-
audit fees) 
 
1992 data from 117 UK insurance 
companies 
(UK) 
 
 
 
 
 There is weak evidence of the relationship between 
provision of non-audit service and audit fees. No 
evidence between audit fees and nature of non-audit 
service. Company size and complexity are the most 
important determinants of audit pricing in insurance 
companies, with significant price reductions earned by 
insurers specializing in either general or life insurance 
business. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Frankel et al. (2002)  
(AR) 
Examines whether auditor fees are 
associated with earnings management 
and investigates the market reaction to 
the disclosure of auditor fees. 
 
 
2001 data from 3,074 proxy statements on 
the SEC”S EdGAR database with filing 
date between February 5, 2001 and June 
15 2001. 
 
(USA) 
 Presents evidence that non-audit fees are positively 
associated with small earnings surprise and the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals 
 Found that audit fees are negatively associated with 
these earnings management indicators. 
 Also found a negative association between non-audit 
fees and share values on the date the fees were 
disclosed, although the effect is small in economic 
terms. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003)  
 
(AR) 
Further investigation of the association 
between non-audit fees and biased 
financial reporting. 
 
 
2001 data from 3,170 U.S. registrant firms 
for which 2,000 proxy statements were 
available on EDGAR or Global Access 
during November and December 2001 
(excluding financial institutions) 
 
(USA) 
 
 Finds no relationship between positive discretionary 
accruals and any of the auditor fee metrics when 
discretionary accruals are adjusted for firm performance 
and sample firms are partitioned by income-increasing 
versus income decreasing accruals 
 In the earnings benchmark tests, they find no relation 
between fee ratio and the likelihood that firms beat 
analysts' forecasts. 
 Also finds no evidence that the market reacts to the 
magnitude of non-audit fees relative to total fees 
 
 
Whisenant et al. (2003)  
 
(IJA) 
Investigates whether the characteristics 
of clients, auditors, and the auditor-
client relationship simultaneously 
determine audit and non-audit fees. 
2001 data from 2,666 listed firms 
disclosing fiscal year 2000 audit and non-
audit fee data in proxy statements filed at 
the SEC from January 1 to August 31 
2001. 
 
 
(USA) 
 
 The results of the study show that audit and non-audit 
fees are endogenous. 
 It was found that inferences are different on the relation 
between audit and non-audit fees after considering the 
simultaneity of audit and non-audit services compared 
with those inferences from single-equation estimations. 
 Estimating the system of fee equations simultaneously, 
they find that provision of audit and non-audit services 
leads to no relation with audit fees, with suggestion that 
single-equation estimations suffer from simultaneous-
equation bias. 
 Findings also suggest that either there is no knowledge 
spillover or equal knowledge spillover exists between 
audit and non-audit services. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Abbott et al. (2003b) 
(CAR) 
 
Examine the association between audit 
committee characteristics and the ratio 
of non-audit service(NAS)  fees to audit 
fees 
 
538 companies filing proxies with SEC 
between Feb 5, 2001 and June 30 2001      
( excluding mutual funds and other 
financial registrants) 
(USA) 
 
 
 Audit committee comprised solely of independent 
directors meeting at least four times annually has 
significant negative association with the NAS fee ratio. 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) 
 
(JAR) 
 
 
To examine the relationship between 
the fees paid to audit firms for audit and 
non-audit services and the behaviour of 
accounting accruals. 
2000-2001 data from 5,815 firm-years  
 
(USA) 
 The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive 
relation with the absolute value of accruals 
 Using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of 
firms with a homogenous regression structure reveals 
that the positive association only occurs for about 8.5% 
of the sample  
 Find consistent evidence of a negative relation between 
the level of fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to 
auditors and accruals (i.e. higher fees are associated with 
smaller accruals) 
 The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative 
relation is strongest for client firms with weak 
governance 
 
 
Felix et al. (2005)  
 
(CAR) 
Investigates how external auditor 
provision of significant non-audit 
services and client pressure to use the 
work of internal auditor influence 
external auditors’ use of internal 
auditors’ work. 
 
Audit engagements for 1996 
were obtained from the same data set used 
in Felix et al (2001) and gathered through 
matched surveys completed by internal 
and external auditors for 74 Fortune 1000 
firms 
 
(USA) 
 It was found that when significant non-audit services are 
not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the 
level of internal-external auditor coordination positively 
affect auditors’ internal audit reliance decisions 
 However, when the auditor provides significant non-
audit services to the client, internal audit quality and the 
extent of internal-external auditor coordination do not 
significantly affect auditors’ reliance decisions 
 When significant non-audit services are provided, client 
pressure significantly increases extent of internal audit 
reliance. 
 External auditors appear to be more affected by client 
pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality 
and coordination when making internal audit reliance 
decisions for clients for whom significant non-audit 
services are also provided. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Lee and Mande (2005) 
(QJBE) 
 
Examine the association between the 
fees paid to the external auditor and 
effective audit committees 
2000 data from  792 firms from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center’s 
(IRRC) database 
(US) 
 
 Initial results also suggest that effective audit 
committees seek to increase audit quality by reducing 
the non-audit services provided by the external auditor.  
 Once the non-audit fee is modelled endogenously the 
results show that there is no statistically significant 
association between the non-audit fees and audit 
committee effectiveness. 
Jeong et al. (2005)  
 
(IJOA) 
Investigate the relationship among audit 
fees, mandatory auditor assignment and 
the joint provision of Non-audit and 
auditor services. 
Data from 2025 firm year observations of 
companies listed on Korean Stock 
Exchange for the period between 1999 and 
2002. 
 
(Korea) 
 Assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees 
than freely selected auditors. 
 Joint provision of audit fees and non-audit fees does 
intensify the relationship between auditor assignment 
and audit fees. 
 Suggest that mandatory auditor assignment may 
improve auditor independence. 
Antle et al. (2006) 
 
(RQFA) 
Addresses the endogeneity issue by 
modelling the confluence of audit fees, 
fees for non-audit services and abnormal 
accruals in a system of simultaneous 
equations. 
 
Data from 2,294 Firm year observations 
from 25 industries for fiscal year 1994-
2000 and 1,570 USA firms’ year 
observations for fiscal year 1994. 
 
(US) 
 Finds evidence consistent with knowledge spillover (or 
economies of scope) from auditing to non-audit services 
and from non-audit services to auditing. 
 Do not find support for the assertion that fees for non-
audit services increase abnormal accruals. 
 Found that non-audit fees decrease abnormal accruals, 
which is attributed to the productive effects of non-audit 
services. 
Hay et al. (2006)  
 
(JBFA) 
Examines evidence in New Zealand as 
to whether auditors providing more non-
audit services are less independent.  
1999-2001 data from top companies in 
New Zealand (177 for 1999, 224 in 2000 
and 243 in 2001). 
 
(New Zealand) 
 Found positive relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees. 
 No significant relationship between audit qualification 
or modification and non-audit fees. 
 There is no significant relationship between auditor 
change and non-audit fees.  
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Wu  (2006) 
 
(CAR) 
 
Presents a model in which both markets 
for audit services and non-audit services 
are oligopolistic. 
 
Data from two oligopolistic markets: the 
audit market ( CPA firms or auditors) and 
the consulting market (consulting firms or 
consultants) 
 
(USA) 
 
 The empirical implication of the result is that because of 
competition-crossover effects between the auditing and 
consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence 
for knowledge spillover benefit is likely to be difficult. 
 Control variables for “audit market concentration” 
concerned with competition-crossover effects and 
“auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge spillover 
benefits should be included in audit fee regressions to 
increase the power of empirical tests. 
 With regard to policy implications, the analyses help 
explain the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
“market segmentation” and hence the profitability of 
accounting firms. 
 
Stein (2006) 
 
(CAR) 
 
To explain the theory/empirical 
evidence gap on the knowledge spill-
over.  
 
2001 data from 
3,053 firm year observations of publicly 
traded companies 
 
(USA) 
 
 The results suggest that knowledge spillover benefits 
may be difficult to find because of the intermediating 
effect of competition crossover. 
 Control variable for audit “market concentration” 
concerned with knowledge spillover benefit should be 
included in audit fee regressions to increase the power 
of empirical testing. 
 
Che Ahmad et al. (2006) 
 
( AAMJAF) 
 
To examine the effect of non-audit 
services on audit fees, to investigate the 
relationship between non-audit fees and 
the issuance of qualified audit opinion 
and to analyse the proportion of non-
audit fees to total fees paid by a client to 
its auditor. 
 
2002 data of 819 public listed companies. 
 
(Malaysia) 
 
 Found significant positive relationship between audit 
fees and non-audit fees and significant relationship 
between non-audit fees and qualified audit opinions.  
 Finally, the descriptive analysis presents a worrying 
development regarding the high ratio of non-audit fees 
to total fee. 
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
 
(CAR) 
 
This study examines linkages between 
the audit and non-audit fees and accrual 
quality.  
 
2000-2001 data from a database compiled 
by Standard & Poors from proxy 
statements 
 
(USA) 
 Results show that accrual quality has a significant 
negative association with the magnitude of non-audit 
fees but a significant positive association with audit 
fees. 
 This latter result is consistent with the proposition that 
higher audit fee reflects higher audit effort and better 
judgments about the propriety of accruals, but is not 
consistent with the proposition that audit fee is 
associated with economic bonding. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Mitra and Hossain (2007)  
 
(JBR) 
Examines the empirical relationship 
between the institutional stock 
ownership and the relative level of non-
audit service fees. 
Data from 335 firms listed on NYSE that 
are non-regulated, non-financial and non-
service in nature and which have their 
year-end on 31/12/2000. 
 
(USA) 
 There is a significant negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and non-audit ratio. 
 
Joe and Vandervelde (2007) 
 
(CAR) 
 
Investigate whether knowledge gained 
from working on a non-audit task can be 
transferred to enhance the performance 
of the audit task and whether any 
knowledge transfer can be achieved if 
the auditor only reviews the non-audit 
work papers prepared by non-audit staff 
in the same audit firm or a different 
audit firm. 
 
 
2005 data from 84 in-charge auditors from 
a “Big 4” public accounting firm in   US 
who were attending a firm-wide in-charge 
auditor training program. 
 
Method: Experiment 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 Results shows that auditor-provided non-audit services 
can be beneficial in that knowledge transfer aids audit 
risk assessments when the same auditor performs both 
non-audit and audit services-higher risk assessments 
were made by auditors who performed both services 
than were made by auditors who performed  only audit 
services and had no access to the non-audit service work 
papers. 
 
Bigus and Zimmermann (2008) 
 
(IJA) 
 
Analyses auditors’ market shares and 
concentration in Germany on the basis 
of audit fees. 
 
2005 data from  175 listed companies 
 
(Germany) 
 
 Non-audit fees amount to 41.9% of the total fees and are 
nearly as important as audit fees. 
 The Big 4 firms obtained 87% of all the audit fees and 
90% of the total fees. 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers is the market leader, based on 
the total fees and the audit fees. 
 KPMG earns the most in the sub-market for tax 
consultancy. 
 Audit firms specialize in certain industries or stock 
market segments. 
 Market concentration increases over time 
 
 
Lim and Tan (2008) 
 
(JAR) 
 
 
Investigates whether the relationship 
between the provision of non-audit 
services and the impairment of audit 
quality is conditional on auditor 
specialization. 
 
2000-2001 data from 1,692 financially 
distressed firms 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 It was found that audit quality, measured by increased 
propensity to issue going-concern opinion, increased 
propensity to miss analysts’ forecast, as well as that 
higher earnings-response coefficients increase with the 
level of non-audit services acquired from industry 
specialist auditors compared to non-specialist auditors. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Lee et al. (2009) 
(IJA) 
 
To examine whether audit report lags 
decrease as auditor tenure increases and 
to study whether the provision of non-
audit services by external auditor 
reduces report lags 
 
2000-2005 data from 
18,473 firms-years representing 15 
industries 
 
(USA) 
 
 Both audit tenure and non-audit services are negatively 
significantly associated with ARLs. 
 Indicates that the longer the audit tenure, the more 
efficient auditors are in auditing their clients and the 
more non-audit services they supply, meaning more 
learning, thus reducing audit delays. 
 
Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009)   
 
(IJA) 
 
Investigate the influence of NAS on the 
perceived auditor independence. 
 
2006 data from 98 survey responses from 
“Borsen-Team” an academic investment 
club at Darmstadt University of 
Technology 
 
(Germany) 
 
 Shareholders generally perceive a negative effect on 
auditor’s independence if NAS are provided, especially 
if NAS is provided by separate department of audit firm 
 
Griffin et al. (2009) 
 
( A&F) 
 
 
Examines the association between 
overseas and New Zealand governance 
regulatory reforms and New Zealand 
companies’ audit and non-audit fees 
 
 
Data from 653 company-year observations 
for the period 2002-2007. 
 
(New Zealand) 
 
 Found that audit fees increased in New Zealand over 
2002–2006 and such increases associate reliably with the 
transition to and adoption of NZ IFRS and not with 
earlier overseas governance reforms. 
 Also document a decrease in non-audit fees over the 
same period, but find no IFRS effect for non-audit fees. 
 
 
Lu and Sapra (2009)  
 
(AR) 
Develop a theoretical framework to 
investigate the determinants and 
consequences of auditor Conservatism 
in a capital market and implications of 
Section 201 of SOX for auditor 
conservatism and investment efficiency. 
A theoretical paper: Model the interactions 
between corporate decisions and investors’ 
decisions and assess how auditing 
mediates these interactions. 
 By adjusting the mix of audit and non-audit fees, 
companies with high business risk induce auditor 
conservatism, while companies with low business risk 
induce auditor aggressiveness.  
 The nature of investment inefficiency(over or under) 
depends on its auditor attestation (conservative or 
aggressive)  
 Mandatory restriction of non-audit services imposed by 
section 201 increases audit conservatism, decreases a 
conservative auditor’s audit quality and increases an 
aggressive auditor’s audit quality, increases 
overinvestment and decreases under-investments and 
increases the audit fees. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Ghosh et al. (2009) 
 
(JAPP) 
 
Examine the relationship between audit 
and non-audit fees and capital market 
perceptions of auditor independence 
 
2001 - 2006 data of 21,797 firm-year 
Observations (client of Big 5 auditor). 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 
 Found that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are 
negatively associated with client importance, but there is 
no evidence of an association between ERCs and non-
audit fee ratio- investors perceive client importance, and 
not non-audit fee ratio, as compromising auditors’ 
independence.  
 Further, when they decomposed client importance into 
two components: audit fees and non-audit fees, from a 
given client as percentages of the total revenues of the 
audit firm, they found that only the audit fee component 
is significantly negatively related to ERCs- investors are 
concerned about perceived auditor independence when 
client importance increases because of audit fees, but 
not because of non-audit fees. 
 
Lai and Krishnan (2009) 
 
(A&F) 
 
Study the association of non-audit 
services with firm value. 
 
 
Data from 562 firm-year observations for 
sample 1 firms (mixture of companies 
buying/not buying the service) and 408 for 
sample 2 firms that buy FIS-related 
services from the incumbent auditors in 
year 2000 or 2001. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Found that the market value of equity is greater for 
firms that purchase FIS-related services from their 
incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not.  
 The levels of FIS fees are found positively related to 
firm value after controlling for total other fees, or total 
other non-audit fees.  
 Implication: Despite the negative perception associated 
with non-audit services, investors regard FIS-related 
services as value-adding activities. 
 
Duh et al. (2009) 
 
(RQFA) 
 
Examines whether non-audit service 
provision impairs auditor independence 
and whether the degree of auditor 
independence in Taiwan changed in the 
wake of the 2004 Procomp scandal 
 
Data from 37 companies listed on the TSE 
and the GreTai securities market for 2003 
and 2004. 
 
(Taiwan) 
 
 The results indicate that the non-audit fees ratio was 
significantly and negatively associated with audit 
adjustment in 2003 (prior to the Procomp event) but not 
in 2004 (after the event).  
 The coefficient of manipulation for 2004 was 
significantly smaller than that for 2003. Using non-audit 
fees (rather than non-audit fees ratio) as an independent 
variable yields similar results.  
 These findings have implications for the amendment of 
the CPA Law currently under deliberation in that 
proscribing non-audit service may not be the only route 
to strengthening auditor independence. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Abidin et al. (2010)  
 
(BAR) 
Study the audit market structure, fees 
and choices in a period of structural 
change (1998-2003) in UK 
Data from UK companies listed on Main 
and AIM market of London stock 
exchange (9,006 observations) for the 
period 1998-2003. 
 
(UK) 
 There has been significant upward pressure on audit fees 
since 2001 for smaller auditees and audit fee income for 
Big 4/5 did not change significantly, while the number 
of auditees fell significantly. 
 Andersen’s demise reduced the level of inequality 
among top tier firms, with PWC retaining its position as 
the dominant firm. Former Andersen clients experienced 
an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation. 
 There are significantly lower Non-audit fees among the 
companies. 
 
Craswell et al. (2010) 
 
(Conference Paper) 
To estimate a supply and demand 
system for the audit of Australian listed 
companies by combining publicly 
available data and proprietary data on 
audit hours (using simultaneous 
equation). 
Data from 136 Australian listed 
companies.  
 
(Australia)  
 The results from the study suggest that the higher audit 
fees obtained by suppliers of non-audit services result 
from two influences: a shift to the right in the demand 
curve and an upward shift in the supply-price function. 
 The benefits of any knowledge spillovers are offset by 
higher prices representing economic rents. 
 
Zaman et al. (2011) 
 
(JBFA) 
Examines the influence of audit 
committee effectiveness (ACE) as a 
proxy for governance quality on audit 
fees and non-audit fees using a new 
composite measure comprising audit 
committee independence, expertise, 
diligence and size. 
Data from 135 companies (540 company 
year observations) of UK FTSE-350 in 
2001-2004 
(UK) 
 ACE has positive association with Non-audit service fee 
(NASF)  
 NASF is negatively associated with audit committee 
financial expertise and audit committee independence 
and positively associated with audit committee size. 
 Board meeting, CEO-duality, board independence, 
company size and Big 4 has positive association with 
NASF. 
 
Knechel et al. (2012) 
 
(JBFA) 
Examines whether auditor-provided 
non-audit services generate 
knowledge spillover, using a sample of 
audits from New Zealand 
2004-2005 data of 230 Firm year 
observations of New Zealand listed 
companies. 
 A negative association between non-audit fees and audit 
lag, thus suggesting the presence of knowledge 
spillover. However, the knowledge spillover effect is 
limited to the city office providing both the audit and 
non-audit services 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Chan et al (2012) 
 
(AF) 
 
Examines whether independent audit 
committee members’ board tenure 
affects audit fees 
 
1524 firm-year observations for the years 
2005 and 2006.  
(USA) 
 
 Find that audit fees are negatively associated 
with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the 
independent audit committee, consistent with the notion 
that audit committee members’ long board  tenure 
results in lower audit effort.  
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to review prior literature on audit pricing. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the importance of audit pricing research as 
identified by previous researchers such as Al-Harsani (2008), Gist (1992), Low 
et al. (1990) and Hay et al. (2006). It can be summarised that the reason people 
study audit fees is to evaluate the competitiveness of the audit market and 
examine issues of contracting and independence related to the audit process. In 
addition, knowledge in audit pricing could help clients in negotiating audit fees 
and controlling the internal aspects to reduce their audit costs. On the other 
hand, auditors could become more proficient in determining the appropriate 
audit fee.  
 
The discussion continues with a general review of audit pricing literature. In 
1980, Simunic’s seminal paper introduced a model for audit fee determinants. 
This model identified size, complexity, industry, audit risk, audit tenure and 
auditor type as the key audit fee determinants. The model was used by many 
later studies, with new variables added. Over the past 30 years, many other 
determinants have been identified and added to the original Simunic model. 
These determinants can be classified as client attributes, auditor attributes and 
other attributes. Other determinants added recently by audit pricing researchers 
include the Herfindahl index, ownership control, auditor location, SOX, the 
effect of having two auditors, the effect of introduction of new standards, and 
economic crisis. 
 
The second part of the chapter discusses literature relating to governance 
characteristics, including ownership structure, on audit fees. In terms of board 
characteristics, literature relating to board independence, size and diligence is 
discussed. This is followed by a review of literature regarding audit committee 
characteristics, which includes audit committee effectiveness, size, 
independence, expertise, diligence and commitment. This is followed by a 
review of audit-pricing literature relating to ownership concentration, non-
executive share ownership and executive share ownership. The literature review 
reveals the gap in audit pricing literature as prior studies only investigates the 
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relationship between governance characteristics in limited scope (only focus on 
the board, audit committee or ownership structure structure). This part ends with 
a summary of audit pricing and governance literature since the 1990s. 
 
The third part of the chapter discusses the non-audit fees literature. First there is 
discussion of the independence of the auditor, which seems to be affected by the 
amount of non-audit services provided to the audit client. Prior to the Enron-
Andersen scandal, many studies investigated issues relating to non-audit fees. 
However, the importance of such research was only realised after that scandal. 
Studies post Enron found a continuous and worrying trend of high non-audit to 
audit fee ratios. However, many studies failed to show conclusive evidence of 
the relationship between lower audit quality and non-audit fees (e.g. Flankel et 
al., 2002). Studies have also investigated instances of financial distress, seeking 
to identify the relationship between auditor independence and going concern 
and/or other modified audit opinions received by companies. However, most of 
the studies found no significant relationship between non-audit fees and going 
concern or modified audit opinions, which suggests that auditor independence is 
not affected by the magnitude of non-audit services provided to their clients.  
 
The discussion then turns to the relationship between non-audit fees and audit 
fees, which has attracted much attention since the 1980s. The findings of prior 
literature have been mixed, showing that the relationship between non-audit fees 
and audit fees is inconsistent. Theoretically the relationship between non-audit 
fees and audit fees should be negative due to “knowledge spill-over” effects. 
Any saving made by the auditor as a result of carrying out less testing and 
investigation will be passed on to the client, which will lead to lower audit fees. 
Another reason for the negative relationship highlighted by prior studies is the 
“loss leader”, whereby the auditor reduces audit fees to gain more lucrative 
consultancy work from their client. 
 
 Despite the knowledge spill-over and loss leader theory, many studies have 
found a positive relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees. The first 
reason highlighted by prior studies for this positive relationship is the increase in 
demand from the client for more audit service as the price per unit of the audit 
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services is reduced as a result of joint provision of audit and non-audit services. 
Client specific events that require special consultancy services and at the same 
time necessitate additional auditing are identified as the second reason for the 
positive relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees. Third, as client 
companies that require additional non-audit services are normally problematic 
companies, joint provision provides the auditor with insider knowledge on client 
riskiness, thus higher audit fees are charged to cover the higher subsequent 
associated litigation cost. The fourth reason for the positive relationship is that 
monopoly power is reflected in efficient provision of non-audit services, which 
allows the auditor to charge a fee premium for the audit service. The last part 
review studies that investigate the relationship between audit fees and details 
non-audit fees. The gap is identified where a study using published data that is 
more reliable is needed as prior studies only rely on suyvey response. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Development 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical background and the development of the 
hypotheses of the study. The chapter starts with a discussion on the use of 
agency theory as a basis for understanding the role of corporate governance and 
its assumptions, which underpin the present research. The chapter continues with 
the development of five hypotheses on the relationship between board 
characteristics and audit fees. This is followed by development of another eight 
hypotheses on the relationship between audit fees and audit committee 
characteristics and then by discussion leading to the development of three 
hypotheses on the relationship between audit fees and  ownership structures. The 
chapter continues with the development of hypotheses on the relationship 
between non-audit fees and audit fees and also the effect of economic crisis on 
the earlier relationship. In addition to examination of the relationship between 
audit fees – along with governance characteristics, ownership structure – and 
non-audit fees, which are the main focus of this study, the relationship between 
other audit fee determinants used as control variables in this study is discussed. 
4.2 Theoretical underpinning of the study 
This study is heavily dependent on Agency Theory. This theory is rooted in the 
work of Berle and Means (1932) on the separation of firm ownership from 
management. Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) identified the agency 
relationship between principal (the owner, shareholder) and agent (the 
management), whereby the principal engages the agent to perform services on 
their behalf. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the management is 
obliged to maximise the shareholder’s wealth for long-term survival of the 
business. Therefore, some decision-making authority is given to the top 
management to ensure smooth business operation. As a reward for their best 
efforts in running the business, the management will be given good 
remuneration package and incentives. This theory assumes a model of man 
(manager) that is self-serving, individualistic and opportunistic in nature, who 
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prefers to maximise his own utility functions at the expense of the owners. As a 
result, the theory is built on the assumption that there is almost always a 
divergence of objectives between the goals of the management and those of the 
shareholders. 
Past studies (e.g Abdul Rahman, 2006; Arnold and De Lange (2004) have 
highlighted possible problems that can occur in agency relationships. Abdul 
Rahman (2006) identified two problems, namely adverse selection (where the 
principal cannot determine if the agent is performing the work for which he is 
paid) and moral hazard (where the principal is unsure as to whether the agent has 
performed their work to their best ability, due to self-seeking motives). Arnold 
and De Lange (2004), on the other hand, associate the agency problem with 
different attitudes towards risk. Therefore, managers may not act in the best 
interest of the shareholders but prefer actions which could maximise their 
compensation, security, status and reputation. Timing of the main business 
objective (profitability) is another issue. The management normally prefer profit 
maximisation, which is short term in nature, to demonstrate success while the 
shareholders prefer shareholder wealth maximisation (which could maximise the 
share price, profitability and dividend payouts), which could maintain the 
success of the company in the long run (Arnold and De Lange, 2004).  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) assume that individuals act to maximise their own 
utility and consequently some managers’ decisions might reduce the welfare of 
the principal as they are motivated by self-interest. Abdul Rahman (2006) 
explained that the agency problem is aggravated by information asymmetry 
which occurs when management have the competitive advantage of the 
information within the business over the owners. Consequently, management are 
tempted to place less emphasis on maximising shareholders’ wealth but focus 
more on expanding the asset base, increasing turnover at the expense of long 
term profitability and paying themselves higher salaries. 
There are costs associated with the agency problem which arise from the conflict 
between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (the management), such as 
costs associated with monitoring management, creating and implementing an 
effective incentive system and value destroyed by sub-optimal actions on the 
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part of the management (Abdul Rahman, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
categorise agency cost into monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual costs. 
Monitoring costs are defined as the costs paid by shareholders to measure, 
monitor and control the activities and behaviour of the management. Included in 
these costs are the cost of appointing the board of directors to monitor 
management’s activities and the cost paid to external auditors to verify the 
accuracy of the financial statements prepared by the management. Bonding 
costs, on the other hand, relate to the debt contract between the principal (the 
lenders) and agents (the borrowers).  It is the cost of establishing and complying 
with the mechanisms of guaranteeing that the agent’s remuneration is based on 
the principal’s expectations on how much the agent’s behaviour is likely to 
oppose the principal’s interests. The costs incurred in these bonding activities 
include those relating to the time and effort involved in producing quarterly 
reports. Residual loss occurs because the costs of monitoring and bonding make 
it impossible to identify or stop all self-interested behaviour by managers. It is 
also argued that residual loss arises because the cost to overcome agency 
problem would be more than the benefits derived from doing so (Abdul Rahman, 
2006). Failure of the board of directors to exercise due care in their oversight 
role over the management could cause agency cost. The best example of such an 
occurrence is the Enron case. The failure of the company happened because 
Enron’s board of directors did not properly monitor the company’s incentive 
compensation plans, thereby allowing top executives to “hype” the company’s 
shares so that employees would add them to their retirement plans (Abdul 
Rahman, 2006).  
As a conclusion, the main focus of the theory in the agency relationship is the 
selection of an appropriate governance mechanism between principal and agents 
to efficiently align the principal’s and agents’ interests, and hence minimise 
agency costs. Therefore, a number of mechanisms have been devised to reduce 
conflicts of interest and their impact on organizations (Abdul Rahman, 2006). 
First, incorporating into the contract between the contracting parties as many 
clauses as possible to simulate possible scenarios and attempt to provide for 
them in the contract could reduce the conflict between these parties. Another 
method of control includes linking management compensation to performance. 
113 
 
Reducing the free cash flow available within the organisation through debt 
financing could also solve the problem as it reduces the possibility of 
consumption of perquisites. Finally, increasing management’s stake in the equity 
of the company could be another solution. It is suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that increasing management’s share ownership should align 
their interests more closely with those of other shareholders. 
This study focuses on the relationship between the internal mechanism 
(including board of directors, audit committees and ownership structure) and the 
external mechanism that is the auditor. Agency theory provides a theoretical 
foundation to the study as it could explain the behaviour of the management and 
the mechanism in place towards goal unity between the management and the 
shareholders. The theory influences the formulation of the study hypotheses, 
research methodology and statistical techniques used in this study. Popular 
agency cost variables relevant to the study are examined. Relationships between 
variables are explained first in the context of Agency Theory and then other 
theories. 
4.3 Development of Hypotheses: Board Characteristics and Audit Fees 
The relationship between board characteristics and audit fees has begun to attract 
interest from audit fee researchers. By the early 2000s, only a few studies had 
looked at the issue (e.g. O’Sullivan, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Peel and 
Clatworthy, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002 and Tsui et al., 2001). More recently, 
there has been slightly more research interest (e.g.  Bliss et al., 2007; Boo and 
Sharma, 2008;  Zaman et al., 2011 and Adelopo and Jallow, 2012). The board 
characteristic most frequently studied is the independence of board members as 
successive governance reforms since the 1990s have emphasised the monitoring 
potential of non-executive board members (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998 
and Higgs, 2003, Combined Codes, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2008; UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010, 2012). The existence of effective board could reduce 
agency cost as an effective board stands as a good monitoring mechanism to 
protect shareholders’ interests against misbehaviour of the management. 
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Board Independence and Audit Fee 
Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998), and Higgs (2003), various editions of the 
Combined Code and the current UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) have all 
emphasised the importance of non-executive representation on the board of 
directors as a means of ensuring greater independence and impartiality in board 
decision-making. Carcello et al. (2002) describe three factors which may 
motivate independent directors to prevent and detect any opportunistic reporting 
behaviour by management. First, the directors may seek to protect their 
reputations as experts in monitoring, because the market for directors punishes 
those associated with corporate failure or poor performance. Second, from a 
legal liability perspective, directors who fail to exercise reasonable care in 
discharging their monitoring responsibilities are liable to be subject to severe 
sanctions. Third, shareholders often suffer significant losses in the wake of 
financial reporting problems, so directors seeking to protect shareholder wealth 
may seek a higher quality audit service. Past studies found evidence of an 
inverse relationship between the percentage of outside directors and fraudulent 
financial reporting (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996).  
As an internal governance mechanism, non-executive directors could contribute 
to higher quality auditing in many ways. According to O’Sullivan and Diacon 
(2002), increasing the non-executive representation on the board of directors has 
the capacity for improving the quality of the audit process in the following three 
respects:  
a. External auditors are able to discuss matters arising from the audit 
process with non-executive representative board members, free from 
managerial influence. This is especially important if auditors seek to 
question certain aspects of the preparation of the financial statements by 
management or require further (more costly) testing in order to reach an 
opinion on the quality of financial statements. 
b. In negotiations with the external auditor, non-executives are expected to 
place greater emphasis on the extent and quality of the audit rather than 
on the cost, compared to executive directors. 
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c. Non-executives are expected to favour more extensive auditing in order 
to complement their own monitoring responsibilities since they share 
with auditors the objective of identifying and rectifying reporting errors 
made by managers, deliberately or otherwise. 
O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) suggested that because of the factors listed above, 
higher levels of non-executive representation are expected to result in higher 
audit fees. The hypothesis is supported by studies in the UK, US and Hong 
Kong, Greece  and Malaysia which find that the proportion of non-executive 
directors has a significant and positive impact on audit fees (O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Carcello et al., 2000; Tsui et al., 2001; Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2010; Bliss 
et al., 2007; Bliss, 2011). However, O’Sullivan (1999) and Peel and Clatworthy 
(2001) in their studies covering large UK companies in the post-Cadbury period 
did not find any evidence that board characteristics influence auditors’ pricing 
decisions. This could be due to the fact that improved board monitoring may be 
counterbalanced by an increase in audit effort and the assurances demanded by 
non-executive directors. 
In recognition of the non-executive directors’ potential for improving monitoring 
and also in ensuring high quality auditing and greater transparency of financial 
reporting, the Revised Combined Code on Corporate Governance July 2003 
requires the board to have a balance of executive and non-executive directors 
(and in particular independent non-executive directors) such that no individual 
or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision making. As per 
earlier studies and theoretical expectation that it is expected that the presence of 
a larger number of non-executive directors, especially independent non-
executive directors, on the board will lead to the purchase of a higher quality 
audit and that is expected to lead to higher audit fees. Hence, the first two 
hypotheses of the study are: 
H1a: There will be a positive relationship between the proportion of non-
executives serving on a company’s board and the audit fee. 
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H1b: There will be a positive relationship between the proportion of 
independent non-executives serving on a company’s board and the audit 
fee. 
CEO Duality 
Another issue related to board independence is CEO duality – whereby the same 
individual holds the positions of CEO and chairman. CEO dominated boards are 
likely to exist when the CEO and chairman of the board are the same person. It 
is argued that CEO duality upsets the balance of power among the top 
management team and therefore increases the agency cost as CEO duality 
restricts the board’s effectiveness in controlling managerial initiatives and in 
decision-making since duality is assumed to increase information asymmetry 
between the CEO and the board (Boyd et al., 2005, Desender et al., 2009).  
Fosberg and Nelson (1999) state that firms with separated, clear-cut leadership 
perform significantly better in the areas of strategy formulation and 
implementation. This is supported by Farber (2005), who found that fraud firms 
have a higher percentage of duality, which makes it difficult for insecure 
directors to be honest when evaluating firm performance, thereby leading to long 
term organisational drift (Carver, 2006). Bliss (2011) found that the positive 
association between board independence and audit fee proxied for audit quality 
is only present in firms without CEO duality. He suggests that CEO duality 
constrains board independence. In the presence of a dominant CEO, non-
executive directors are expected to have reduced influence in seeking an 
intensive audit (Desender et al., 2009) and as a result companies with CEO 
duality are more likely to have lower demand for external audit services 
(O’Sullivan, 2000), hence audit fees will be lower. A study by Tsui et al. (2001) 
found that the negative association between audit fees and independent corporate 
boards is stronger (weaker) for firms with low (high) growth opportunities. The 
results have two implications; first, from a policy perspective, they demonstrate 
that firms with CEO domination are associated with higher risk and higher audit 
fees. Second, the findings provide evidence consistent with the contracting 
theory that growth firms are associated with higher uncertainty, which in turn 
makes monitoring of managerial activities more difficult. An independent 
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corporate board is likely to reduce this uncertainty and mitigate potential 
opportunistic behaviour associated with high-growth opportunities. Independent 
board members who are concerned about incurring legal liability which could 
harm their reputations will support the external auditors in accomplishing their 
assurance duties. Lee et al. (2004) examined the relationship between board 
independence and auditor resignations and found that board independence is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of auditor resignation. 
On the other hand, companies with CEO duality may be perceived by the auditor 
as having weaker internal governance, which might be expected to result in 
higher audit fees. This is supported by a study by Bliss et al. (2007), who found 
that the presence of CEO duality on boards is associated with higher audit fees. 
Desender et al. (2009) found that in widely-held firms, board independence and 
CEO duality are significantly related to audit fees, whereas in closely-held firms 
the relationship is insignificant.  They argued that controlling shareholders 
encourage the board to focus on the provision of resources rather than 
monitoring, while boards in widely-held firms have a stronger focus on 
monitoring. 
As a conclusion, the existence of CEO duality impairs the effectiveness of 
internal control, hence increasing the agency cost. Therefore it is expected that 
CEO duality will reduce board independence therefore will support the purchase 
of lower quality audit. Hence, the next hypothesis of the study is: 
H1c: There will be a negative relationship between the existence of CEO duality 
and the audit fee. 
Board Size and Audit Fee 
Board size can be a determinant of the effectiveness of the board of directors in 
terms of the performance of its monitoring and oversight functions. More 
experienced and larger boards, comprising directors with a range of 
backgrounds, knowledge and expertise, have the potential for greater 
effectiveness and usefulness to the organisation as compared to smaller boards 
(Vafeas 1999; Beasley 1996; Yermack 1996 and Jensen 1993).  
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On the other hand, bigger boards could also be associated with more bottlenecks 
and sluggishness in decision making and, consequently, be more susceptible to 
management whims (Adellappo and Jallow, 2008). Jensen (1993, p. 865) stated 
that:‘as groups increase in size they become less effective because the 
coordination and process problems overwhelm the advantages from having more 
people to draw on’. Another disadvantage associated with larger boards relates 
to less effective monitoring due to potential free riding, communication 
breakdowns and inefficiencies (Dechow et al., 1996; Bushman et al., 2004). 
Yermack (1996) provided empirical evidence consistent with these views to 
demonstrate that companies with smaller boards have higher market value. 
Correspondingly, Beasley (1996) found that the likelihood of fraud increases 
with board size. Prior studies in the US (Boo and Sharma, 2008) and in the UK 
(Adelopo and Jallow, 2008) found an insignificant relationship between audit 
fees and board size. However, Chan et al. (2012), in a study based on 2005 and 
2006 data in the US, found that board size has a significant positive relationship 
with audit fees.  
Therefore it is expected that bigger board size could increase agency cost due to 
monitoring over the management becoming less effective. Drawing on the past 
literature, and consistent with the risk-based perspective, the current study 
expects larger boards to have a heightened risk of material misstatements; 
consequently, they will require a more extensive audit. It is therefore expected 
that board size, as defined by the number of directors on the board, will have a 
positive relationship with audit fees. Hence, the next hypothesis of the study is: 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the board size and the audit 
fee. 
Board Diligence and Audit Fees 
The other characteristics studied by Carcello et al. (2002) in relation to boards 
were the diligence of the directors and the expertise of board members. The 
diligence of the board is measured by the number of board meetings held, since 
the behaviour of individual board members surrounding such meetings, which 
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includes preparation before meetings, attentiveness and participation during 
meetings, and post-meeting follow-up, is not observable by the public.  
Schedule C - that is the Disclosure of corporate governance arrangements in the 
Combined Code (2010), amongst other things, recommends the disclosure of the 
number of meetings held by the board and individual attendance by directors 
(A.1.2). Meeting frequency could reflect board effectiveness as boards that meet 
frequently are likely to be better informed and more diligent in performing their 
duties (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006). This is supported by earlier 
researchers, such as Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Conger et al. (1998), who 
found that boards of directors that meet frequently are more likely to discharge 
their duties well. In addition, a board of directors that has frequent meetings has 
more time to identify and discuss problems, and this is expected to lead to 
superior performance of the company (Evans and Weir, 1995). Tauringana et al. 
(2008) found a significant negative relationship between frequency of board 
meetings and timeliness of annual reports for companies listed on the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange (NSE) in Kenya. This indicates that companies which hold 
meetings frequently publish their annual reports earlier, thereby enhancing the 
company’s performance and providing evidence of an effective corporate 
governance mechanism. Hence, it is expected that such companies will adopt a 
more responsible attitude towards the shareholders, thereby reducing the agency 
cost, which could consequently lead to the purchase of relatively higher quality 
audit services, resulting in higher audit fees. Carcello et al. (2002) confirm that 
high frequency of board meetings could indicate a higher level of control in the 
company, leading to higher audit fees. Zaman et al. (2011) used number of board 
meetings to control for board effectiveness and found a significant positive 
relationship between audit fees and number of board meetings per year. The 
above discussion leads to the third hypothesis. 
H3:  There will be a positive relationship between the number of board meetings 
and the audit fee. 
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4.4 Development of Hypotheses: Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit 
Fees 
Audit Committee Effectiveness and Audit Fees 
An Audit committee represents a governance mechanism that needs to function 
effectively in order to limit potential agency conflict arising from the separation 
of corporate ownership and control (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Following the increased regulatory interest, especially 
following the failure of big corporations, many studies have been undertaken to 
examine the contribution of audit committees to auditing.  Such studies include 
that of Lee et al., (2004), who argue that audit committees may affect the quality 
of auditing in several respects. First, the audit committee may demand that the 
firm appoints a more knowledgeable auditor with a better reputation (see e.g. 
Abbot and Parker, 2000; Chen et al., 2005). Second, the audit committee may 
improve audit quality by demanding a greater amount of audit effort from the 
incumbent auditor (e.g. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006; Abbot et al., 2003; 
Carcello et al., 2002). Audit committees may also increase the independence of 
external auditors by providing support for auditors in potential disputes with the 
firm’s management (see e.g. Knapp 1987; Carcello and Neal, 2000; DeZoort and 
Salterio, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2003).  Finally, audit committees may enhance the 
integrity of audit reports by mitigating the potential threat of auditor dismissal 
based on managerial motives (see e.g. Carcello and Neal, 2000; Lee et al., 2004). 
The relationship between effective audit committees and the external auditor has 
been studied by many researchers (e.g Zaman et al, 2011). Many studies have 
been carried out to examine the relationship between audit committees and audit 
fees, although earlier studies focused only on the existence of audit committees 
and audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Goddard and Masters, 2000; Coulton 
et al., 2001). To be more effective and efficient, audit committees should have 
certain characteristics; hence, researchers later started to examine the association 
between audit fees and audit committee characteristics and activities such as the 
independence and expertise of committee members and frequency of meetings 
(Carcello et al., 2002; Abbort et al., 2003; Sharma, 2003). Other characteristics 
used to measure effectiveness of the audit committee are committee size. 
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Recently, the relationship between audit committee characteristics and audit fees 
has been investigated further by, for example, Lee and Mande (2005), Goodwin-
Steward and Kent (2006), Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) and Hoitash and 
Hoitash (2009).  
Prior research (Goodwind-Stewart and Kent, 2006) explained that the 
relationship between audit committees and audit fees is complex and affected by 
both the demand for audit services by the client and the supply of audit services 
by the external auditor. From the demand side, the presence of an audit 
committee may have a positive association with audit fees by ensuring that audit 
hours are not reduced to a level that compromises the quality of the audit. This 
could reduce the risk of litigation and the loss of reputation in the event of 
fraudulent financial reporting. From the supply side, the audit committee’s 
involvement in strengthening the internal controls of the company may lead the 
external auditor to reduce the assessed level of control risk. As a result of the 
auditor’s reliance on internal controls, less testing will be carried out and this 
could lower the audit fee (Collier and Gregory, 1996). However, an increase in 
audit hours resulting from the need for audit partners to liaise regularly with 
audit committees, attend audit committee meetings and prepare reports for the 
committee could increase the audit fees. Furthermore, Goodwin-Stewart and 
Munro (2003) find that audit partners and managers believe that the presence of 
an audit committee has little impact on the level of audit testing but that audit 
fees are greater as a result of the increase in partner and manager time. 
 A further reason for a positive relationship between audit fees and audit 
committees is that an effective audit committee should reduce the threat of 
auditor dismissal and therefore could strengthen the auditor’s bargaining 
position during fee negotiation (Abbot et al., 2003). Other recent studies have 
also found a positive association between audit committee characteristics and 
audit fees (Lee and Mande, 2005; Goodwin-Steward and Kent, 2006; Vafeas and 
Waegelein, 2007; Zaman et al, 2011). As one of the governance mechanisms to 
reduce agency cost, it is expected that an effective audit committee will request a 
higher quality audit to safeguard the shareholders from any financial 
irregularities and fraud. As a result, there will be an increase in audit effort 
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which will lead to higher audit fees. Similar Zaman et al. (2011) this study uses a 
composite measure for audit committee effectiveness on the following 4 
variables: the size of the committee (at least 3 members), the independence of 
the committee members (contains only non-executive directors), number of 
committee meetings (a minimum of 3 meetings per year) and the existence of 
expertise on the committee (at least one finance expert on the committee). The 
6th hypothesis is as follows: 
H4:  There will be a positive relationship between audit committee 
effectiveness and the audit fee. 
Audit Committee Independence and Audit Fees 
Agency theory suggests that the independence of the non-executive directors is 
crucial to the effective performance of the audit committee’s monitoring 
function. Many previous studies, such as Beasley (1996), Hudaib and Cooke 
(2005) and Peasnell et al. (2005), have correlated the independence of directors 
with audit quality as independent directors are normally more interested in 
reducing the likelihood of fraud and earnings management. As a result, audit 
committees comprising only independent non-executive directors are able to 
exercise power over management and could demand greater audit scope to 
ensure audit quality (Zaman et al., 2011). In the US, Abbott et al. (2009) and 
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) found that audit committee independence is 
positively associated with audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit 
committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring 
management. Utilising data for 2001-2004 from FTSE 350 companies in the 
UK, Zaman et al. (2011) later also confirmed that audit committee independence 
has a positive association with audit fees. In the UK, successive Codes of Best 
Practice have clearly stated that audit committees should consist only of 
independent non-executive directors. Results from Zaman et al. (2011) reveal 
that 99% of their sample firms in 2004 had only independent directors on the 
audit committee, showing that some companies were still not following the 
requirements of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (2003). 
Motivated by this finding, and despite the existing requirement for 100% 
independent director composition of audit committees, this study includes 
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measures for audit committee independence. It is therefore expected that audit 
committee independence will have a positive impact on audit pricing. This 
discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5:  There will be a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and the audit fee. 
Audit Committee Size 
It appears that an audit committee’s size is a significant factor in ensuring its 
effectiveness. As indicated by the BRC (1999), “Because of the audit 
committee’s responsibilities and the complex nature of the accounting and 
financial matters reviewed, the committee merits significant director resources”. 
This is because a small audit committee will have an insufficient number of 
directors available to serve on the committee, thus its monitoring capacity is 
reduced (Vafeas, 2005). Alzoubi and Selamat (2012) suggest that a small audit 
committee is not capable of fulfilling its duties efficiently as the given 
assignments are always increasing.  Due to the important contribution that can 
be made by this committee, it is expected that many companies will have more 
members than required on their audit committee. The larger the number of 
members on the committee, the more effective it can be since each of the 
members could contribute to the objectives and efficiency of the committee in 
performing its roles, especially its monitoring role.  
The benefit of additional members, however, must be weighed against the 
incremental cost of poorer communication and decision making associated with 
larger groups. In general, it is recommended that the size of the committee 
should be limited to five (Levitt, 1998) or six members (National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD), 1999). Previous studies have suggested that the 
ideal audit committee size is either three or four members (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Vafeas, 2005; Xie et al., 2003). The Codes of Best Practice in Corporate 
Governance (2006) suggest an audit committee needs at least three members in 
order to provide the necessary strength and diversity of expertise and views to 
ensure appropriate monitoring. While the evidence is limited, it suggests that 
size does matter. For example, Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) find a 
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significantly negative relationship between committee size and suspicious 
auditor switches. On the other hand, Abbott et al. (2004) find no significant 
association between audit committee size and earnings misstatements. However, 
other studies, for example, Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), suggest that a large audit 
committee is more likely to enhance the status and power of the audit committee 
within the organisation and demand higher quality audits. In addition, Pincus et 
al. (1989) suggest that as they have more resources, larger audit committees are 
more likely to discover potential problems and therefore to fulfil their 
monitoring role more effectively. Consequently, large audit committees are 
expected to improve the quality of internal control as a result of enhanced status 
and increased resources and hence to be more effective in fulfilling their 
monitoring role (Zaman et al., 2011).  
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007), using 2001-2003 data from 500 Fortune 500 
companies, found that audit committee size is positively associated with audit 
fees. However, Boo and Sharma (2008) found that the association between audit 
fees and audit committee size is weaker for regulated companies. In the UK, 
Zaman et al. (2011) found that audit committee size is positively associated with 
audit fees. Based on demand perspective of the audit fees, it is expected that 
audit committees with larger numbers of members will require higher quality 
audits, resulting in higher audit fees. This discussion leads to the next 
hypothesis: 
H6:  There will be a positive relationship between audit committee size and 
audit fee. 
Audit Committee Expertise and Audit Fees 
Having a financial expert director on the audit committee could improve its 
effectiveness, especially in relation to financial matters. It is expected that 
financially knowledgeable members will be able to perform their oversight roles 
more effectively, especially in relation to detecting material misstatements 
(Raghunandan et al, 2001; Davidson et al., 2004; Defond et al., 2005). SEC 
(2002) firstly defined expertise by emphasising knowledge of accounting gained 
through extensive experience in the field.  However, as a result of criticism of 
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this narrow definition, SEC (2003) broadened the definition of expertise beyond 
accounting experience to also include experience in finance, financial statement 
analysis or evaluation and supervision of accounting and financial executives or 
personnel. The UK’s Corporate Governance Code specifies that at least one 
member of the audit committee should have recent and relevant financial 
experience. The code is not specific about what constitutes “relevant 
experience”, but the Smith Report pointed out that it is desirable that the 
committee member whom the board considers to have recent and relevant 
financial experience should have a professional qualification from one of the 
professional accountancy bodies. 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) demonstrated that audit committees comprised solely 
of independent directors and having at least one member with an accounting or 
finance background are more likely to have longer meetings with the chief 
internal auditor, are more likely to meet privately with the chief internal auditor, 
more likely to review the internal auditing programme and results, and review 
management’s interaction with internal auditing. In the same respect, DeZoort 
and Salterio (2001) document that independent audit committee members having 
relatively high audit knowledge are more likely to support the auditor in auditor-
management disputes over accounting policy. This is supported by Carcello et 
al. (2006), who found a significant relationship between having a financial 
expert on the audit committee and a lower level of earnings management and 
this association is most pronounced when the designated financial expert has 
prior work experience in accounting, for example, s(he) is a CPA, former CFO, 
corporate treasurer or controller. Another study in the US (Vafeas and 
Waegelein, 2007) found that audit committee expertise is positively associated 
with audit fee levels.  In addition, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) report that 
as the percentage of financial experts on the audit committee increases, the 
likelihood of disclosing internal control weaknesses decreases. As one of the 
duties of the audit committee is to review financial reports prepared by 
management, having financially literate and qualified audit committee members 
on the board should lead to a more effective review. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) 
suggest that audit committees with more expertise are more likely to understand 
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complex accounting issues and demand higher assurance levels from the 
auditors that the financial statements do not contain material misstatements.  
Most of the prior research studying expertise is based on measurements of 
expertise outlined by the recommendations of the BRC (Blue Ribbon 
Committee, 1999) and SEC (2003). Previous studies have examined the 
importance of expertise by means of various measurements. Carcello et al. 
(2002) measured audit committee expertise using the number of other 
directorships held by audit committee members, while Abbott et al. (2003a) used 
the presence of at least one audit committee member with accounting or 
financial management qualifications. However, recent studies, including those of 
Hoitash et al. (2009), Carcello et al.(2008), Hoitash and Hoitash (2009), have 
shown that classifying financial expertise in a more granular way can reveal 
important insights on this matter. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) highlighted the 
importance of separating the two types of expert as recent evidence emphasises 
the importance of distinguishing between diverse types of expertise due to 
inconsistent evidence with regard to the contribution of experts without 
accounting qualifications. Bedard et al. (2007), for example, found that both 
accounting and supervisory financial experts are associated with better internal 
control quality in their area of expertise. Similarly, DeFond et al. (2005) 
observed a positive market reaction to the appointment of directors with 
accounting expertise but not to those with other types of expertise. This is 
further supported by Carcello et al. (2008), who found that designated financial 
experts with accounting experience contribute to higher reporting quality but 
that supervisory financial experts do not. In the same vein, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) 
find that only accounting experts contribute to higher accrual quality, while 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) find that conservative accounting reporting is 
positively associated only with accounting expertise. Therefore, this study 
separates financial experts into supervisory financial experts and accounting 
financial experts. A supervisory expert is an individual who has qualification as 
a result of knowledge obtained through supervising accounting tasks (e.g. CEO). 
On the other hand, an accounting financial expert is one who has an accounting 
qualification gained through experience (e.g. CPA, CFO). Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) found financial expertise to be negatively related to audit 
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fees when the definition of expertise is restricted to accounting expertise. They 
argue that accounting experts lower the overall audit risk and, therefore, auditors 
value accounting experts for their potential to strengthen the effectiveness of 
audit committees. In support of this finding, Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) report 
that experts with supervisory experience demand a higher level of assurance in 
comparison to accounting experts as they do not have the necessary experience 
to understand complex accounting issues. Hence, in order to reduce the risk to 
shareholders, they authorise additional audit work. On the other hand, experts 
with accounting qualifications might be better negotiators and therefore able to 
purchase the same level of assurance at a lower cost.  
Financial experts might also seek to purchase additional services in order to 
protect themselves (Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009). Better audit committees with 
better  financial knowledge and experience will demand higher audit quality in 
order to avoid personal monetary and reputational loss (Abbott and Parker 
(2000).  Evidence from the US suggests that financial expertise is positively 
associated with audit fees (e.g. Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003a). 
Consequently, it is expected that having a larger number of directors with 
financial knowledge and experience (financial expert) on the audit committee 
may increase the committee’s demand for higher quality audits and this will lead 
to higher audit fees being charged by the auditor.  So, the next hypothesis of the 
study is: 
H7 : There will be a positive relationship between the number of financial expert 
members of the audit committee and the audit fee. 
Audit Committee Diligence and Commitment and Audit Fees 
Audit committee diligence will be tested using the number of audit committee 
meetings held per year as disclosed in the Annual Reports. An audit committee 
that is eager to carry out its functions of control must maintain a constant level 
of activity, so the Codes of Best Practice suggest three meetings a year (Cadbury 
Report, 1992; Smith Report, 2003).  McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) found 
that audit committees of firms that are facing SEC enforcement actions or 
restating their quarterly reports are less likely to have frequent meetings. The 
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committees of only 23 percent of these problematic companies met more than 
twice a year compared to 40 percent for the other firms. Abbott et al. (2004) find 
similar results in a more recent sample. Audit committees meeting more 
frequently are expected to require higher quality audits, leading to higher audit 
fees.  
 Recent studies in the US examining corporate governance in an audit context 
have found that the number of meetings of the audit committee and the board 
(Abbott et al., 2003, Abbott et al., 2004) and the financial expertise of its 
members (Carcello and Neal, 2003) do indeed proxy for effective monitoring. 
Abbott et al. (2003), for example, found that the numbers of audit committee and 
board meetings, as well as the financial expertise of the audit committee, are 
positively associated with audit fees. Using data for the year 2000 from 401 
Australian public listed companies by way of combining survey and public data, 
Goodwind-Steward and Kent (2006) also examined the association between 
audit fees, effective audit committee and internal audit. The studies revealed a 
significant positive association between the level of audit fees and audit 
committee meeting frequency. However, the study also found a significant three-
way interaction between audit committee independence, expertise and meeting 
frequency.  Additional analysis by the study indicates that expertise is positively 
associated with audit fees only when meeting frequency and independence are 
low, implying that audit committees with accounting expertise demand a higher 
level of audit assurance in these circumstances. Contrary to other researchers, 
Adelopo and Jallow (2008) found a significant negative relationship between 
audit committee meetings and audit fees in the UK. The study utilised data from 
87 of the top 100 UK listed companies for the year 2006.  
On the other hand, audit committee meetings not attended by members will 
serve no purpose at all. It is expected that committed audit committee members 
will form a highly effective audit committee which will demand more quality 
assurance for financial reports presented by the management, hence leading to 
higher audit fees being paid. The commitment of members is measured from 
their individual attendance at meetings of the audit committee in any given year. 
The above discussion leads to the next two hypotheses: 
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H8 a: There will be a positive relationship between the number of audit 
committee meetings and the audit fee 
H8 b: There will be a positive relationship between the percentage of attendance 
at meetings by members of the audit committee and the audit fee. 
4.5 Development of Hypotheses: Ownership Structure and Audit Fees 
Previous studies such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Keasey and Short (1999) 
and Mitra et al. (2007) have suggested that the ownership structure in an 
organisation matters as it could affect corporate monitoring and control. 
Essentially, as ownership becomes more dispersed, direct monitoring by 
shareholders becomes more costly and greater reliance on the audit as a 
mechanism of governance is expected. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
dispersed owners are more likely to anticipate opportunities for managers to 
pursue their own interests at the owners’ expense. There are two sides to the 
argument. From the managers’ perspective, aware of the shareholders’ 
perceptions of their credibility and transparency, they are expected to push for a 
more comprehensive audit so as to signal their interest in the shareholders’ 
welfare (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002). From the shareholders’ perspective, 
Chan et al. (1993) suggested that in widely dispersed ownership companies they 
are more likely to rely on auditors as a means of managerial monitoring and this 
indirectly leads to higher quality audits and higher audit fees.  
On the other hand, the major shareholders in companies with more concentrated 
ownership are more likely to be actively involved in monitoring managerial 
behaviour, thus reducing the dependence on the auditor; hence audit fees are 
lower. The results of past studies are mixed regarding the impact of large 
blockholder on audit fees. In the US, Mitra et al. (2007) used the percentage 
holdings of institutional investors as a measure of ownership structure and found 
a negative relationship between large percentage shareholding and audit fees. 
However, using the same measurement for his UK sample companies, 
O’Sullivan (2000) did not arrive at the same result. However, another UK study, 
Adelopo et al. (2012) found a significant negative relationship between the 
number of multiple large shareholders (MLS) and audit fees. Using more 
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contemporary data this study expects that the ownership of large blockholders 
will have a negative impact on audit fees as the existence of large blockholders 
reduces agency cost, therefore reducing the need for an extensive audit. In line 
with this thinking, the next Hypothesis is: 
H9a: There will be a negative relationship between the ownership of large 
blockholders and the audit fee. 
Another type of ownership that could have an impact on audit fees is board 
shareholding, particularly management shareholding. Chow (1982) suggests that 
when managers own smaller equity stakes in their firms, they have increased 
incentives to falsify financial disclosures as such information will be used by 
shareholders in setting managers’ remuneration. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
suggest a solution to this by arguing that the conflict between shareholders and 
management could be reconciled when managers possess an ownership interest 
in their companies. As a monitoring mechanism, the external auditor acts as a 
mediator to resolve the conflicts expected by agency theory to arise between 
managers and owners of the business (Fan and Wong, 2005). If there is no 
separation between management and the owner, no conflict would arise as 
agency costs are eliminated. Consequently, unless required by law, no auditor 
would be needed to observe or check the financial statement prepared as no 
earnings management, fraud or other manipulation by management would occur. 
However, whilst finding such an organisation nowadays is virtually impossible, 
finding an organisation with a substantial proportion of management 
shareholding is not. As their interest in the company increases due to a sense of 
belonging, it is expected that the management in companies with high 
management ownership will work hard to improve the company’s performance: 
since higher performance means higher returns. In addition, there will be less 
involvement in earnings management since there will be less tendency or 
initiative to issue misleading information to the users of financial statements, 
especially the shareholders. This train of events leads to greater company 
success and higher quality of financial reporting and increases trust among 
auditors regarding transparency.  
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However, the relationship between management ownership and firm 
performance is not straightforward and has attracted much attention, especially 
among corporate finance researchers. Early researchers such as Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) suggested a linear relationship between these two variables, while 
later analyses considered a non-linear relationship (for example, Kole, 1995). 
The issue of alignment and entrenchment plays an important role in shaping up 
any relationship found. Short and Keasey (1999) found that at low levels the 
shareholding by managers helps align the interests of managers and shareholders 
to the extent that there is less divergence of resources from value maximisation. 
However, at increasing levels of equity ownership, the manager’s consumption 
of perquisites such as an attractive salary may outweigh the loss they suffer from 
a reduction in the value of the firm. At a higher stage, managerial ownership 
could lead to entrenchment as management have sufficient control to follow 
their objectives without fear of disciplinary action from the other shareholders. 
The study by Short and Keasey (1999) confirmed that UK management becomes 
entrenched at higher levels of ownership as compared to its US counterparts. 
Using information for taken-over companies between 1985 and 1996, Cosh et al. 
(2006) found evidence that overall board ownership has a strong positive impact 
on long run share returns and a weak positive impact on operating performance. 
When board ownership is split into CEO, executive and non-executive, only the 
relation between takeover performance and CEO ownership is significantly 
positive. This could be explained by the argument that substantial share 
ownership in a firm by board members can also result in a shift in conflicts of 
interest from management-shareholders to management-minority shareholders 
(Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010). This is because, in line with entrenchment 
theory, having higher management shareholdings means less risk of 
retrenchment among managers and, consequently, outside shareholders’ ability 
to monitor management is greatly reduced, which causes opportunistic 
behaviour to increase (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010). This claim is supported 
by the finding of Mak and Li (2001) that executive share ownership is negatively 
related to board monitoring of management activities. Based on a sample of 124 
public listed companies in Malaysia, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) later found 
a negative relationship between board ownership and corporate voluntary 
disclosure. However, the relationship is weaker for firms with higher proportions 
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of Independent non-executive directors on Audit committee. These results 
support the notion that non-executive directors increase independence and could 
possibly explain why Cosh et al. (2006) found no relationship between company 
performance and executive share ownership, as non-executive directors 
moderate the effect of executive shareholdings. 
The impact on audit fees of having a higher proportion of managerial share 
ownership should be viewed from two different perspectives. Looking at the 
demand for audit services, the degree of management ownership is expected to 
be negatively related with audit fees due to the demand for high quality audits 
decreasing. This is supported by previous studies which found that at high levels 
of ownership managers become entrenched (Sudarsanam et al., 1996) and prefer 
to satisfy their own objectives at the expense of other shareholders’ interests; 
thus they require a reduced audit. However, looking at the supply of audit 
services, there are two possible scenarios. If the management share ownership is 
seen by the auditor as affecting the independence of the board (leading to lower 
disclosure and lower board monitoring), the auditor might charge a premium to 
compensate for the higher associated audit risk. On the other hand, if the 
assumption is that share ownership by the management could improve corporate 
governance, this will reduce the need for a high quality audit, hence audit fees 
will be lower. Studying the relationship between ownership structure and audit 
pricing by utilising data from a sample of 402 quoted companies in the UK prior 
to the adoption of the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury, 1992), O’Sullivan (2000) found 
that audit fees are negatively related to the proportion of equity owned by 
executive directors and non-executive directors. Overall, O’Sullivan (2000) 
suggested that non-executive directors encourage more intensive audits as a 
complement to their own monitoring role, while a reduction in agency costs is 
expected through signiﬁcant managerial ownership resulting in a reduced need 
for intensive auditing. The significant negative association between audit fees 
and management ownership found in O’Sullivan (2000) is supported by two US 
studies conducted in 2007. First, utilising data from 358 New York Stock 
Exchange listed firms which were audited by Big Five auditors in the year 2000, 
Mitra et al. (2007) found that managerial ownership is negatively associated 
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with audit fees. Utilising more recent data (2001- 2003) of Fortune 500 
companies, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) documented an inverse relationship 
between audit fee levels and insider ownership. This suggests that insider 
ownership acts as a substitute for external audit effort in monitoring 
management. More recently, Gotti et al. (2012) found that management equity 
holdings and analyst coverage are negatively related with audit fees. Based on 
the above findings, it is expected that the percentage of equity owned by 
executive directors will reduce the audit work, leading to lower audit fees. This 
leads to the following Hypothesis: 
H9b: There will be a negative relationship between the percentage of ownership 
held by executives and the audit fee. 
It is also interesting to investigate the relationship between Non-executive share 
ownership and audit fees. The existence of non-executive directors on boards 
could improve board independence, especially regarding monitoring the 
behaviour of management. Resource dependence theory supports having more 
independent directors on boards because of the expertise, prestige and contacts 
they bring (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Despite the obvious benefit of having a 
majority of non-executive directors on the board as suggested by agency theory, 
some studies have acknowledged certain drawbacks. The shortcomings 
identified by researchers include the stifling of strategic action, excessive 
monitoring and lack of the business knowledge needed to be effective 
(Goodstein et al., 1994, Baysinger and Butler, 1985, Patton and Baker, 1987). 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) question whether non-executive directors are 
actually independent, which is especially relevant if these directors are former 
employees of the firm or have a personal relationship with the management. If 
opportunistic behaviour among executive directors can be reduced or eradicated 
by giving them share ownership, as was suggested by Jenson and Meckling 
(1976), the same can also be done in the case of non-executive directors as a 
way of motivating them to enhance the company’s performance.  
As compared to management ownership, very few studies appear to have 
explored the effect of non-executive share ownership on business performance 
(Swan and Honeine, 2010). Swan and Honeine (2010) concluded that listing 
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requirements of many countries, for example, the Australian Security Exchange 
(ASX), do not encourage non-executive share ownership as they believe it will 
affect non-executive independence. By contrast, New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) listing rules do not treat stock ownership as a barrier to independence. 
Utilising a unique panel dataset, they observed a sizeable positive relationship 
between non-executive director ownership and firm performance. More 
specifically they found that firms with a non-executive director with substantial 
shareholding perform 29.7% better than otherwise. Consequently it is expected 
that higher non-executive share ownership will lead to less audit work and hence 
lower audit fees. O’Sullivan (2000) found that ownership by non-executive 
directors exerts a significant negative impact on audit fees. Both the regression 
results and the correlations suggested that non-executive ownership and 
executive ownership affect audit fees in a similar way. This indicates that 
nonexecutives possessing significant equity interests may also have business or 
family links with the company and consequently behave in a similar way to their 
executive colleagues. Based on the result of past studies it is expected that non-
executive share ownership will lead to less audit work and hence lower audit 
fees. This expectation leads to the following Hypothesis: 
H9c: There will be a negative relationship between the percentage of ownership 
held by non-executives and the audit fee 
4.6 Development of Hypotheses: Non-Audit Fees and Audit Fees 
According to agency theory, external auditor is one of the mechanisms that 
could reduce agency cost. It is expected that the provision of non-audit service to 
audit client may affect auditor independence. Therefore, a negative relationship 
is expected between audit fees and non-audit fees. Studies which find a negative 
relationship argue that audit fees should decrease as a result of external 
economic synergy arising from the provision of  audit and non-audit services 
and known as “knowledge spillover” (Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 1997; 
Whisenant et al., 2003). In addition, in a competitive environment where clients 
have freedom of choice, the dismissal of auditors is common, and auditors may 
regard reducing audit fees and recovering the loss by charging higher Non-audit 
fees to the client as an alternative way to operate (Loss Leader Theory).  
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Despite the theoretical logic of a negative relationship between audit fees and 
non-audit fees arising from the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, 
many researchers have reported a positive relationship between the two. The 
meta-analysis undertaken by Hay et al. (2006) demonstrates that the majority of 
studies undertaken between 1977 and 2003 found a positive relationship 
between non-audit fees and audit fees. The explanation for such a positive 
relationship is that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services reduces the 
price per unit of audit services and triggers the purchase of more audit service. 
The alternative explanation is that client specific events such as mergers and 
acquisitions, share issues, and implementation of new accounting and 
information services generate demand for consultancy services and at the same 
time these result in additional auditing. Furthermore, providing non-audit 
services could expose to the auditor the real financial position of the client and 
enable the auditor to price the relevant risk identified and accordingly charge 
higher audit fees for problematic clients. Monopoly power, as reflected in 
efficiency of non-audit service provision, also allows the auditor to charge an 
audit fee premium (Hay et al., 2006), especially with accounting firms 
increasingly promoting themselves as “one stop” service providers (McMeeking, 
2006). 
The inconsistent results of past studies on the relationship between non-audit 
fees and audit fees as well as several changes that have taken place recently with 
regards to the disclosure of non-audit fees, and the continuing concern among 
many parties regarding the provision of non-audit fees by the auditor motivated 
the current author to conduct a further investigation on this relationship using 
more current data drawn from a bigger sample and including financial 
institutions, which have mostly been ignored by previous studies. Previous 
studies like  Ezzamel et al.(2002) and Firth (2002) found positive relationship 
between non-audit fees and audit fees, therefore this study also expects the same 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees. This discussion leads to my 
next Hypothesis: 
 H10: There will be a positive relationship between total Non-audit fees 
provided by the auditor and the audit fee 
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4.7 Development of Hypotheses: the Effect of Economic Crisis  
4.7.1 Governance Characteristics and Audit Fees 
Many parties have blamed corporate governance as one of the reasons for the 
recent economic crisis. Financial Times columnist John Plender writes  “the 
credit bubble was not just a simple market failure, but a failure of business 
leadership, corporate governance and risk management, exacerbated by flawed 
incentive structures within banks” (Plender, 2008) .  
In the same vein, a report has pointed out that the 2008/2009 financial crisis can 
to an extent be attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance  as 
there was a failure in protection from excessive risk taking and irresponsible 
behaviour (ACCA, 2009). The report later highlighted a few governance-related 
reasons for the economic crisis. The first reason is dysfunctional boards that did 
not fully understand the risks and impact associated with the strategies and 
activities they approved. In addition, the boards did not provide adequate 
monitoring of implementation, accounting, reporting and audit. The reason for 
this is identified as lack of appropriately qualified non-executive directors with 
the broad range of skills and knowledge required to fully understand the 
complex financial and non-financial matters involved. Irresponsible ownership 
also exacerbated the financial crisis as powerful shareholders did not play an 
active enough role in improving governance. Remuneration systems that 
encouraged short-term thinking and unsustainable risk taking at the expense of 
longer term sustainability were another factor that contributed to the failure of 
governance and hence to the economic crisis. It is suggested that the corporate 
governance model needs changing and corporate governance practices should be 
enhanced to restore confidence to markets. However, Barker (2008,p.9) 
disagrees with this opinion and comments: 
“The credit-crunch and the resulting crisis amongst leading financial 
institutions are increasingly presented as a crisis of corporate 
governance. However, although current problems are indicative of 
shortcomings in the global financial architecture, they should not be 
interpreted as reflecting dysfunction in the broader UK corporate 
governance model. Consequently, it is essential that UK policy makers 
focus their response to the crisis on the underlying source of the problem: 
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the financial regulatory framework (both in the UK and globally). They 
should resist populist calls for more general corporate governance 
reform”.  
He also highlighted that the challenge for the future is to ensure that the UK 
model of corporate governance remains an asset rather than a liability for the UK 
business community. 
UK corporate governance is guided by the Codes of Corporate Governance. 
Since its establishment in 1992, the Code has been used widely and gained some 
reputation. Indeed, it seems that there is almost a belief that complying with the 
Code in itself constitutes good governance. However, the Code is only a 
guidance in general terms to principles, structure and processes. It cannot 
guarantee effective board behaviour  and the boards have a lot of room within 
the framework of the Code to decide for themselves how they should act. 
However, running a corporate board successfully is extremely challenging and 
demanding as it requires high quality efforts due to time and knowledge 
constraints and the need to maintain mutual respect and openness between a cast 
of strong, able and busy directors dealing with each other across the different 
demands of executive and non-executive roles.  
The financial crisis triggered a widespread reappraisal of governance systems 
globally. In the UK the governance of banks and other financial institutions has 
been reviewed (Walker Review, 2010) simultaneously with the revision of the 
Code of Corporate Governance. Two principal conclusions were drawn by the 
FRC from its review. First, that much more attention needed to be paid to 
following the spirit of the Code as well as its letter. Secondly, that the impact of 
shareholders in monitoring the Code could and should be enhanced by better 
interaction between the boards of listed companies and their shareholders. The 
Stewardship Code was then published in 2010 and revised in 2012 to provide 
guidance on this interaction and with the aim to promote the long term success 
of companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper. 
Effective stewardship benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole 
(FRC, 2012). Following the Walker Review (2009) the UK Corporate 
Governance Code was reviewed in 2010 and 2012. Many improvements were 
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made regarding boards of directors, especially in relation to their characteristics 
and effectiveness. In addition, Guidance on Audit Committees was published in 
September 2012 to assist company boards in making suitable arrangements for 
their audit committees, and to assist directors serving on audit committees in 
carrying out their role. 
It can be concluded that regular revision and updating of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code and Guidance on Audit Committees  will allow identification 
and enhancement of the principles that underlie effective boards and audit 
committees, especially following the economic crisis. These revisions enhance 
the quality of boards and audit committees as an internal monitoring mechanism, 
therefore reducing agency costs. To complement this, the UK Stewardship Code 
sets out the principles of effective stewardship by investors so that they can play 
an active role towards success of the company. This is important because, as was 
pointed out earlier, irresponsible ownership contributed to the financial crisis as 
powerful shareholders did not play an active enough role in improving 
governance. It is expected that the changes to the Codes will improve the 
characteristics and effectiveness of the internal governance mechanism (board 
and audit committee) and also the involvement of the investor in company 
operation.  
However, as discussed earlier, the Codes only provide guidance on best practice 
but the implementation will be in the hands of the board and also the 
shareholders. An online survey (Mckinsey, 2013) involving 1597 corporate 
directors worldwide reveals that boards have taken to heart the new and higher 
demands placed on them. However, some directors say that they feel ill 
equipped to live up to these expectations because of inadequate expertise about 
the business and the lack of time they can commit to their board duties. This 
finding shows that the boards are under great pressure because many parties 
have put huge responsibility on them to monitor the company properly. On the 
other hand, the auditor, as another monitoring mechanism, is also under great 
scrutiny and pressure, especially when most company failures (e.g. Enron, 
WorldCom) have been blamed on auditors for failing to detect material 
misstatement and errors before the companies went bankrupt. It is expected that 
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the auditor will conduct sufficient investigation and evaluation of the quality of 
corporate governance of the company before determination of the extent of audit 
procedure needed. This therefore will strengthen the relationship between audit 
fees and governance characteristics. As a result, it is expected that the 
relationship between audit fees and governance characteristics will be stronger 
after the economic crisis (2010) than before the economic crisis.  
H11a:  The relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees is 
stronger after the economic crisis. 
4.7.2 Non-Audit Fees and Audit Fees Relationship 
An independence auditor could monitor the behaviour of the management and 
reduce agency cost. However, it is argued that the provision of non-audit 
services may affect auditor independence. The literature review chapter and the 
development of hypotheses for non-audit and audit fees have highlighted 
changes that have been introduced on disclosure of non-audit services, total 
prohibition of provision of non-audit services by the company auditor to their 
audit client, and compulsory auditor rotation, especially after the economic 
crisis. These changes have placed auditors under great pressure to maintain their 
reputation and also their independence. This is supported by stronger governance 
as a result of regular revision of UK Corporate Governance Code and Guidance 
on Audit Committees  especially following the economic crisis. Guidance on 
Audit Committee (2008) for example contain detailed guidance for audit 
committees regarding the approval of non-audit services, to ensure that the 
independence of external auditor is not impaired. Therefore, it is expected that 
auditor independence will be stronger after the economic crisis as a result of 
these changes. Consequently, this study expects that the relationship between 
non-audit and audit fees after the economic crisis will be stronger than the 
relationship found before the economic crisis. This expectation leads to the next 
hypothesis: 
H11b:  The relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees is stronger after 
the economic crisis. 
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4.8 Control Variables  
Consistent with previous audit pricing studies, this study includes other audit 
fees determinants in the model to control for client related attributes such as 
client size, complexity and also audit risk. Besides these, auditor related 
attributes such as auditor size and location could also affect the audit fees they 
charge to their audit client. Other attributes considered include report lag and the 
seasons when the audit work is undertaken. Following is discussion of the 
control variables. 
Client Size 
The most significant and consistent explanatory variable in determining audit 
fees is the size of the company being audited.  It is expected that the bigger the 
company, the more audit effort is needed to audit the financial statements, in the 
form of testing and analysis of data and information (Simunic, 1980; Firth, 1985; 
Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Simon, 1995; Firth, 1997; 
Adams et al., 1997).  Hence, the larger the company, the higher the audit fee 
charged by the auditor. Prior studies have commonly used either total assets or 
revenue as measurements of fee size.  Of 111 research studies on the 
determinants of audit fees, published up to 2003, 87 used total assets while 25 
used revenues (Hay et al., 2006). Total assets is considered suitable for audit 
firms that adopt an audit approach which is essentially balance sheet based, 
while turnover  may be a better explanatory variable for auditors employing a 
transactions based approach to the audit (Chan et al., 1993). In this respect, 
many studies (e.g. Low et al., 1990; Firth, 1997; Carson et al., 2004; Lawrence 
et al., 2011) have found that the size of the client company as measured by their 
total assets is the major factor in determining the audit fee. On the other hand, 
other studies, which prefer to use the natural logarithm of annual net sales as a 
measure of company size, also report a significant positively association 
between client size and audit fees (e.g. Chan et al., 1993; Collier & Gregory, 
1996; Owusu-Ansah et al., 2010). Total revenue may be superior to total assets 
in the sense that it is not so susceptible to accounting policy choices, financial 
structure and capital intensity of a company as is the case for the total assets 
measurement (see Chan et al., 1993:766).  Furthermore, in subsequent regression 
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models, a sales-based model may exhibit relatively lower heteroscedasticity than 
an asset-based model (see Collier and Gregory, 1996:190). 
However, Chan et al. (1993) stressed that both measurements of client size have 
their drawbacks. For example, differences in total assets may be influenced by 
the age profile of assets and choice of accounting policy, especially with regard 
to fixed asset revaluations, treatment of goodwill and other types of assets. In 
addition, using assets to represent size may be problematic due to its relationship 
and subsequent interaction with complexity variables, especially those which 
incorporate total assets directly into the calculation (e.g. inventory to total assets 
ratio and debtors to total assets ratio). As for the use of revenue, differences in 
the definition of revenue amongst different industries may affect subsequent 
comparisons.   
Economies of scale in the auditor’s production function and the likelihood that 
larger companies will have more sophisticated internal control procedures 
suggest that the relationship between auditee size and audit fees is unlikely to be 
linear (Chan et al., 1993). This is supported by the findings of Carsons et al. 
(2004). Using 1995-1999 data from 795 audit engagements in Australia, the 
study presented evidence that audit fees are not linearly related to client size as 
is typically assumed in audit fee models. In the US environment, O’Keefe 
(1994) also found clear evidence that, ceteris paribus, audit effort is a concave 
function of client size. In addition, the study also found that the documented 
concave relationship between audit fees and size is caused partially by the 
employment of a relatively large proportion of low-level (and therefore 
relatively inexpensive) professional labour as clients increase in size. As a 
conclusion, despite the strong argument that a bigger company is likely to have 
stronger internal control mechanisms that will reduce  the audit fee charged by 
the auditor, the majority of past studies (from 1980-2003), as reflected in the 
meta-analysis in Hay et al. (2006), have reported a significant positive 
relationship between client size and audit fees. In his latest paper, Hay (2012) 
confirms that client size was the audit fee determinant most consistently used by 
researchers between 1980 and 2007. 
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Client Complexity 
A second issue commonly addressed in audit pricing studies is the complexity of 
the client company (e.g.: Low et al., 1990; Gist, 1992; Chan et al., 1993; Brinn 
et al,1994; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Gist, 1994; Collier and Gregory, 1996; 
O’Sullivan, 1999; Menon and Williams, 2001; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; 
Basioudis and Fifi, 2004; O’Keefe, 2004; Cameran, 2005; Mc Meeking, 2006; 
Mat Zain, 2007; O’Sullivan, 2009). The level of audit effort may be expected to 
increase due to the increased complexity of the audit task directly influencing 
audit fees. The complexity of audit clients is normally associated with the nature 
of their business, its location, the quality of internal controls, and the presence of 
unusual transactions. Measurements commonly used to represent complexity 
include the number of subsidiaries, the number of foreign subsidiaries, the 
proportion of foreign assets, the number of standard industrial classification 
(SIC) codes that apply to the business, the number of business segments, the 
number of audit locations, and a subjective rating of complexity provided by the 
audit team.  
The number of subsidiaries is the measurement most commonly used in prior 
work (Hay et al., 2006). As discussed in Chan et al. (1993), there are certain 
reasons why a group of companies with many subsidiaries has to pay higher 
audit fees as compared to a single company of comparable size. First, more 
testing and audit effort is required to audit accounts across all subsidiaries, 
which involves a variety of statutory and disclosure requirements. In addition, if 
not all the subsidiary companies are audited by the same auditor, there may be 
some inquiry costs involved in obtaining information and this could increase 
audit cost. Besides, a group auditor should always pay particular attention to 
intra-group transactions, taxation implications of pricing policy and the 
existence of related party transactions, etc. Another point to stress is the 
importance of protecting the interests of minority shareholders in the case of the 
subsidiary company not being a wholly owned subsidiary. Finally, if the 
subsidiary companies operate in a variety of different fields, this could also 
complicate the auditing process since more substantial learning and expertise 
costs will be incurred by the auditor. Maher et al. (1992), Brinn et al. (1994),  
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Chan et al. (1993),  Pong and Whittington (1994),  Gist (1994a), O’Sullivan 
(1999), O’Sullivan (2000),  O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) and Basioudis and 
Fifi (2004) all found that the number of subsidiaries has a significant positive 
impact on audit fees in their sample of companies. This is supported by Hay 
(2012), who found a strongly significant positive association between number of 
subsidiaries and audit fees in his meta-analysis of audit fee literature published 
between 1980 and 2007. 
In the UK, O’Sullivan (1999) emphasised the importance of segregating 
subsidiaries into foreign and local subsidiaries and his results show that foreign 
subsidiaries have a greater impact on audit fees as compared to local 
subsidiaries. O’Sullivan (2000) later further specified foreign subsidiaries as US 
subsidiary or other non-UK subsidiaries. The study found a significant positive 
relationship between all categories of subsidiary with audit fees. Consequently, 
some studies have found the proportion of foreign subsidiaries to total 
subsidiaries to be another important explanatory variable in explaining the 
complexity of client companies, leading to the auditor charging higher audit fees 
(Hay et al., 2006). The reason for this is that the existence of foreign subsidiaries 
is expected to increase the monitoring and control costs as different offices of 
the auditor firm, in different countries, take part in auditing the client (Chan et 
al., 1993).   
The industry in which the client operates also determines the audit fees charged 
by an auditor as a common assertion made by auditors and researchers is that 
some industries are more difficult to audit than others (Simunic 1980; Turpen 
1990; Pearson and Trompeter 1994). Financial institutions and utilities, which 
have relatively large assets, are generally easier to audit than manufacturing 
companies, for instance, which have extensive inventory, receivables or 
knowledge based assets (Hay et al., 2006). Another explanation could derive 
from the differing nature of regulation in different industries. Focusing on the 
insurance industry, O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) find that insurers specializing 
either in life or general insurance pay significantly lower fees than their 
composite counterparts, suggesting that the audit of specialist insurers is less 
complex and consequently consumes less audit effort. In their study, Low et al. 
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(1990) concluded that there are significant improvements in the explanatory 
power of the audit fee model when industries are segmented into specific 
industrial models. The study found that complexity variables were only 
significant in the hotel industry. The two industries that have most frequently 
been singled out in audit fee research are financial institutions (eight studies) and 
utilities (15 studies) (Hay et al., 2006). Studies have typically found a reduced 
audit fee for companies operating in regulated industries (e.g. Ezzamel et al., 
1996; O’Sullivan, 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000). Ezzamel et al. (1996) offer two 
possible explanations for this finding on lower audit fees among regulated firms. 
First, some of the regulated companies in their sub-sample were previously 
publicly owned and may have been subject to a different level and ethos of 
accountability, control and audit.Therefore, less risk is associated with them 
hence resulting in a lower audit fee. Second, the majority of regulated 
enterprises operate with a limited product range and usually on a national rather 
than an international basis so less effort is needed to audit the company as 
compared to a multinational manufacturer of a similar product.  
As well as firm characteristics, the content and nature of financial statement 
items can add to the complexity of the audit. Thinggaard and Kiertzner (2008) 
argue that the nature of transactions, the accounting criteria for recognition and 
measurement, and the degree of judgment necessary regarding the potential 
importance of the outcome of future events may affect client complexity. In 
addition, the ratio of the sum of inventories and receivables to total assets is 
commonly used by researchers as a proxy for financial statement items that 
require more attention from the auditor. Early researchers such as Firth (1985) 
used this ratio to control for the complexity of audit clients. Using total 
inventories, debtors and internally generated intangible assets over assets as a 
proxy for financial statement items for which it is often difficult to obtain 
sufficient and appropriate audit evidence regarding possible material 
misstatement (labelled as complexity of substance), Thinggaard and Kiertzner 
(2008) found a significant positive relationship between complexity and audit 
fees. However, the study only found a significant effect for technical complexity 
(represented by the square root of the sum of subsidiaries and associated 
companies) among their small companies sample. The result implies that the 
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accounting technicality of consolidation has some weight in small companies 
but, in large companies, traditional considerations of inherent risk in relation to 
financial statement items are more important for the auditors, in line with audit 
theory of materiality and risk. In the Malaysian environment, Che Ahmad et al. 
(2006) also found that client complexity (proxied by total inventory and 
receivables to total assets) is positively and significantly related to audit fees. On 
the other hand, O’Sullivan (2000) used expenditure on research and 
development as one of his proxies for complexity. The study found that 
companies’ expenditure on research and development has a positive impact on 
audit fees. The result is consistent with the argument that knowledge-based 
industries are likely to require more intensive auditing due to the larger 
proportion of intangible assets involved. 
Other factors that can affect client complexity include the number of audit 
locations and the ratio of foreign to total assets. Gist (1992) used the number of 
audit locations visited by the auditor and the ratio of foreign to total assets to 
proxy for client complexity. Based on survey data from 95 public companies 
between 1983 and 1985 in the USA, the study found that the complexity of audit 
clients is significant in explaining variability of external audit fees. In the same 
year, Maher et al. (1992) also studied the effect of client complexity on audit 
fees, during a period of greater competition in USA as a result of deregulation of 
prohibition on client encroachment, client solicitation and advertising 
prohibition. He used additional measurements of client complexity which 
consisted of: two digit SIC codes, the number of subsidiaries, the ratio of foreign 
assets to total assets, the ratio of receivables to total assets and the ratio of 
inventory to total assets. He found a significant positive relationship between all 
these variables as proxies for client complexity and audit fees. Despite different 
definitions and the number of variables used to measure client complexity across 
prior literature, all the studies document empirical results indicating that the 
degree of client complexity significantly influences the audit fees charged by 
auditors.  These findings support the argument that complex and diversified 
companies are charged higher audit fees as more audit labour, knowledge, and 
effort are needed to satisfactorily complete an audit assignment. 
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Audit Risk 
During an audit of a client company the auditor is exposed to risk.  Risk occurs 
when financial statements have been fraudulently prepared and include 
falsification of financial records, intentional omissions of transactions, 
misapplication of accounting principles and intentional omission of disclosures 
of financial information. As described in Zhao et al. (2006), there is a difference 
between audit failure and audit risk. Audit failure means that the auditor 
provides an incorrect audit opinion for unfaithful financial statements due to 
non-conformation to audit standards. Audit risk is the risk that the auditor may 
unknowingly fail to express the appropriate opinion on financial statements that 
are materially misstated. The main difference between audit failure and audit 
risk is whether or not the auditor conforms to audit standards. As mentioned in 
Wong (2009), results of a survey done by the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia in 2003 show that there has been a dramatic increase in the cost of 
insurance premiums purchased by audit firms to cover them against possible 
claims arising if they issue the wrong opinion. As these insurance costs are a 
significant expense for auditors, one way of compensating for this extra cost is 
by increasing audit fees to their audit client according to the degree of riskiness 
of the firm. 
There are two forms of risk which are relevant to the auditor, business risk and 
audit risk. Business risk is defined as risk related to the business, which relates 
to the probability that an auditor will suffer financial or reputational loss in his 
professional practice as a result of lawsuits, sanctions imposed by external 
regulators, diminution of the auditor’s professional reputation, possible loss of 
clients, time and costs incurred in defending the auditor’s position and the non-
realisation of audit fees (Jubb et al., 1996). Audit risk is defined as the risk that 
financial statements may be materially misstated after the audit is completed and 
an unqualified opinion issued (Arens and Loebbecke, 1994). The major 
components of business risk for audit firms arise from client specific audit risk. 
The higher the audit risk of the client company, the higher the business risk for 
the audit firm.  
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The relationship between audit fees and audit risk is described by Cameran 
(2005) as being much more complex than that between the other two attributes. 
Since higher audit risk means higher business risk for the audit firm, the auditor 
will try to provide for possible losses by charging extra fees to their client. 
Consequently, the higher the audit risk, the more testing needs to be carried out 
by the auditor and the higher the fees charged to compensate for the additional 
work and the greater the risk of audit failure (Brinn et al., 1994). Bell et al. 
(2001) found that high business risk increases the number of audit hours, but not 
the fee per hour. This implies that audit firms perceive firm-level differences in 
business risk and obtain compensation through billing additional hours, not by 
increasing the hourly charge.  When considering inherent risk, profitability and 
leverage are among the common examples of audit risk. Generally, inherent risk 
is measured based on accounting information and also based on market risk 
measures. Using accounting information, the riskiness of a business is 
determined by the value of inventory to total assets ratio, receivables over total 
assets, inventory and receivable over total assets and current ratios. Simunic 
(1980) was the first to recognise inventory and receivables as “risky” balance 
sheet items that generally represent a material portion of the balance sheet figure 
and could lead to an increase in the level of audit effort and at the higher risk of 
a material misstatement of the items being missed by the auditor. However, it 
was argued by Jubb et al. (1996) that the use of these measures of risk is 
redundant with the proxy for complexity. This is because in the case of a more 
complex auditee, its operations are more dispersed and it may be harder for the 
auditee’s central management to maintain adequate control over their inventories 
and receivables. Greater complexity leads to higher risk. Market risk, on the 
other hand, takes into account the systematic risk (i.e. market beta). Most of the 
earlier literature, such as studies by DeFond et al. (2000), Menon and Williams 
(2001), Nieme (2002) and Simunic and Stein (1996), used accounting 
information to determine risk. As compared to accounting based risk measures, 
market based measures are not widely used, despite possessing desirable 
properties such as being forward looking and not being affected by differences 
in accounting practices. In addition, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) suggests that the 
correct measure for the systematic risk of a firm is the beta. Motivated by this 
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proposition, Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2003) investigated whether auditors across 
different environments actually access the systematic market risk in their audit 
pricing decisions. The results of the study reveal that the market based risk 
measure explains audit fees in addition to risk measures based on accounting 
information. However, the model differs among countries, which could be due to 
differences in cultural factors. Also, in using the market beta to measure risk, 
O’Sullivan (2000) found that the beta has a positive impact on audit fees. The 
result suggests that auditors charge a higher fee for auditing companies with 
greater stock market volatility as volatility can lead to a financial distress 
condition and subsequent investigation of the auditor’s work. As a conclusion, 
the higher the inherent risk the higher the audit fees charged and, according to 
Hay (2006), 71% of audit fees studies from 1980-2003 reported a significant 
positive relationship between audit fees and various measures of inherent risk.  
The profitability of a company can also be reflected in the riskiness of an audit. 
Client profitability reflects the extent to which an auditor may be exposed to loss 
in the event of a client not being financially viable and eventually failing 
(Simunic, 1980). The weaker the performance of the firm, the higher the risk for 
the auditor and the higher the audit fee expected to be charged (Van Caneghem, 
2010). Loss by a client has become an increasingly important driver of audit fees 
in recent years (Hay et al, 2006), in addition to measures of profitability. It is 
expected that the audit fees will have a negative relationship with return on 
assets (ROA) and have a positive relationship with the presence of a loss. 
However, contrary to the above expectations, Nieme (2002) found that loss-
making Finnish firms pay lower fees than their better performing counterparts. 
Nieme (2002) suggested this was due to the fact that the poor financial condition 
of a company might increase fee pressure and prevent the auditor from raising 
the audit fees.  
Measures of leverage and liquidity may also be used to assess the risk of client 
failure, which potentially exposes the auditor to a loss (Simunic, 1980). 
Normally, leverage is used to measure long-term solvency and the liquidity 
ratios (current ratio and acid-test ratio) measure short term liquidity. It is 
expected that audit fees will have a positive relationship with leverage and a 
149 
 
negative relationship with the current and acid test ratios. However, Chaney et 
al. (2004) found a negative relationship between leverage and audit fees for a 
sample of privately held UK firms. It is argued that such a relationship is due to 
the stricter monitoring by lenders, which leads to lower audit fees for those 
companies with higher leverage levels. This is supported by Ang et al. (2000), 
who argue that as leverage increases, the risk of default also increases and this 
leads to more incentives for lenders to monitor the firm to avoid losses. Half of 
the studies included in the meta-analysis by Hay et al. (2006) showed a highly 
significant relationship between audit fees and leverage.  Furthermore, based on 
a classification of studies by country, it is suggested that leverage is a more 
important determinant of audit fees in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom than in other countries.  
It is suggested by Houston et al. (2005) that business risk is composed of at least 
three factors (acceptable audit risk, residual litigation risk and non-litigation 
risk) and that auditors are compensated to act as auditors, provide insurance for 
investor losses and bear risks associated with factors that extend beyond the 
conducting of the audit. Bedard et al. (2008) examined the association between 
audit fees and disclosure regarding effectiveness of internal control under 
section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. Despite the fact that auditors are 
not required to evaluate internal controls under section 302, they found that 
companies disclosing problems under this section pay higher audit fees and 
continue paying higher audit fees in the following year. This is supported in a 
study by Hoitash et al. (2008), who found that audit fees were positively 
associated with internal control problems disclosed in the first year of 
implementation of section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002. These two 
studies provide detailed insights into audit risk adjustment during the initial 
period of SOX implementation. In an investigation of whether the association 
between financial reporting risk and audit fees changed during a period marked 
by momentous and historic events for auditors in the wake of the Enron scandal, 
Charles et al. (2010) found that the positive relationship between financial 
reporting risk and audit fees strengthened significantly in 2002 and 2003, 
consistent with a shift in the way auditors priced risk, in response to the events 
surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Companies experiencing 
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restatements are normally assessed by the auditor as having higher audit risk 
than those with no financial problems. Using data from 228 US companies that 
had financial restatements for 2003, Feldman (2009) investigated this matter and 
also investigated whether subsequent remedial actions moderate the increase in 
audit price resulting from the higher audit risk. The study found evidence that 
audit fees are higher for restatement firms, compared with a matched-pair 
control group of non-restatement firms. Recently, Doogar et al. (2010) studied 
the transition effect to the new Auditing Standard (from Auditing Standard No 2 
(AS2) to Auditing Standard No 5 (AS5)) in the US, using data from the years 
2005 to 2008. It was found that AS5 audit fees are aligned with auditee fraud 
risk but AS2 audit fees are not; hence, AS5 audit fees are greater for those 
clients with higher fraud risk. 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) can also lead to higher audit risk. There is a 
possibility of opportunistic earning management by issuers in an attempt to 
increase the offering price. It was found by Venkataraman et al. (2008) that 
auditors earn higher fees for IPO engagements than post-IPO engagements.  The 
wedge between control rights and cash flow rights arising from the presence of a 
dual-class share structure also could increase audit risk. Dual class shares exist 
in firms having two or more classes of shares, with disproportionate voting 
rights. It was found by Khalil et al. (2008) that audit fees and the wedge between 
cash flow rights and control rights have a significant positive relationship. This 
is due to the wider scope of such audits, since auditors perceive a higher level of 
business risk in this kind of organisation.   
Another factor that could play a crucial role in determining the auditor’s legal 
liability is the legal environment. This prompted Choi et al. (2009b) to conduct a 
study of the effect of cross listing on audit fees based on the three following 
predictions. First, auditors charge higher fees for firms that are cross-listed in 
stronger legal regimes than for non-listed firms. Second, when firms are cross-
listed in countries whose legal regimes are no stronger than those of their home 
countries, the cross-listing premium exists if and only if cross-listing leads to a 
significant increase in audit complexity. The third prediction is that for the firms 
cross-listed in stronger legal regimes, the cross listing audit fees premium 
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increases (decreases) as the difference in the strength of the legal regimes 
between the cross-listed foreign country and the home country becomes larger 
(smaller). The subsequent empirical analysis supported the first and third 
predictions only. The conclusion from this study is that cross-listing audit 
premiums are associated with increased legal liability. Using data from 21,559 
firms across 15 countries between 1996 and 2002, Choi et al. (2008) found that 
the strictness of a country’s legal liability regime is an important fee-increasing 
factor after controlling for the client firm-specific fee determinants and other 
factors, such as macroeconomic variables. The other findings include the 
existence of a Big 4 audit fee premium at a particular legal liability as the Big 4 
charge higher audit fees as compared to non-Big 4 firms; however, the Big 4 
premium decreases as the country’s legal liability regime becomes stronger. 
They also found that the effect of legal regime on audit pricing and Big 4 
premiums is more salient for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms. 
Finally, Choi et al. (2008) also found that the marginal effects of most firm-
specific fee determinants on audit fees differ systematically between countries 
with stronger legal regimes and countries with weaker legal regimes, suggesting 
that the strictness of legal liability regimes is an important factor in explaining 
variations in audit fee structure across countries with different legal 
environments.  
These findings are supported by Chan et al. (2008), who found that the increase 
in audit fees among large foreign accelerated filers is negatively associated with 
the strength of the legal environment in their home countries, implying that 
auditors charge higher audit fees to compensate for the higher audit risk 
associated with weaker legal environments. Laux and Newman (2010) 
developed a theoretical model to shed some light on the implications of the legal 
liability environment for the auditor’s decision to accept or reject risky clients 
and the level of audit quality and audit fees in a setting in which the auditor 
expends considerable resources on evaluating the prospective client prior to 
making the acceptance decision. The main finding is that the relationship 
between the strictness of the legal regime and the probability of client rejection 
is U-shaped (rejection is higher for both weak and strong liability regimes as 
compared to those with moderate liability regimes). It was also found that both 
152 
 
audit quality and audit fees increase as the auditor’s expected litigation loss from 
audit failures increases. 
Krishnan et al. (2009) studied the possibility that a company’s earnings forecast 
policy is associated with audit fees. It is argued that auditors view clients that 
make earnings forecasts as being associated with greater risk of earnings 
management and litigation. Consistent with this argument, the study found that 
companies issuing a greater number of earnings forecasts in a particular year, 
making more precise forecasts and management earnings forecasts which are 
more optimistically biased, pay higher audit fees. 
Auditor Size 
It is widely hypothesized that large audit firms demand higher fees (Cameran, 
2005) and this could be due to the level of audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981), risk 
factors due to higher exposure to litigation risk if the client company should fail 
since bigger audit firms are perceived to be more wealthy (Mishari, 2008) and to 
possess stronger brands, or due to their market power (Basioudis and Fifi, 2004). 
However, contrary to the above assumptions, in a study among private firms, it 
was found that auditees, on average, do not view Big 5 auditors as sufficiently 
superior in terms of the perceived quality of the services provided to warrant a 
fee premium (Chaney et al., 2004). 
Results from several studies in many countries support the positive association 
between audit fees and big audit firms (Taffler and Ramalinggam, 1982, Francis, 
1984, Francis and Stokes, 1986, Chan et al., 1993, Anderson and Zéghal, 1994, 
Pong and Whittington, 1994, Wang et al., 2009). However, some studies in 
USA, Canada and UK have found no significant difference between fees paid to 
big audit firms and non-big firms (Simunic, 1980; Brinn et al., 1994). Even 
though the above studies show mixed results, combined results from 25 years of 
audit fee studies show a strong association between Big 8/6/5/4 firms and audit 
fees, with 58% of studies finding a significant positive relationship (Hay et al., 
2006).   In his latest meta-analysis study, Hay (2012) found strong evidence that 
big audit firms are associated with higher audit fees. While the majority of 
previous studies have found a strong significant positive relationship between 
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audit fees and Big audit firms, some authors believe that the relationship 
between the two variables should actually be negative (Cameran, 2005). The 
rationale behind this is that a negative relationship between audit fees and 
auditor size can be explained by the expected presence of greater economies of 
scale in the costs of the larger auditors (Palmrose, 1986). 
Some authors have investigated this positive result further and found that the 
relationship differs between small and large auditee markets (e.g. Carson et al., 
2004). Studies from the early to mid-1980s (Simunic, 1980; Simon, 1986; 
Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986) found that auditor size is not 
significant for very large companies with assets of over $600 million. For 
relatively small companies with mean assets less than $100 million, auditor size 
has a positive relationship with audit fees (Francis, 1984; Francis and Stokes, 
1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996; McMeeking et al., 
2006). One possible explanation for this result is that economies of scale offset 
the price premium for Big auditors in the large client segment (Francis and 
Stokes, 1986) and the positive relationship among smaller clients reflects the 
effect of product differentiation of the auditor rather than  the abuse of monopoly 
power (McMeeking et al, 2006). However, recent studies from the 1990s and 
2000s have found evidence that a Big 6 audit fee premium does exist among 
listed companies and larger audit clients (Johnson et al., 1995; Gul, 1999; 
Ireland and Lennox, 2002). 
Some published literature has studied the effect of big audit firm premium in 
different audit market segments. Nieme (2004) examined the effect of auditor 
size among small Finnish audit firms. The results suggest that both size and 
technical capability have a positive impact on auditor remuneration. Earlier 
studies in Australia (e.g. Francis and Stokes, 1986), based on the large company 
segment, observed no significant differences between large and small audit 
firms, while in the small company segment, Big 8 firms charged significantly 
higher audit fees than non-Big 8 firms. This result is similar to the findings of 
Brinn et al. (1994), who studied big audit firm premiums in the UK. In the US, 
Palmrose (1986) and Francis and Simon (1987) have also reported the existence 
of a Big 8 audit firm premium with respect to smaller companies. Lee (1996) 
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found that in Hong Kong Big 6 firms charge higher audit fees in the small 
auditee market than in the big auditee market. Gul (1999) found that audit fees 
for Big 6 firms are higher than for non-Big 6 firms, among both larger and 
smaller auditees in the Hong Kong audit market. In the 2000s, Sullivan (2002) 
found that following the mergers in the UK of Big 8 to Big 6, there was evidence 
of reduced marginal costs for auditing large clients as measured by patterns of 
client switches following the mergers and no evidence that mergers were 
anticompetitive. Reynolds and Francis (2001), however, found no evidence that 
Big 5 auditors report more favourably for larger clients. Ireland and Lennox 
(2002) found evidence of a premium being charged by large audit firms in the 
United Kingdom, after modelling the selection of a large auditor by larger 
clients. In a different environment, Basioudis and Fifi (2004) found a significant 
relationship between size of business and audit fees for companies listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2000. 
Using data on UK listed firms collected over a longer period (1985-2002), 
McMeeking et al. (2006) found that, based on partitioning of the sample by 
client size, big firm returns are more significant in the small client sector due to 
product differentiation. In investigating whether the Enron-Andersen affair in 
the US had affected audit fees, Chi (2006) found evidence of higher fees for Big 
4 industry specialists relative to non-specialist auditors but the result only 
applies when the client is a small company. Abidin et al. (2010) studied audit 
market structure, fees and choices in a period of structural change (1998-2003) 
in the UK and found that there has been significant upward pressure on audit 
fees since 2001 for smaller audit clients. In Greece, Owusu-Ansah et al. (2010) 
studied the determinants of corporate audit fees following the liberalization of 
the statutory audit market in the country. They found that size of the auditee and 
particular hours spent on the audit engagement have a positive and significant 
influence on the audit fees charged by the auditor.  Lawrence et al. (2011) 
examined whether differences in proxies for audit quality between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 could be a reflection of their respective clients’ characteristics. The 
study found that the effects of Big 4 auditors are insignificantly
 
different from 
those of non-Big 4 auditors with respect to
 
the three audit-quality proxies, thus 
suggesting that differences in
 
these proxies between Big 4 and non-Big 4 
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auditors largely
 
reflect client characteristics, especially client size. A number of 
studies have divided the audit market into second tier and local or regional firms. 
In the US, Francis and Simon (1987) found a significant Big 8 audit premium in 
both second tier national firms and local or regional firms. Similar results are 
also observed in the UK market by Basiodis (2002). 
Some studies have attempted to relate individual large accounting firms to the 
existence of an audit fee premium (Balachandran and Simon, 1993; Anderson 
and Zéghal, 1994; Simon, 1995; Firth, 1997; Langendijk, 1997; Simon and 
Taylor, 2002). Firth (1997) reported that in general no Big 6 audit firm premium 
applied in Norway as only Arthur Andersen accrued a premium. According to 
Langendijk (1997), the Big 6 audit fee premium in the Netherlands is related to 
KPMG. Simon and Taylor (2002) later reported a big audit firm fee premium in 
Ireland, whilst further analysis revealed that the premium applied only to Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers and Lybrand. Investigating the relationship between 
audit fees and large audit firms in Italy, Cameran (2005) found that Italian 
auditees pay more in order to engage a big audit firm. Further testing shows that 
there are intra-Big audit fee differences and that the audit fee premium applies to 
only one large international firm (KPMG) rather than to all large audit firms as a 
group. In addition to auditor size, the size of a local branch office within an audit 
firm could determine the audit quality and audit fees. In this respect, Choi et al. 
(2010) found that office size has a significantly positive relationship with both 
audit quality and audit fees, even after controlling for national-level audit firm 
size and office-level industry expertise. 
Auditor Location 
Location of the auditor may have a significant impact on audit fees. The first 
issue relating to location is geographical proximity. There are two possible 
effects of auditor locality on audit fees. The first is that since geographic 
proximity and familiarity facilitate information flow (Malloy, 2005; Francis et 
al., 1999), the lowered information asymmetry between auditors and clients may 
reduce audit risk and audit cost. These cost savings would allow local auditors to 
charge lower audit fees. On the other hand, the information advantage and the 
more effective communication channels that local auditors enjoy compared to 
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non-local auditors may lead to more effective monitoring, and thus, higher-
quality audits by local auditors. Higher audit quality could lead to the auditor 
charging higher audit fees (Choi et al., 2008). Utilising data from 10,587 firms 
between 2002 and 2005 in the USA, Choi et al. (2008) investigated whether and 
how the locality of auditors or the geographical proximity between auditors and 
clients affects audit quality and audit pricing. It was found that clients of local 
auditors report significantly fewer abnormal accruals than clients of non-local 
auditors and the audit fees paid to local auditors are lower than those paid to 
non-local auditors. This suggests that the cost savings associated with local 
audits are sufficiently large to outweigh potential fee premiums for high quality 
local audits. 
The other issue relating to location is the address of the audit firm itself. The 
measurement commonly used to measure auditor location in metropolitan 
centres, for example, London (UK), Amsterdam (Netherlands) or Oslo (Norway) 
(Hay et al, 2006), is a dummy variable for auditor location. In the UK, Chan et 
al. (1993), Ezzamel et al (1996), O’Sullivan (2000) and Chaney et al. (2004) 
found a significant positive relationship between audit fees and whether the 
auditor was based in London. Hay (2012) found that audit pricing studies that 
have used this measurement, especially those conducted in the UK, show a very 
consistent positive relationship with audit fee; therefore, he considers  this 
variable highly applicable to studies conducted in other countries, such as the US 
and Australia. 
Report Lag 
Report lag is the elapsed time between the audit client’s financial year-end date 
and when the audit report is signed off.  It is sometimes interpreted as an 
indication of the efficiency of an audit. A shorter time taken to audit could imply 
greater efficiency of the auditor. On the other hand, the longer time taken is 
likely to be because of the need for more audit testing and investigation. It is 
predicted that audit fees will have a positive relationship with report lag (Hay et 
al., 2006). In the UK, Chan et al. (1993), Ezzamel et al. (1996) and O’Sullivan 
(2000) found a significant positive relationship between audit fees and the lag 
between the year end and the date of the audit report. However, O’Sullivan 
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(1999) found no significant evidence that report lag has an effect on audit fees. 
To extend the understanding about the determinants of audit report lag, Knechel 
and Payne (2001) examined previously uninvestigated audit firm factors that 
potentially influence audit report lag. Their results indicate that incremental 
audit effort, the presence of contentious tax issues, and the use of less 
experienced audit staff are positively correlated with audit report lag. However, 
audit report lag is decreased by the potential synergistic relationship between 
non-audit services and audit services. 
Busy Season 
It is predicted that auditing during the auditing busy season (normally at the 
beginning of the calendar year) could lead to higher audit fees. However, 
O’Sullivan (1999) and O’Sullivan (2000) found no evidence that auditing during 
the busy season has a significant impact on audit fees. This is supported by Hay 
et al. (2006), who found that of 32 studies between 1980 and 2003 that examined 
the relationship between audit fees and busy season, only 5 reported a significant 
positive relationship, 2 negative and the rest reported insignificant results.  
Although the evidence to support that busy season audits are more costly is quite 
mixed, Hay (2012) concluded that the variable is significantly and positively 
associated with audit fees and such a measure should be included in further 
studies. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
The first part of this chapter provided a rich discussion on various internal 
governance characteristics and their importance. Also discussed was the 
relationship between governance characteristics and audit pricing previously 
investigated by prior studies.  However, the limited availability of contemporary 
studies relating corporate governance with audit pricing was also pointed out. 
The discussion then turned to the development of 17 hypotheses for assessing 
the relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees. 
The second part of the chapter discussed the developments that have taken place 
in relation to non-audit fees, particularly since the recent increase in concern 
among various parties regarding independence of the auditor in dealing with 
158 
 
pressure imposed by management, especially in those companies having 
financial difficulties. These concerns have resulted in additional restrictions on 
the provision of non-audit services by auditors to their audit clients and also the 
publication of new accounting regulations and guidelines on procedures and 
disclosure for non-audit services. The new requirements to disclose details of 
non-audit services in financial statements provided a valuable opportunity for 
this study to investigate further the relationship between non-audit fees and audit 
fees and to assess the impact on audit pricing of each service individually rather 
than having to bundle them together as was previously the case due to data 
limitations. Five hypotheses were developed to test the relationship between 
non-audit fees and audit fees. The study does not test all the non-audit services 
individually as services such as audit of pension fund, SOX related services, 
other services related to pension fund, and IT and actuarial related services are 
too small in value and as percentages of total non-audit services to be considered 
important.  
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide details of the research strategy, data 
collection and the research design used. First, the research methods used in the 
study are discussed in detail and justified. Second, the data used in the study and 
the method of collection are provided, summarised in a table and explained in 
the text. This is followed by details of the samples used, including sample size 
and details of firms by Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industrial 
sector. The means used to measure the dependent variable (LOGAUDIT) and 
various audit fee determinants covering board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics and ownership structure are shown. The discussion of the 
research design comprises an explanation of the control variables, including 
measurement procedure and the expected relationship for each independent and 
control variable. Where possible, variables and their respective measurements 
are supported by past literature. Finally, the regression models, which are 
basically an extension of Simunic’s (1980) audit pricing model, are presented. 
5.2 Research Methodology 
Past studies have identified two main research strategies, namely quantitative 
and qualitative methods (Saunders et al, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
However, some authors (e.g. Craswell, 2003; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003) 
have referred to a third approach, the mixed method, which is a combination of 
the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Research strategy refers to the 
method of data collection and analysis adopted in the study.  
Quantitative research strategy favours a positivist epistemological orientation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003; Hennink et al., 2011). In short the quantitative research 
approach involves quantifying a research problem, measuring and counting 
issues and then to generalising the findings to a broader population (Hennink et 
al., 2011). It employs scientific methods of identifying the research question and 
sampling technique, with a strong theoretical framework. Questions developed 
under this strategy are expressed in terms of hypotheses and estimation models 
in the form of derived equations with which to test the hypotheses. The 
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hypotheses normally are tested using mathematical equations, statistical analyses 
and econometric measurements. This method is also known as a “deductive” 
approach to research. The data are normally collected using semi-structured 
questionnaires or publicly available primary and secondary data. The outcomes 
of a quantitative research normally lead to the identification of statistical trends, 
patterns, averages, frequencies or correlations (Hennink et al., 2011). 
One advantage of using quantitative research strategy is that it allows the 
establishment of causal relationships between variables and provides important 
insights into the interrelationships that could exist between very many variables 
of interest and enhances the understating of their links (Bryman and Bell, 2003; 
Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009). As this method involves strict definition of 
terms and measurement of variables of interest it allows the researcher to 
measure what he sets out to measure and not another phenomenon. In addition, 
the approach allows generalisation and replication of results and may improve 
study validity and originality since mathematical and statistical tools used in this 
method enhance the ability to make inferences and forecasts.  
However, there are a few drawbacks of using this method. Adelopo (2010) 
explore the limitation of this research method. First, the method has the 
difficulty in finding suitable variables to capture the concepts of the study. This 
is because the use of proxy variables for unobservable concepts is not equivalent 
to measuring the actual variable itself. Wrong model specification such as the 
exclusion of important variables, inclusion of irrelevant variables and 
measurement errors either for the dependent or independent variables is another 
common problem. Therefore, he concludes that the idea of using a proxy may 
limit the impact of the established relationship and may cast doubt on the 
validity of the result from such a study. This is because elements of subjectivity 
are involved in determining the proxy or surrogate variables. These leave room 
for wide variations in the choice of variables and their measurements and may 
account for numerous inconsistencies in a number of quantitative studies. 
Finally, the measurement validity and the choice of estimation techniques, 
model specification issues and statistical tests conducted may be inappropriate.  
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Second, this research strategy have been criticized by interpretivists on the 
grounds that it assumes that social sciences, whose primary focus is humans and 
their social involvements, can be subjected to the same or similar methods of 
analysis as the pure sciences.  
On the other hand, qualitative research is guided by concepts from the 
interpretive paradigm (Hennink et al., 2011). Therefore, an inductive research 
approach where research questions lead to the formulation of theory and the 
discovery of a pattern of behavior is preferred. Also, the values and perceptions 
of the researcher are inevitably linked to the research itself. Qualitative research 
is described by Hennink et al. (2011) as an approach that allows an examination 
of people’s experiences in detail, by the use of a specific set of research methods 
such as in-dept interview, focus group discussion, observations, content analysis, 
visual methods, and life histories or biographies. In short, it uses the strategy that 
captures the social dynamics of business, its internal constituents, environments 
and stakeholders. This research strategy involves the use of data collection and 
analysis methods that are considered to be most suitable for investigating a 
social actor in a social setting. In other words, human dynamics are recognised 
in every stage of the research process (Adelopo, 2010).  
The key benefit of this method is the ability to explore and undertake an in depth 
investigation of a social actor or phenomenon, therefore providing the 
opportunity to make meaning of both spoken and unspoken responses, which 
enables firsthand experience and interaction with the subject of the investigation. 
For example, technique such as interviews and focus groups allow the 
participant of the research to give a very detailed and specific answer 
(Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009). It is perhaps the closest representation of 
reality. The inductive research approach also can be the pivot to the emergence 
of a grounded theory, providing a more original insight is there. 
However, this approach has generalisability and replicatability problems 
considering no two individuals are the same in terms of feeling, emotional make 
up and other individual uniqueness. In addition, the sample sizes are normally 
small and non-random, and therefore the findings may not be generalised to the 
larger population (Vanderstoep and Johnston, 2009). Another problem is the 
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possibility of bias arising from the researcher’s own values, culture and 
perceptions. Inductive research method involves direct contact with people of 
various ages and circumstances so the issues of consent, vulnerability and 
participation might be another problem to be addressed. 
The nature of the study itself is a very important determinant in choosing the 
most suitable research method (Saunders et al, 2007). For studying certain issues 
quantitative strategy is more appropriate; for example, in the case of collecting 
data from senior management on corporate strategy or governance processes, 
which is considered sensitive information. Such data could have been reliably 
collected by previous research or could be publicly available through 
government departments or agencies or through private providers and there is no 
point in reinventing the wheel so long as the data is reliable and free from error 
and bias. Constraints such as time and finance could also determine the research 
method. Therefore, readily available secondary or published data are preferred 
by most researchers due to considerations of time and cost effectiveness.  
Based on these facts, this study uses a positivist epistemological stance with a 
deductive approach, using only a quantitative research strategy. These 
philosophical and strategic research choices are based on the nature of the 
investigation as well as the fact that quantitative method is more cost effective 
and less time consuming as compared to qualitatitive research strategy. 
Therefore, the data collected for this study derives from published (the 
companies’ annual reports) and secondary data (datastream). 
5.3 Data Collection 
Most of the data used in this study were obtained from the companies’ annual 
reports for the years 2007 and 2010. The year 2007 is chosen to represent pre 
economic crisis period because, a recent report (Bank of England, 2009) 
indicates that the economic crisis started in 2008 in UK with UK real GDP fell 
by 5.5% between 2008 quarter 1 and 2009 quarter 2 (Bank of England, 2009). 
From early 2010 world economic recovery stabilised, the situation on the global 
financial markets calmed down and crisis measures started to be withdrawn 
(Berg, 2012). Therefore, the year 2010 is used to represent post crisis period.  
The required annual reports were downloaded from the individual company’s 
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website and the filings section of Thomson One Banker. Most of the data were 
hand collected from companies’ annual reports. The data were divided into three 
categories: audit data, governance data and financial data. In order to obtain the 
necessary information, various sections of the annual reports were utilised. Audit 
fee and non-audit fee data were collected from the notes to the accounts listing 
details of the remuneration paid to the company’s auditor. Almost all companies 
involved in the study disclosed this information in the notes to the accounts for 
operating expenses or operating profit. To comply with the requirements of The 
Companies Regulations 2005, most of the companies disclosed details of audit 
and non-audit fees paid to their auditor. This enabled the relationship between 
audit fees and the individual components of non-audit fees to be studied. The 
details of other audit data, such as the name of the auditor, audit report date, type 
of opinion received and location of the auditor, were obtained from the 
independent auditors’ report section of the annual report.  
Governance data were collected from annual reports, in particular, the corporate 
governance section. Board of directors’ profiles, remuneration reports, 
governance statements, directors’ reports and audit committee reports were 
analysed in order to obtain relevant governance information.  The number of 
directors on the board and also the number of non-executive directors was 
calculated using the names disclosed in the board of directors’ profile, excluding 
those who retired before the year end and also those appointed after the year end. 
The names of the directors in the directors’ remuneration statement were then 
crosschecked with those in the governance section of the annual report, which 
normally states the number of directors and also any change of directors during 
the year. Further analysis of the governance statements was done to determine 
which non-executive directors were in fact independent of management. Most of 
the companies stated clearly which directors were considered independent based 
on the code of corporate governance. Information on CEO duality was another 
item of data collected from the board of directors’ profile. CEO duality exists 
when the chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer position is held by 
the same person. The number of audit committee members and the expertise 
possessed by each member was collected from the audit committee report.  
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In order to collect information on board meetings and audit committee meetings, 
the corporate governance report and sometimes the report of the audit committee 
were checked. Most companies provided tables giving details of the attendance 
of each member at board meetings and also committee meetings such as audit 
committee meetings, nomination meetings and remuneration meetings. In the 
absence of such a table, detailed reading of the corporate governance report 
enabled the necessary information to be collected. Ownership information is also 
related to corporate governance. Thus, the remuneration report was utilised to 
determine the number of executive and non-executive directors holding ordinary 
shares in the company. Most companies provided a table showing the share 
ownership of the board. Care was taken not to include in the ownership of the 
board the board members who had retired during the year In relation to 
ownership, blockholder information was obtained from  the directors’ report 
under the significant share ownership section as the companies are obliged to 
disclose the shareholders holding 3% or more of their shares. 
Financial data for the study were obtained from Datastream. In cases where 
figures were missing from the Datastream database, the companies’ financial 
statements were checked to obtain the missing data. Table 5.1 below summarises 
how the data were collected and the sources of the information.  
Table 5.1 Data Collection and Sources of Information 
Type of data Source 
Audit fee data 
Audit fees and Non-audit fees 
 
 
Other audit data 
Report Lag, Auditor Location 
and Auditor size. 
 
Notes to the financial statements under 
operating expenses or operating profit 
headings. 
 
Annual report - Independent auditors’ 
report (Group) 
Governance data 
Board data 
 
 
Audit committee data 
 
Other data 
      Directors’ ownership 
      Blockholders’ ownership 
     Subsidiaries 
 
Board of directors’ profile, corporate 
governance statement, remuneration 
report.  
Audit committee report, corporate 
governance statement  
 
Annual report 
Annual report 
Annual report 
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     Industry classification FTSE websites 
Financial data  Datastream and annual reports. 
 5.3 Sample Selection 
The population of the study consists of all companies listed on the FTSE All 
Share (UK) as at 31
st
 December 2007, information which is available on the 
FTSE website. Table 5.2 shows details of the sample companies. The initial 
number of companies was 672, including investment companies. However, 
investment companies were subsequently excluded as they are typically holding 
companies, producing no goods and services but rather holding investments (or 
shares) in other companies.  This reduced the sample to 568 companies.  Due to 
outliers and other data restrictions, mainly relating to problems in obtaining 
copies of some companies’ annual reports, the number of companies was 
reduced to 492. The companies which were no longer listed in the London Stock 
Exchange and also those that had moved to an AIM listing in 2010 were then 
taken out, leaving the final sample of 384 companies. Total observations for the 
two years  is 768. 
Unlike most prior audit pricing studies, this study includes financial institutions. 
In the UK, all the prior audit pricing studies into the relationship between 
governance characteristics and audit fees (e.g.  O’Sullivan 2000; Peel and 
Clatworthy, 2001; Adelopo and Jallow, 2008; Adelopo et al., 2009) have 
excluded financial companies, while O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) included 
Insurance companies only. The rationale behind the inclusion of financial 
companies in this study is that the recent economic crisis and the collapse of 
banks and financial institutions have increased interest and concern regarding 
the governance of financial institutions so it was felt important to include these 
companies in the sample, especially as they have not been investigated 
previously.  Reasons commonly cited for the exclusion of this industry from 
audit pricing literature are that the financial reporting format of Banks and 
Financial Institutions is different from those of other types of companies and that 
they operate in a regulated industry.  
Table 5.3 shows the sample firms categorised by Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) industry sector. The sample firms are distributed among ten 
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main industries, consisting of general industries such as oil and gas, basic 
materials, industrials, consumer goods, health care, consumer services, 
telecommunications, technology and also regulated industries like utilities and 
financials. The majority of the firms are drawn from three main sectors, namely, 
industrial, consumer services and financial, represented by 105 companies 
(27.3%), 81 companies (21.1%) and 71 companies (18.7%) respectively. The 
remaining companies were listed in other industries, with 16 companies (4.2%) 
listed in oil and gas, 22 companies (5.7%) in basic materials, 34 companies 
(8.8%) in consumer goods, 15 companies (3.9%) in healthcare, 7 companies 
(1.8%) in telecommunications, 9 (2.3%) in utilities industries and 24 companies 
(5.7%) in technology industries. When combined, firms in the regulated 
industries constitute 21% of the total, which is considered quite significant. 
Table 5.2: Sample Firms 
 No of companies 
Initial sample from FTSE All Shares listed on 
31/12/2007 
672 
Investment holdings  110 
Outliers 6 
Unavailability of Annual Report and some 
financial data  
64 
FTSE all shares drop out in 2010 108 
Final sample 384 
 
Table 5.3: Firms by ICB Industry sector  
Industry No of 
companies 
percentage 
Oil & Gas 16 4.2 
Basic Materials 22 5.7 
Industrials 105 27.3 
Consumer Goods 34 8.8 
Health Care 15 3.9 
Consumer Services 81 21.1 
Telecommunications 7 1.8 
Utilities 9 2.3 
Financials (excluding Investment Holdings) 71 18.7 
Technology 24 5.7 
Total 384 100 
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5.4 Research Design and Measurement Procedures 
The first objective of the study is to test the relationship between the internal 
governance characteristics of sample companies and audit quality. Although 
potentially many aspects of internal governance can be considered, this study 
focuses on the impact of characteristics of the board of directors, audit 
committee and ownership structure on audit quality as proxied by audit fees. 
This study uses audit fee as the dependent variable. O’Sullivan (2000) provides 
three justifications for the use of the audit fee as a proxy for audit quality. The 
first justification is that audit fees reflect the extent of auditor investigation and 
quality of staff used by the auditor. Second, existing audit pricing studies 
acknowledge the link between audit quality and pricing by including a binary 
variable to represent  auditor type, with the expectation that big audit firms have 
better quality auditors and charge an audit fee premium to reflect this (e.g. Chan 
et al., 1993; Wang et al., 2009). Third, O’Sullivan (2000) stressed that the link 
between audit quality and fees has been raised both by Cadbury (1992) and the 
Chartered Accountants’ Joint Ethics Committee (1993) report, warning of the 
likelihood that audit quality may be compromised by low fees.  
5.4.1 Measurement for Independent Variables 
Board Independence  
Board independence is a continuous variable measured by the proportion of non-
executives on the board of directors. Prior studies in the US (Carcello et al., 
2002; Lee at al., 2004; Boo and Sharma, 2008) and in the UK (O’Sullivan, 1999; 
O’Sullivan 2000; Peel and Clatworthy, 2001; Adelopo and Jallow, 2008) have 
used the same variable to test the extent of board independence. It is expected 
that the proportion of non-executive directors on the board will affect audit fees 
as non-executive directors will be more concerned with the accuracy of financial 
statements and thus higher quality audits will be required from the auditor, 
leading to higher audit fees.  
 
In the wake of increasing concern regarding the independence of the board, this 
study also tests the independence of directors in terms of the proportion of 
independent non-executives on the board. This is in line with the requirement of 
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the Code of Corporate Governance that the board should have a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors (and specifically independent non-
executive directors) such that no individual or small group of individuals can 
dominate the board’s decision taking. The Code clearly states that the board 
should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it considers to 
be independent. The board should determine whether the director is independent 
in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or circumstances 
which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgment. The 
board should state its reasons for classifying a director as independent, 
notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may 
appear relevant to its determination. Generally the following factors affect the 
independence of non-executive directors (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
2010): 
a. has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
b. has, or has had within the last three years, a material business 
relationship with the company, either directly or as a partner, 
shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a 
relationship with the company; 
c. has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart 
from a director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a 
performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s 
pension scheme; 
d. has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or 
senior employees; 
e. holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors 
through involvement in other companies or bodies; 
f. represents a significant shareholder; or 
g. has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their 
first election. 
Utilising the data available regarding independent non-executive directors in the 
corporate governance section in the annual reports, this study investigates the 
relationship between independent non-executive directors and audit fees. 
Previous studies in the UK, US and Hong Kong, Greece and Malaysia 
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(O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2000; Tsui et al., 2001; Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos, 2010; Bliss et al., 2007; Bliss, 2011) found a significant positive 
relationship between audit fees and the proportion of non-executive directors. 
Therefore this study expect a positive relationship between audit fees and both 
measures of board independence. 
 
CEO duality  
CEO duality arises when the same individual occupies the positions of company 
chairman and CEO. This study use a Binary variable: = 1 if CEO is also 
Chairman of the Board and; = 0 otherwise to measure CEO duality. Prior 
researchers in the UK, such as O’Sullivan (1999), O’Sullivan (2000) and Peel 
and Clatworthy (2001), have included this variable in their studies as have 
researchers in Hong Kong, France and Spain (Tsui et al., 2001; Desender et al., 
2009). Past studies have suggested that CEO duality constrains board 
independence and in presence of a dominant CEO, non-executive directors are 
expected to have reduced influence in seeking an intensive audit and as a result 
companies with CEO duality are more likely to have lower demand for external 
audit services (Bliss, 2011; Desender et al., 2009; O’Sullivan, 2000).  Tsui et al. 
(2001) found a negative relationship between audit fees and CEO Duality.  
Therefore it is expected that the existence of CEO duality will have a negative 
impact on audit fees.  
Board size 
 
Board size is a continuous variable measured by the number of directors on the 
board. This measurement has been used by US studies (Boo and Sharma, 2008; 
Chan et al., 2012) and also previous UK studies (Adelopo and Jallow, 2008). It 
is therefore expected that board size will have a positive relationship with audit 
fees. This is because Chan et al. (2012) found a significant positive relationship 
betweent board size and audit fees. 
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Board diligence 
Board diligence is a continuous variable measured by the number of board 
meetings held during the year. One of the requirements of Schedule C of the 
Combined Code 2006, dealing with the disclosure of corporate governance 
arrangements, is the disclosure of the number of meetings of the board and 
individual attendance by directors (A.1.2). A previous US study (Carcello et al., 
2002) and a UK study (Zaman et al., 2011) have used this measurement and 
found a positive relationship between audit fees and board diligence. Therefore, 
it is expected that the number of board meetings will have a positive relationship 
with audit fees as diligent boards will demand higher quality audits, requiring 
more audit assurance and audit hours, which will lead to higher audit fees.  
Board Expertise  
Board expertise is a continuous variable measured by the Percentage of non-
executive directors holding one or more other directorships in LSE listed 
companies. This is because prior research, particularly audit pricing studies, (e.g. 
Carcello et al., 2002) has typically based the measurement of board expertise on 
multiple directorships held by the directors. The use of this measurement is 
justified by Mace (1986), who suggests that outside directorships are perceived 
to be valuable because they provide executives with prestige, visibility and 
commercial contacts. O’Sullivan (1999), on the other hand, utilised number of 
other directorships because of its potential to reflect the market’s perception of 
an individual non-executive’s monitoring capability. Since the directors who 
hold multiple directorships would suffer more reputational damage if the 
company collapsed due to opportunistic financial reporting behaviour by 
management, they are expected to provide a higher quality monitoring service 
on behalf of shareholders. It is expected that the board expertise variable will 
have a positive relationship with audit fees. This is because expert boards will be 
more supportive of the purchase of higher quality audit services, resulting in 
higher audit fees.  
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5.4.2 Audit Committee Characteristics 
Audit Committee Effectiveness 
Many past studies have measured audit committee effectiveness using a 
composite variable consisting of audit committee independence and diligence 
variables. Lee and Mande (2005) found a positive association between audit fees 
and audit committee effectiveness in US listed companies. A year later, in an 
Australian study, Goodwin-Steward and Kent (2006) used three-way interaction 
between audit committee independence, expertise and meeting frequency. 
Although they found the interaction between these variables to be significant, 
they found that expertise is positively associated with audit fees only when 
meeting frequency and independence are low. This may reflect that an audit 
committee with accounting expertise demands a higher level of assurance in 
these circumstances. In Malaysia, Mat Zain and Subramaniam (2007) also used 
the form of interaction utilised by Goodwin-Steward and Kent (2006) and found 
a positive relationship between Internal audit contribution to financial statement 
audit and audit committee effectiveness. However, in New Zealand, Rainsbury 
et al. (2009) found no significant association between the quality of the audit 
committee and the quality of financial reporting. In the UK, drawing upon 
recommendations in the Smith Report (2003), Zaman et al. (2011) based their 
composite measure for audit committee effectiveness on the following 4 
variables: size of the committee (at least 3 members), independence of the 
committee members (contains only non-executive directors), number of 
committee meetings (a minimum of 3 meetings per year) and existence of 
expertise on the committee (at least one finance expert on the committee). An 
audit committee is only considered effective if all four criteria are met. A 
dummy variable is used to indicate the fulfilling of this condition where Binary 
variable;= 1 if all audit committee members are non-executive directors, at least 
one member has relevant financial expertise, meet at least three times a year and 
having minimum size of three audit committee members;= 0 otherwise. Inspired 
by Zaman et al. (2011), this study uses the same method of measurement for 
audit fee effectiveness. Zaman et al. (2011) found a positive association between 
audit committee effectiveness and audit fees; and this study expects the same 
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finding as an effective audit committee will demand a higher quality audit from 
the incumbent auditor. 
Audit Committee Independence.  
Studies in the US and UK, including those of Abbott et al. (2009), Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) and Zaman et al. (2011), found that audit committee 
independence is positively associated with audit fee levels, consistent with the 
notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in 
monitoring management. Both Abbott et al. (2009) and Zaman et al. (2011) use 
a Binary variable; = 1 if all audit committee members are non-executive 
directors; = 0 otherwise. However, in contrast, Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) 
used a binary variable 1 to indicate the presence of at least one insider on the 
committee, =0 otherwise. This study uses a binary variable similar to that used 
by Abbott et al. (2009) and Zaman et al. (2011), namely, = 1 if all audit 
committee members are non-executive directors; = 0 otherwise. It is expected 
that audit committee independence will have a positive association with audit 
fees as directors who are independent of management will require a higher 
quality audit, which will lead to higher audit fees. 
Audit Committee Size  
Audit committee size is a continuous variable measured by the number of audit 
committee members. According to the Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance, Schedule C.3.1, the board should have an audit committee 
consisting of at least three or in the case of smaller companies two members, 
who should all be independent non-executive directors. Previous studies such as 
Pincus et al. (1989), Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), Vafeas and Waegelein (2007), 
Zaman et al. (2011) have used this measurement to measure audit committee 
size. It is expected that larger audit committees will demand higher quality 
audits, resulting in higher audit fees. 
Audit Committee Expertise 
Audit committee expertise is measured by three different measurements. First, 
audit committee overall financial expertise is measured by the number of audit 
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committee members with overall financial expertise as well as a dummy variable 
indicating instances where the audit committees fulfil the requirement of having 
a financial expert. The current SEC definition for financial expertise is used to 
measure the audit committee’s financial expertise. Therefore, members with 
work experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, chief financial officer, 
financial comptroller or accounting officer and also those with work experience 
as an investment banker, financial analyst, or in any other financial management 
role and/or as a chief executive officer, chairman or company president are 
considered as having general financial expertise. This study expects a positive 
relationship between audit fees and the number of financial expert. This is 
because, having a larger number of directors with financial knowledge and 
experience (financial expert) on the audit committee may increase the 
committee’s demand for higher quality audits which will lead to higher audit 
fees. This is supported by evidence from the US whixh suggests that financial 
expertise is positively associated with audit fees (e.g. Carcello et al., 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2003a) 
The SEC definition of financial expert suggests that the term financial expertise 
could entail accounting and finance expertise, as well as any expertise in the 
preparation of financial statements. Therefore, the second measurement used is 
audit committee accounting expertise. It is again a continuous variable measured 
as the proportion of audit committee members with accounting expertise. The 
notion of accounting expertise is measured by using a strict definition proposed 
by the SEC and later used by Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), Krishnan and 
Lee (2009) and Dhaliwal et al., (2010). The SEC defines the accounting expert 
as ‘a member with experience as a certified public accountant (CPA), auditor, 
chief financial officer (CFO), chief financial controller or chief accounting 
officer’. The Audit committee non accounting expertise is also a continuous 
variable measured as the proportion of audit committee members with non-
accounting expertise i.e. finance and supervisory expertise. This would include 
members with work experience as an investment banker, financial analyst, or 
experience of supervising the preparation of financial statements (e.g. chief 
executive officer or company president). Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et 
al. (2005) have used the same measurement to measure audit committee 
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supervisory expertise. The biographical data disclosed in the annual reports for 
members of the audit committee was perused to identify those serving on other 
audit committees and with financial expertise, i.e. accounting and non-
accounting expertise. This study expects a positive relationship between audit 
fees and supervisory financial expert and negative relationship with accounting 
financial expert. This is supported by findings of Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2009) and Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) who report that experts with supervisory 
experience demand a higher level of assurance in comparison to accounting 
experts as they do not have the necessary experience to understand complex 
accounting issues. 
Audit Committee Diligence and Commitment 
Audit committee diligence is a continuous variable measured by the number of 
or frequency of audit committee meetings held. Other studies that have used this 
measurement include Menon and Williams (1994), Carcello et al. (2002) , 
Hoitash and Hoitash (2009),  Abbott et al.(2003a), Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006), Hoitash and Hoitash ( 2009) and  Zaman et al.(2011). Prior studies (e.g 
Zaman et al., 2011; Abbott et al.2003a; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent,2006) found 
a positive relationship between audit committee meeting and audit fees. 
Therefore, this study anticipates that audit committee diligence will be 
associated with higher audit fees.  
Audit committee commitment will be measured by the weighted average 
attendance of all audit committee members to audit committee meetings. As 
highly committed members indirectly promote efficiency and effectiveness of 
the committee, a positive association is expected between audit fees and the 
proportion of audit committee members who attended all meetings scheduled for 
the year. 
5.4.3 Ownership Structure 
The essence of ownership structure is captured using blockholder ownership, 
executive ownership and non-executive ownership. Blockholder ownership is 
measured by two different measurements. First, it is measured by the percentage 
of total shares held by substantial shareholders (holding 3% or more 
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shareholdings). This was previously used in Chan et al. (1993) and O’Sullivan 
(2000). The study also used the number of large shareholders (shareholders 
holding 3% shares or more) to measure blockholder ownership. This method 
was previously used by Adelopo et al. (2012). This study predicts a negative 
relationship between blockholder ownership and audit fees since past studies 
(e.g. Mitra et al., 2007 and Adelopo et al., 2012) also documented a negative 
relationship between audit fees and blockholder ownership. 
The Executive or management ownership is a continuous variable measured by 
the proportion of shares held by directors (defined as proportioned of issued 
beneficial and non beneficial ordinary shares). This was previously used by 
O’Sullivan (2000), Mitra et al. (2007) and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007).  
Non-executive director ownership is also a continuous variable and is measured 
by the percentage of total shares owned by non-executive directors (beneficial 
shares only) over total share capital. Studies such as Honeine and Swan (2010) 
and O’Sullivan (2000) have used the same measurement to measure non-
executive director ownership. The information on ownership structure was 
collected by consulting the remuneration and directors report section of the 
annual report of each company. O’sullivan (2000) documented a negative 
relationship between both management share ownership and non-executive 
director ownership and audit fees. Therefore, this study also expects a negative 
relationship between management share ownership and non-executive director 
ownership and audit fees. 
5.4.4 Control Variables  
The study recognises other factors which might affect the amount of audit fees 
paid. Thus, a number of control variables consistent with prior literature are also 
identified and included in the model. Client attributes include company size, 
client complexity, riskiness and other attributes. Client size is measured by Log 
sales and Log total assets. Client complexity,  on the other hand, is measured by 
total number of subsidiaries of the company, number of UK subsidiaries, number 
of Non-UK subsidiaries and number of US subsidiaries and USDUMMY (using 
binary variable;= 1 if the company has US subsidiary;= 0 otherwise). The 
riskiness of the client is controlled for by including variables such as proportion 
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of total assets represented by stock (stock/total assets), proportion of total assets 
represented by debtors (debtors/total assets), return on assets (earnings before 
interest and tax/total assets), leverage ratio (long term liabilities/total assets) and 
whether the company experienced loss during the year (using binary variable; =1 
if the company experienced loss during the year; =0 otherwise). The client 
attribute of whether the company belongs to a regulated industry (financial and 
utilities) is also included. This is measured by binary variable; =1 if the company 
belongs to financial or utilities industry; =0 otherwise. Since this study also 
includes financial institutions, a binary variable; =1 if the company belongs to 
financial institutions; =0 otherwise is also used. 
 
Auditor related attributes included in the study are auditor size and location of 
the auditor. Auditor size (BIG4) is measured by a Binary variable; =1 if auditor 
is Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG or PricewaterhouseCoopers; =0 if 
otherwise. The location of the auditor labelled as LONDON is also measured by 
a binary variable; =1 if the auditor has a London address; =0 if otherwise.  
Consistent with prior literature, attributes such as report lag labelled DELAY, 
which represents  the elapsed time from the audit client’s financial year-end date 
until the audit report is signed off, and whether the auditing is done during the 
busy season labelled BUSY are also included in the audit pricing model. The 
report lag is measured by the number of days between the accounting year end 
and the date of the audit report. The busy season, which is labelled as BUSY, is 
measured by a binary variable; =1 if the financial year end is between 31
st
 
December and 31
st
 March; =0 otherwise. A list of variables used in this study 
and the methods of measurement used are shown in Table 4.4. 
5.4.5 Non-Audit Fee 
The study is also aimed at finding the association between non-audit fees and 
audit fees. First, Non-audit fees are measured by the natural log of the total 
amount of non-audit fees the company pays to its auditor. Theoretically the 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees is expected to be negative.  
Second, this study unbundles the non-audit service. This study contributes 
significantly to the existing literature by investigating the relationship between 
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audit fees and details of non-audit services using published data. Previous 
research (Palmrose, 1988; Beattie and Fearnley, 2002; Ezzamel et al., 2002 and 
Lai and Krishnan, 2009) have unbundled the non-audit service using information 
from survey responses. In the Post-SOX period, the issue of non-audit fees and 
auditor independence has become controversial following a series of corporate 
collapses and this has triggered a demand for more detailed disclosures from 
regulators. One of the responses from the regulators was the establishment of the 
Companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) 
Regulations 2005. Under these regulations, UK companies are required to 
disclose details in the annual report of non-audit fees paid to their incumbent 
auditors. The availability of this data made possible investigation of the 
relationship between audit fees and individual non-audit fees. Although many 
individual non-audit services are disclosed in the annual report, some services 
are not very widely used and the values as a proportion of total non-audit fees 
are too small for meaningful study. For the purposes of this study, it was decided 
that it would be more practical to condense non-audit services into four 
categories: other services related to legislation, tax services, corporate finance 
services and other services (other services relates to pension plan, actuarial 
service, IT service and any other service). The other services related to 
legislation are measured using the percentage of other services related to 
legislation over total non-audit fee (other services related to legislation/total non-
audit fee) x 100. Each of the other non-audit service categories is calculated in 
the same manner. 
The study also measures non-audit using binary variable ;= 1 if total non-audit 
fees is greater than  audit fees;=0 otherwise. This is to capture the relationship 
between audit fees and the incident where non-audit service is more dominant 
than audit service. Other measurements used include the percentage of total 
audit remuneration from non-audit fee.  
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5.5 Empirical Research Models and Tests 
The study utilises four main empirical models to test the relationship between 
audit fees and governance characteristics.  
5.5.1 Audit fees and Governance Model 
Model 1 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS + b13LOGTOTNONAUDIT 
+  b14 %INDIRS +  b15 BOARDMEET + b16ACSIZE + b17 % ACNEXEC+ 
b18 % ACMEET + b19 %ACCOMM +  b20 %ACFINEXPERT+  b21 
ABLOCKOWN+ b22 ANEXSHARES+ b23 AEXESHARES + b24 PERIOD 
Model 2 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS + b13LOGTOTNONAUDIT 
+ b14 BOARDSIZE +  b15 %INDIRS +  b16 BOARDMEET + b17ACSIZE + 
b18%ACNEXEC + b19 %ACMEET + b20 %ACCOMM +  
b21%ACFINEXPERT +  b22 ABLOCKOWN +  b23 ANEXSHARES+  b24 
AEXESHARES + b25 PERIOD 
Model 3 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS + b13LOGTOTNONAUDIT 
+  b14 %INDIRS +  b15 BOARDMEET + b16ACSIZE + b17 % ACNEXEC+ 
b18 % ACMEET + b19 %ACCOMM +  b20 %ACSUEXPERT  + b21% 
ACACCEXPERT  +  b22 ABLOCKOWN+ b23 ANEXSHARES+ b24 
AEXESHARES + b25 PERIOD 
Model 4 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS + b13LOGTOTNONAUDIT 
+  b14 %INDIRS +  b15 BOARDMEET + b16 ACE +  b17 ABLOCKOWN+ 
b18 ANEXSHARES+ b19 AEXESHARES + b20 PERIOD 
In addition, this study presents various robustness tests of the impact of various 
governance characteristics and control variables on audit quality, utilising 
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different variations of variables of board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics and ownership structure. This part of the analysis extends our 
understanding of the impact of these variations on audit quality. 
5.5.2 Audit Fees and Non-Audit Fees 
Model 1 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS +   b13 %INDIRS +  b14 
BOARDMEET + b15 ACSIZE + b16  % ACNEXEC+ b17 % ACMEET + b18 
%ACCOMM +  b19 %ACFINEXPERT+  b20 ABLOCKOWN+ b21 
ANEXSHARES+ b22 AEXESHARES + b23 PERIOD + b24 LEGIST(M) + b23 
TAX(M) + b23 CORPFIN(M) +  b23 OTHERSERVICE 
Model 2 
LogAUDIT = b0 + b1 LOGTOTASSETS+ b2 UKSUBS + b3 USSUBS + b4 
ROA + b5 STOCK + b6 DEBTORS + b7 REG + b8 BUSY + b9 LOGDELAY +  
b10 LONDON   + b11 BIG4 + b12 3YEARSLOSS +   b13 %INDIRS +  b14 
BOARDMEET + b15 ACSIZE + b16  % ACNEXEC+ b17 % ACMEET + b18 
%ACCOMM +  b19 %ACFINEXPERT+  b20 ABLOCKOWN+ b21 
ANEXSHARES+ b22 AEXESHARES + b23 PERIOD + b24 AUDITVSNON 
5.6 Statistical Techniques Used to Conduct Univariate and Bivariate 
Analysis 
SPSS software for Windows package was used to analyse the data gathered. 
First, descriptive statistics were presented. The second statistical method used 
was correlation analysis. This type of analysis is important since it measures the 
strength of the linear association between two independent variables under 
study. The correlation coefficient takes on values ranging between +1 and -1. 
The sign of the correlation coefficient (+,-) defines the direction of the 
relationship, either positive or negative. A positive correlation coefficient means 
that as the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable 
increases; as one decreases the other decreases. A negative correlation 
coefficient indicates that as one variable increases, the other decreases, and vice-
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versa. The correlation coefficient is also helpful in determining variables suitable 
for inclusion in the regression model. Correlation analysis can be used to trace 
any multicollinearity problems among independent variables. Multicollinearity 
exists when the independent variables are highly correlated (r=.8 and above). 
The data were further tested using multiple regression analysis, based on a series 
of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The study will also use Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) to detect multi-collinearity problems. This study noted 
that the threshold, for instance, of severe multi-collinearity is indicated by a VIF 
of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). Thus, throughout the investigations, the researcher will 
compare the results of the correlation matrix with the VIF values to determine 
instances of severe multi-collinearity. One of the key assumptions of regression 
is that the variance of the errors is constant across observations, to test for 
heteroscedasticity problems, this study uses the Durbin Watson test. The 
variables and their definitions are summarised in table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4: Definitions of Variables  
Variables Description 
Dependent  
 
LOGAUDIT Natural log of audit fee (source: Financial statements) 
Control variables 
 
LOGTOTASSETS Natural log of total assets (source: Financial statements) 
UKSUBS Number of subsidiaries located in UK (source: Financial 
statements) 
USSUBS Number of US subsidiaries (source: Financial statements) 
REG Binary variable;= 1 if the company belongs to a closely regulated 
industry that is a financial or utilities industry;= 0 otherwise 
ROA Profit before interest and taxation (EBIT)/total assets (%)  (source: 
Datastream ) 
STOCK % total assets represented by stock (source: Datastream) 
DEBTORS % total assets represented by debtors (source: Datastream) 
GEARING % of long term liabilities over total assets 
LOSS3YEARS Binary variable;= 1 if the company incurred a loss in the previous 3 
years; = 0 otherwise 
LOGDELAY Natural log of the Numbers of days between financial year-end and 
date audit report signed by auditor (source: Financial statements) 
LONDON Binary variable;= 1 if auditor has a London address;= 0 otherwise 
BIG4 Binary variable;= 1 if auditor is Deloitte & Touche,  Ernst & 
Young, KPMG or PricewaterhouseCoopers;= 0 otherwise 
BUSY Binary variable:= 1 if company’s financial year-end is between 31 
December and 31 March inclusive; = 0 otherwise 
Governance  
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Board  
 
BOARDSIZE No. of directors on the board 
DUALITY Binary variable:= 1 if CEO is also Chairman of the Board and; = 0 
otherwise 
%INDDIRS % independent non-executive directors on the board (source: 
financial statements) 
BOARDMEET Number of board meetings (source: financial statements) 
Audit committee   
ACSIZE Number of members on audit committee (source: financial 
statements) 
ACMEET Number of audit committee meetings 
%ACCOMM 
 
% of attendance by audit committee members in audit committee 
meetings  
%ACNEXEC % of audit committee members that are non-executive directors 
%SUEXPERT %  of financial experts on audit committee who are CEO or 
chairman of a board of directors 
%ACCEXPERT % of Audit committee members who  have relevant accounting 
education, qualification and experience(CPA, CFO, finance 
director, financial controller, CIMA, auditor or chief accounting 
officer) 
%FINEXPERT % of Audit committee members who have recent and relevant 
financial experience 
ACE Binary variable;= 1 if all audit committee members are non-
executive directors, at least one member has relevant financial 
expertise, meet at least three times a year and having minimum size 
of three audit committee members;= 0 otherwise 
Ownership  
ABLOCKOWN % of ordinary shares owned by substantial shareholders (owning in 
excess of 3% shares) 
ANEXSHARES % of ordinary shares owned by non-executive directors  
AEXESHARES % of ordinary shares owned by executive directors 
NON-AUDIT  
LOGTOTNON 
AUDIT 
Natural log of non-audit services fee paid to auditor (source: 
financial statements) 
LEGIST (M) Total non-audit services fee from other services pursuant to 
legislation (source: financial statements ) in Millions 
TAX (M) Total non-audit services fee from taxation (source: financial 
statements) in Millions  
CORPFINANCE (M) Total non-audit services fee from corporate finance (source: 
financial statements) in Millions 
OTHERSERVICE(M) Total non-audit services fee from any other services (source: 
financial statements) in Millions 
AUDITVSNON Binary variable;= 1 if total non-audit fees is greater than  audit 
fees;=0 otherwise  
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The first part of this chapter provides details of data collection.  Most of the data 
used in this study were obtained from the companies’ annual reports for the 
years 2007 and 2010. The required annual reports were downloaded from the 
individual company’s website and the filings section of Thomson One Banker. 
Most of the data were hand collected from companies’ annual reports. The data 
were divided into three categories:  audit data, governance data and financial 
182 
 
data. Audit fee and non-audit fee data were collected from the notes to the 
accounts listing details of the remuneration paid to the company’s auditor. 
Governance data were collected from annual reports, in particular, the corporate 
governance section. Board of directors’ profiles, remuneration report, 
governance statement, directors’ report and audit committee reports were 
analysed in order to obtain relevant governance information. Financial data for 
the study were obtained from Datastream and from financial statements in cases 
where any data were missing from the Datastream database.  
 
The second part of the chapter provides details of sample firms. The sample 
selected for this study consisted of all companies listed on the FTSE All Share 
(UK) as at 31
st
 December 2007, information which is available on the FTSE 
website. The initial number of companies was 672, including investment holding 
companies. The removal of investment holding companies from the list reduced 
the final sample of companies to 492 in 2007. Of these 492 companies, 385 
remained and were usable at the end of 2010. This study includes financial 
institutions in the sample as the current economic crisis and the collapse of 
banks and financial institutions has increased interest and concern regarding the 
governance of these institutions. The sample was drawn from 10 different 
sectors which were identified from the FTSE All Share Index Series, 
constituents, weightings & performance reports as at 31
st
 December 2007. The 
biggest industry was the Industrials sector and the smallest was the 
Telecommunications sector. 
Discussion of the sample is followed by description of the research design and 
measurement procedures. The measurements used to measure the dependent 
variable (LOGAUDIT) and various audit fee determinants covering board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics, ownership structure and non-
audit are described. The discussion of the research design comprises an 
explanation of the independent variables and control variables, including 
measurement procedures and the relationship expected between each 
independent and control variable. Relevant past literature is used to support the 
choice of variables and the respective forms of measurement.  
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Lastly, details of data analysis are described. SPSS for windows package is used 
to analyse the data gathered. First, descriptive statistics are presented. The 
second statistical method used was correlation analysis. The relationships 
between dependent variable and independent variables were tested using 
multiple regression analysis, based on a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions. The variables and their definitions are summarised in Table 5.4. 
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CHAPTER 6:  DATA ANALYSIS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The data analysis chapter will be organised into three sections. First, descriptive 
statistics will be presented, showing mean, median, standard deviations as well 
as maximum and minimum values for each variable employed in the empirical 
analysis investigating the impact of governance characteristics and non-audit 
fees on audit pricing. The descriptive analysis includes: a combined analysis of 
the overall sample for both the pre-economic crisis period (2007) and post-
economic crisis period (2010) and a detailed analysis based on the individual 
years. This is followed by a correlation matrix, showing a two way Pearson 
correlations between the variables included in this study. The correlation matrix 
is important as it could highlight the associations between audit fees and the 
explanatory variables used in the study. It therefore could support the 
relationship found in the regression analysis. In addition, correlations areuseful 
in detecting the possibility of multicollinearity between the independent 
variables that could serve to undermine the subsequent multiple regression 
results. The chapter continues with the results of detailed multivariate regression 
analysis (pooled dataset) to investigate the hypotheses set out in chapter 4. The 
multivariate analysis includes robustness tests on the impact of various control 
and governance characteristics variables on audit fees.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
  Combined period (2007&2010) Pre-economic crisis (2007) Post-economic crisis (2010) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
             
AUDITFEE 1572526.23 
 
3739175.290 6000 38000000 1449223.11 3187924.079 13103 24694144 1709823.98 4221146.674 6000 38000000 
BOARDSIZE 8.87 2.566 3 20 9.05 2.692 3 20 8.67 2.409 4 17 
%NEXEC 60.5013 12.28344 20.00 100.00 59.0327 12.70013 20.00 88.89 62.1098 11.73744 20.00 100.00 
%INDDIRS 50.8543 12.82044 5.26 90.91 49.3985 12.67287 5.26 83.33 52.2516 12.85679 12.50 90.91 
DUALITY .02 .155 0 1 .03 .158 0 1 .02 .151 0 1 
BOARDMEET 8.84 3.085 1 30 8.61 2.683 1 19 9.09 3.608 3 30 
ACE .87 .343 0 1 .86 .368 0 1 .89 .316 0 1 
ACSIZE 3.51 .950 0 9 3.51 .987 0 9 3.52 .914 0 8 
ACSIZEDUMMY .98 .147 0 1 .98 .124 0 1 .97 .174 0 1 
%ACNEXEC 99.7063 4.26143 0.00 100.00 99.7416 2.92722 0 100.00 99.6745 5.25693 0.00 100.00 
ACNEXECDUM .99 .088 0 1 .99 .101 0 1 .99 .072 0 1 
ACMEET 4.00 1.526 0 17 3.90 1.418 1 14 4.09 1.616 0 17 
ACMEETDUM .9190 .27308 0.00 1.00 .9041 .29477 0.00 1.00 .9349 .24703 0.00 1.00 
%ACCOMM 95.9540 5.43772 66.67 100.00 95.7436 5.31832 75.00 100.00 96.1629 5.53415 66.67 100.00 
%ACFINEXPERT 33.6124 19.65977 0.00 100.00 38.2384 20.38044 0.00 100.00 28.8120 17.68212 0.00 100.00 
EXPERTDUM .96 .185 0 1 .96 .205 0 1 .97 .159 0 1 
%ACSUEXPERT 9.7527 18.72538 0.00 100.00 9.5958 20.76767 0.00 100.00 9.9010 16.32340 0.00 100.00 
%ACCEXPERT 23.8140 18.98202 0.00 100.00 28.7072 20.62989 0.00 100.00 18.7548 15.72202 0.00 100.00 
NOBLOCKS 5.78 2.471 1 14 5.72 2.550 1 14 5.83 2.422 1 13 
ABLOCKOWN 41.6087 18.49024 4.60 97.83 40.6408 18.50686 4.60 97.83 42.6378 18.38302 4.60 92.40 
ANEXSHARES 1.85821 6.943340 0.000 72.410 2.08183 7.550862 0.000 72.410 1.63079 6.231891 0.000 53.455 
AEXESHARES 4.34440 11.178649 0.000 95.093 4.28677 10.766769 0.000 67.736 4.37457 11.530287 0.000 95.093 
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Table 6.1: Continued. 
  Combined period(2007&2010) Pre-economic crisis (2007) Post-economic crisis (2010) 
  Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
             
TOTASSETS 21368.97 139975.364 25 1900519 18969.34 132811.963 25 1900519 23656.99 146158.802 26 1576305 
LOGTOTASSETS 9.077810 .7994683 7.4063 12.2789 9.041856 .7950327 7.4063 12.2789 9.117324 .8034189 7.4090 12.1976 
%DEBTORS 13.4636 14.59576 0.00 96.93 13.7464 13.93614 0.00 94.05 13.2439 15.22426 0.00 96.93 
%STOCK 8.4271 13.95982 0.00 93.97 8.2879 14.10809 0.00 93.97 8.5239 13.75137 0.00 86.93 
ROA 9.6326 10.42299 -54.00 103.06 10.7815 10.80705 -54.00 79.83 8.3994 9.88103 -46.02 103.06 
%GEARING 26.9709 20.11744 0.00 109.95 28.1695 20.21335 0.00 109.95 25.8093 19.93283 0.00 93.04 
LIQUIDITY 3.86795 40.267709 0.000 947.661 6.11115 56.665713 .108 947.661 1.59204 2.209905 0.000 31.857 
BUSY .76 .430 0 1 .77 .419 0 1 .74 .439 0 1 
SUBS 22.66 22.793 1 294 23.25 25.253 1 294 22.17 20.026 1 179 
UKSUBS 9.53 10.325 0 73 9.68 10.563 0 73 9.33 10.046 -1 65 
USSUBS 2.14 3.846 0 29 2.23 4.062 0 29         
USDUMMY .48 .500 0 1 .48 .500 0 1 .47 .500 0 1 
FTSE350 .67708 .467896 0.000 1.000 .67609 .468568 0.000 1.000 .67188 .470143 0.000 1.000 
REG .21 .408 0 1 .21 .407 0 1 .21 .409 0 1 
FINANCIALS .19 .391 0 1 .19 .389 0 1 .19 .391 0 1 
BIG4 .95 .220 0 1 .94 .236 0 1 .96 .200 0 1 
LONDON .61 .488 0 1 .61 .488 0 1 .61 .488 0 1 
DELAY 66.30 38.328 23 181 68.02 20.201 25 181 67.02 50.118 23 181 
%LEGIST 16.2576 24.00805 0.00 100.00 14.8862 22.64597 0.00 100.00 17.7408 25.31626 0.00 100.00 
%TAX 40.5945 34.15486 0.00 100.00 38.6316 33.09848 0.00 100.00 42.6987 35.13304 0.00 100.00 
%CORPFIN 12.9585 25.80181 0.00 100.00 13.4754 25.59198 0.00 100.00 12.5944 26.13764 0.00 100.00 
%OTHERSERVIS 30.1454 32.95001 0.00 100.00 32.9280 34.22503 0.00 100.00 26.9661 31.22725 0.00 100.00 
TOTNONAUDIT 1114399.74 2359931.886 0 25000000 1194188.17 2413265.850 0 25000000 1045098.14 2298944.768 0 18706882 
LOGNONAUDIT 5.366634 1.2364728 0.0000 7.3979 5.451576 1.1471731 0.0000 7.3979 5.290364 1.3134461 0.0000 7.2720 
AUDITVSNON .29 .456 0 1 .33 .470 0 1 .26 .439 0 1 
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6.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for dependent (audit fees), 
independent variables such as board characteristics variables, audit committee 
characteristics variables, ownership variables, non-audit fees variables and 
control variables for the combined period (2007 and 2010), for the pre-economic 
crisis period (2007) and post-economic crisis period (2010). The mean for audit 
fee is approximately £ 1,572526 for the combined period, with a standard 
deviation of £3,739,175. The range of fees paid by the audit clients starts as low 
as £6,000 and goes as high as £38,000,000. It is observed that there is an 
increase in audit fees from a mean of £1,449,223 pre-economic crisis to 
£1,709,823 in the post-economic crisis period or an increase of 18% in audit fees 
over these two periods. These results suggest that auditors have increased their 
fees over the years, especially when the economic environment has become 
more complicated, since more audit work is needed. The mean for non-audit fee 
is £1,114,399 for the combined period, with a median of £356,000. It is observed 
that the average non-audit fees paid to the auditor decreased significantly from 
£1,194,199 in the year 2007 to £1,045,098 in the year 2010, with a decrease in 
median from £400,000 to £300,000. Over reliance of the companies’ auditors on 
non-audit services could affect their independence, especially independence in 
appearance. On average, 29% of the sample companies pay more non-audit fees 
to their auditor as compared to audit fees in the combined period. This study 
observes a reduction of 7% in the number of companies paying more for non-
audit services: from 33% in 2007 to 26% in 2010. Using the detailed disclosure 
of Non-audit fees in annual reports, non-audit fees are categorised into four 
services. On average, 16% or £248,503 of the total non-audit fees paid by listed 
companies in UK for the combined period derived from other services supplied 
pursuant to such legislation (%LEGIST). There was an increase in this type of 
non-audit service during the combined period: from 15% in 2007 to 18% in 
2010. Tax services are the services most often provided by the company’s 
auditor to their audit client. On average, 41% or £326,313 of the total non-audit 
fees of the sample companies derived from tax services and the study observes 
an increase in these services from 38% in 2007 to 43% in 2010. Other services 
that are also frequently provided by the auditor are corporate finance related 
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services. The average proportion of corporate finance related transactions to total 
non-audit fees wass 13% for the combined period and there was a slight decrease 
of 1% from 13% in 2007 to 12% in 2010. This study found that other non-audit 
services such as pension scheme audits, SOX related compliance services, other 
services related to pensions, actuarial services and IT services were not popular 
among the companies and the proportion to total non-audit fees was too 
insignificant (below 1%). Therefore, these services were combined with other 
services figures disclosed in the annual reports. Combining these services, other 
non-audit services constituted 30% of total non-audit fees for the combined 
period and showed a downward trend of 33% in 2007 and 27% in 2010. Overall, 
this study observes a reduction in total non-audit fees, the number of companies 
paying more for non-audit services as compared to audit fees, fees paid for 
corporate finance related transactions and other non-audit services. This 
reduction could be due to an increase in awareness of the effect of non-audit 
services on auditor independence. However, the increase in fees for other 
services supplied pursuant to such legislation (%LEGIST) and tax services 
(%TAX) could reflect that companies have increased their reliance on the 
auditor to help them in filing for documents with the authorities, including tax 
authorities.  
Table 6.1 also shows that, on average, the size of the board is approximately 
nine members, with a standard deviation of 2.56. This figure is lower than 
Adelopo and Jallow’s (2008) finding of an average board size of 11 but is 
consistent with Chan et al. (2012). There is no obvious change in board size over 
the two periods; however, table 6.1 shows an increase in the proportion of non-
executive directors from 59% in 2007 to 62% in 2010, suggesting that the 
companies have increased the number of non-executive directors on their board 
to replace executive directors. There is an upward trend in the proportion of non-
executives on boards, especially post-Cadbury. Conyon (1994) found a 
proportion of 37.77% in 1993, while O’Sullivan (1999), using 1995 data, 
documented average representation of 50.2% by non-executives on boards. Most 
recently, by reporting an average proportion of non-executives of 54% (using 
2004 data), Zaman et al. (2011) confirmed that non-executive representation on 
boards is becoming more important. Further analysis of non-executive directors 
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shows that on average only 85% of the non-executives are independent as 
defined by the code (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). Independence was 
determined after reading the disclosure in the companies’ governance reports 
regarding board members, as companies are required by the code of corporate 
governance to disclose detailed information regarding board independence. This 
proportion is consistent over the two periods. The average proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board was 51% in the combined 
period, suggesting that UK companies have followed the requirement by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010) for there to be a majority of independent 
directors on the board. There was an increase in the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the boards from 49% pre-economic crisis (2007) to 
52% in the post-economic crisis period (2010), suggesting an increase in 
compliance to the requirement of the Code by UK companies.  
In terms of board leadership, only two percent of the companies in the combined 
period have the same individual occupying the positions of company chairman 
and CEO. There is also a reduction of one percent of CEO duality case from 
three percent in 2007 to two percent in 2010.  It appears that large UK 
companies are now less likely to exhibit CEO duality than was the case in the 
1990s. There has been a significant reduction in the percentage of companies 
having the same individual in the position of company chairman and CEO. For 
example, Conyon (1994) reported 23% CEO duality in 1993, O’Sullivan (1999) 
reported 15% for the year 1995 and recently Zaman et al. (2011) reported a 
significant reduction as only 3% of their 135 sample firms in 2004 had the same 
person occupying these two important positions. The continuous reduction in the 
CEO duality case is a result of the recommendation of the codes of corporate 
governance (e.g. UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). Section A.2.1 of the 
most recent codes highlighted that the roles of chairman and chief executive 
should not be fulfilled by the same individual and the division of responsibilities 
between the chairman and chief executive should be clearly established, set out 
in writing and agreed by the board. The average frequency of board meetings is 
eight, with a minimum of one and a maximum of 30 meetings a year. The 
average meeting frequency is similar to prior UK and US studies such as Zaman 
et al. (2011) and Abbott et al. (2003). There was only a slight increase in the 
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number of meetings over the two periods. However, a further investigation of 
the maximum value reveals that the company which had 30 meetings (in 2010) 
disclosed in their annual report that their board’s agenda was considerably 
challenged during the period under review by the market environment. 
Consequently, more board meetings were necessary for the year 2010 as 
compared to previous years (e.g. 10 meetings in the year 2007). 
As for the audit committee characteristics, table 6.1 illustrates that on average, 
the number of audit committee members is slightly more than 3 (3.51) and 98% 
of sample firms have at least three audit committee members. The audit 
committee’s average size remains constant over the two periods; however, the 
number of companies having a minimum of three members, or in smaller 
companies two, declined by 1% in 2010 as compared to the year 2007.  This 
finding shows that most of the listed companies in the UK have followed the 
requirement of the Code of Corporate Governance that audit committees of 
FTSE 350 firms should have at least three members and smaller firms should 
have at least two. This is supported by results of detailed analysis (see appendix 
1) which reveal that FTSE 350 firms have an average 4 audit committee 
members while non FTSE 350 firms on average have 3 members. However, it is 
interesting to point out that even though the maximum number of audit 
committee members in the sample is 9, the minimum number is 0. This result 
reveals that there is a company fully listed on London Stock Exchange (listed on 
FTSE 350) which still does not have an audit committee. The result highlights 
the existence of a company which does not comply with the requirement of The 
Combined Code and also the recommendation of the Cadbury (1992) report and 
other reports (e.g. Smith Report, 2003; Higgs Report, 2003) that a company 
should have an audit committee to enhance governance effectiveness. A detailed 
investigation on this particular company reveals that it also has CEO duality, 
does not have a strong independent non-executive element or meet certain other 
requirements stated in the Combined Codes (Combined Code 2003, 2006, 2008 
or 2010). However, the company has provided in the annual report an 
explanation for non-compliance with the Code as required under the “comply or 
explain” stipulation by the UK Combined Code. It seems that the company is 
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taking advantage of the UK corporate governance system, which is more open, 
and is self regulated.  
 
To be more effective, the Codes (e.g. UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010) 
also recommend that not only should the committee number at least three but 
also the membership should only consist of independent non-executive directors. 
This is to ensure optimal effectiveness as independent non-executive directors 
could act on behalf of the shareholders. Almost all the companies have complied 
with this recommendation as 98% of the companies in the study only have non-
executive directors on their audit committee. Consequently the average 
percentage of non-executive membership on the audit committee is 99.70%, 
with a median value of 100%. Similar to audit committee size, the proportion of 
non-executive directors on audit committees is also consistent over the two 
periods under study. Partitioning firms into FTSE 350 and Non FTSE 350 
reveals that there is no significant difference between the mean percentages of 
non-executives between the two groups (99.09% for non-FTSE 350 and 99.78% 
for FTSE 350 firms). The result of this study is similar to Zaman et al.’s (2011) 
finding of 99% compliance with the requirement that the audit committee should 
only consist of independent non-executive directors. In addition, this study 
captures the share-ownership of non-executive and executive directors. On 
average, only 1.8% of total company shares are owned by non-executive 
directors while 4.3% are held by executive directors for the combined period. 
There is only a slight decrease in non-executive ownership from the year 2007 to 
the year 2010 while executive share ownership remains the same. 
 
The average frequency of audit committee meetings is about 4 times per year 
(3.84), with a maximum of 17 meetings per-year and a minimum of none. This is 
in line with the recommendation of the corporate governance code, which 
recommends a minimum of 3 meetings per year. Aware of this recommendation, 
91.90% of the sample companies have at least 3 meetings per year. Both FTSE 
350 firms and smaller firms in the sample company have meetings more than 
three times a year (an average of 4.59 times for FTSE 350 and 3.85 for non 
FTSE 350 firms). This figure is significantly higher than the percentage 
identified by Zaman et al. (2011). Based on 195 sample firms listed on FTSE 
192 
 
350 in 2004, the researchers found that only 39% of their sample had at least 3 
audit committee meetings per year. This lower percentage could be due to the 
time factor as both the Higgs Report and Smith Report were released in 2003 
and the listed companies needed some time to consider and apply their 
recommendations. Comparing the two periods (pre- and post-economic crisis), it 
is found that compliance with the recommendation of the Codes regarding the 
minimum number of meetings increased by 4% from the year 2007 to the year 
2010. The incidence of high profile business failures such as Northern Rock has 
increased pressure on listed companies to strengthen their governance to 
safeguard the company and their shareholders and hence to comply with the 
recommendations of the Code of Corporate Governance. Commitment of audit 
committee members to attend scheduled meetings is important to ensuring the 
committee’s effectiveness.  
Another measure of effectiveness for audit committees is the existence of a 
financial expert on the committee, which could be especially helpful in detecting 
material misstatements in financial reports. On average, 96% of the sample firms 
(combined period) have at least one supervisory or accounting expert. On 
average the proportion of audit committee members who are either accounting or 
supervisory finance experts is 34%, with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 
100%. There was an increase of 1% in the existence of finance experts on audit 
committees among UK listed companies from 96% in 2007 to 97% in 2010. The 
result of this study shows that the number of audit committees with at least one 
member with finance expertise has increased considerably in the last few years 
as a previous UK study (Zaman et al., 2011) indicated only 70% compliance in 
2004. This figure is also higher than the finding by a US study (Abbott et al., 
2003) that 80% of audit committees in the US had at least one member with 
financial expertise. Analysing further, the expertise is divided on the basis of 
accounting expertise and supervisory expertise. The mean proportion of 
accounting experts on audit committees who have relevant accounting 
education, qualifications and experience (Certified Public Accountant, Chief 
Financial Officer, finance director, financial controller, CIMA, auditor or chief 
accounting officer) is 24%. On the other hand, the average proportion of 
supervisory finance experts who are current or former CEOs or chairmen of the 
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board of directors on an audit committee is 10%. Analysis was also carried out 
to investigate whether FTSE 350 companies have a higher proportion of audit 
committee finance expertise. The descriptive statistics show that non FTSE 350 
have a higher proportion of audit committee finance expert as compared to 
FTSE 350 companies (34% for non FTSE 350, 32% for FTSE 350). The same 
trend is found for accounting finance expert and supervisory finance expert 
(Please see appendix 1). 
Zaman et al. (2011) used a composite measure for audit committee effectiveness 
based on 4 variables: size of the committee (at least 3 members for FTSE 350 
and 2 members for FTSE small capital firms), independence of the committee 
members (contains only non-executive directors), number of committee 
meetings (a minimum of 3 meetings per year) and existence of expertise on the 
committee (existence of at least one finance expert on the committee). An audit 
committee is only considered effective if all four criteria are met. Using a 
dummy variable to indicate whether these conditions were fulfilled, 87% of the 
sample firms were found to have effective audit committees in the combined 
period. There is an increase of 3% in audit committee effectiveness in these two 
periods: from 86 % in 2007 to 87% in 2010. The result shows a significant 
increase in the effectiveness of the audit committee over the last few years in the 
UK compared to earlier UK-based evidence provided by Zaman et al. (2011), 
which documented that only 16% of sample firms had effective audit 
committees in the year 2004. Further analysis reveals that there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of companies having a minimum of 3 (or 2 
in the case of smaller firms) audit committee members (21% in Zaman et al., 
2011) and in the committees’ activity (only 39% had a minimum of 3 meetings 
per year). 
In addition to audit committee characteristics recommended by the Codes, this 
study adds a variable measuring audit committee commitment (ACCOMM) 
since commitment of audit committee members to attend scheduled meetings is 
also important in enhancing committee effectiveness. On average, the audit 
committee members gave 96% commitment to attend the scheduled audit 
committee meetings for the combined period and the years 2007 and 2010. 
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Table 6.1 also shows the descriptive statistics for other determinants of audit 
fees. The average number of companies with block shareholders holding 3% 
shares or more is 6, with average share ownership of 41% of shares. The average 
number of block holders remained constant over the two periods while share 
ownership increased from 40% in the year 2007 to 43% in the year 2010.Total 
assets are used to measure client size. The average company size based on total 
assets is £21,368 million for combined period; 13% and 8% of total assets are 
represented by debtors and stock respectively. Despite the economic crisis in 
2008 and 2009, the average total assets of the companies increased from an 
average of £18,969 millions in 2007 to £23,657 million in 2010. The average 
return on assets (ROA) is 9.63%, with a minimum return as low as -54 % and a 
maximum return of 103%.There was a decrease of 1% in ROA between these 
two periods. The gearing ratio ranges from 0 to 109%, showing that some 
companies rely heavily on long term liabilities to finance their assets, which 
exposes them to significant financial risk, especially during difficult economic 
conditions. However, the average gearing is only 26.97%, with a median value 
of 25.20%. On average 20% of the companies experienced financial loss for the 
three years of the combined period, made up of 11% loss occurrence in 2007 and 
29% in 2010. There was apparently an increase of 18% in the number of 
companies experiencing losses in the last three years, including 2010, which 
might be due to the losses incurred in 2008 and 2009 when the economic crisis 
was most severe. 67.71 % of the sample firms are listed on the FTSE 350 of 
London Stock Exchange, while the remainder are listed on FTSE Small Capital. 
21% of the company represent regulated industries, with 19% being financial 
companies. The number of subsidiary companies held by the sample firms 
ranges from a minimum of one to a maximum of 294 subsidiaries and the 
average holding is 22 subsidiary companies. Partitioning the subsidiaries into 
UK and US subs revealed that more than half of the holdings are in companies 
operating outside the UK (average of 90% subsidiaries) and 48% of the 
companies have subsidiaries in the US. In terms of ownership, on average the 
firms under study are owned by 5.81 block- holders who hold at least 3% share 
ownership. On average, 76% of the sample companies have an accounting year 
that ends between 31
st
 December and 31
st
 March (BUSY) for the combined 
period and interestingly the percentage dropped from 77% in 2007 to 74% in 
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2010, indicating that 3% of companies changed their accounting period between 
these two periods. 95% of the sample companies are audited by one of Big Four 
auditing firms, whilst 61% of the companies are audited by a London-based 
auditor. There is a slight decrease (2%) in the percentage of companies audited 
by the Big Four auditing firms in 2010, while the number of companies audited 
by London auditors remained the same. The average audit delay (DELAY) is 66 
days, with a standard deviation of 38 days for the combined period and with the 
length of the audit period ranging from a minimum of 25 days to a maximum of 
181 days. There is a decrease of 6 days average report lag between the years 
2007 and 2010.  
6.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 6.2 contains a correlation matrix showing two-way Pearson correlations 
between all variables included in this study. An examination of correlations is 
useful in identifying associations between individual variables, especially 
between the dependent variable and each independent variable as this could 
assist in understanding the subsequent multivariate results. Another use of 
correlation analysis is to trace any multicollinearity problems among 
independent variables. According to Judge et al. (1988), multicollinearity exists 
when the independent variables are highly correlated (r=.8 and above). In the 
same vein, Hair et al. (1995) and Gujrati (2003) suggests that a correlation value 
of below 0.80 is deemed to be safe for the variables to be included together in 
the multivariate regression analysis. Singularity is another related issue.  
Singularity occurs when one independent variable is actually a combination of 
other independent variables. The existence of multicollinearity and singularity 
breaches the OLS assumption of no multicollinearity, which could cause 
problems in generalising the regression results. Multiple regressions do not 
relate well to multicollinearity or singularity, and such combinations do not 
produce a good regression model (Pallant, 2001). The double and single 
asterisks in table 6.2 signify statistically significant correlations at one percent 
and five percent respectively. The correlations in column 1 show how each of 
the explanatory variables relates to audit fees. As expected, the variable 
measuring client size (LOGTOTASSETS) correlates significantly with audit 
fees, with correlation values of 0.784 reflecting that bigger companies pay 
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Table 6.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 LOGAUDITFEE 1 
                 
2 BOARDSIZE .534** 1 
                
3 %NEXEC .281** .043 1 
               
4 %INDDIRS .293** -.024 .642** 1 
              
5 DUALITY -.089* -.073* -.098** -.084* 1 
             
6 BOARDMEET .040 -.039 -.031 .069 -.050 1 
            
7 ACE .174** .121** .153** .152** -.074* .039 1 
           
8 ACSIZE .404** .522** .247** .269** -.095** .014 .200** 1 
          
9 ACSIZEDUMMY .073* .169** .064 .111** -.090* .015 .333** .286** 1 
         
10 %ACNEXEC .049 .002 .074* .100** -.119** .071 .184** .025 -.010 1 
        
11 ACNEXECDUM .050 .028 .107** .119** -.201** .088* .185** .079* .102** .993** 1 
       
12 ACMEET .456** .384** .170** .223** -.053 .227** .320** .281** .094** .022 .024 1 
      
13 ACMEETDUM .215** .172** .177** .146** -.087* .012 .708** .180** .098** -.021 -.021 .398** 1 
     
14 %ACFINEXPERT -.199** -.247** -.181** -.160** .107** -.041 .070 -.272** .028 -.085* -.077* -.106** -.113** 1 
    
15 EXPERTDUM .001 -.073* .047 .035 -.019 .038 .488** .031 .075* -.014 -.014 .024 -.004 .329** 1 
   
16 %ACCOMM -.008 -.059 .024 .024 -.052 -.046 -.066 -.145** -.019 .005 .020 -.004 -.049 .049 -.023 1 
  
17 %ACSUEXPERT -.059 -.089* -.010 .034 -.035 -.021 -.003 -.107** -.002 .003 .006 -.016 -.050 .504** .100** .025 1 
 
18 %ACCEXPERT -.149** -.168** -.176** -.199** .144** -.019 .072* -.174** .031 -.091* -.084* -.094** -.065 .523** .231** .024 -.468** 1 
19 NOBLOCKS -.255** -.299** -.122** -.030 -.023 .070 .028 -.208** .022 .063 .052 -.138** -.007 .155** .074* .009 .054 .105** 
20 ABLOCKOWN -.311** -.283** -.010 -.109** .022 -.031 -.066 -.243** -.037 -.004 -.025 -.196** -.102** .128** .064 .007 .086* .044 
21 ANEXSHARES -.187** -.062 .149** -.096** .042 -.099** -.095** -.116** -.086* -.127** -.102** -.076* -.059 .068 -.016 .092* .062 .011 
22 AEXESHARES -.205** -.109** -.160** -.193** .123** -.133** -.121** -.135** -.029 -.093* -.081* -.133** -.138** .122** -.005 .018 .062 .069 
23 LOGTOTASSETS .784** .616** .284** .320** -.064 .029 .197** .425** .072* .062 .053 .469** .225** -.261** .015 -.059 -.050 -.223** 
24 DEBTORS .066 -.062 -.085* -.088* -.019 .094* .006 -.041 .017 -.029 -.009 .056 .038 .068 -.033 .075* -.024 .093* 
25 STOCK -.103** -.147** -.067 -.001 -.024 .012 -.020 -.053 .007 .040 .046 -.104** -.040 .014 .027 .010 -.006 .017 
26 ROA -.097** -.093* -.039 -.067 .048 -.143** -.026 -.034 -.018 -.070 -.071* -.062 -.006 .111** -.014 .004 -.015 .129** 
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Table 6.2   : Continued 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
27 3YEARSLOSS -.113** -.017 .021 -.001 .048 .162** -.051 -.044 -.037 -.001 -.001 .049 -.038 -.053 .005 .002 .012 -.068 
28 GEARING .105** .076* .046 .048 -.044 -.015 .053 .061 .041 -.011 -.015 -.035 .035 -.074* .041 -.039 -.050 -.030 
29 LIQUIDITY -.090* -.055 
-
.140** 
-.091* -.007 .015 -.034 
-
.094** 
.009 .004 .005 -.027 -.053 .095** .012 -.028 .001 .097** 
30 BUSY .202** .138** .045 -.008 -.046 -.010 .021 .029 .038 .037 .029 .136** .000 .017 .022 .057 .045 -.028 
31 SUBS .377** .171** .017 .014 .009 -.085* .055 .132** .024 .006 -.019 .098** .086* -.045 -.048 -.017 -.051 .002 
32 USDUMMY .399** .086* .132** .173** .016 -.077* .051 .100** -.016 .001 -.020 .138** .116** -.035 
-
.074* 
.039 -.055 .018 
33 FTSE350 .462** .324** .153** .173** -.033 -.071 .171** .303** .010 -.009 -.021 .236** .221** 
-
.168** 
.004 -.056 -.074* 
-
.106** 
34 REG .049 .217** -.041 -.045 .041 .002 .038 .118** .013 -.010 -.038 .200** .021 -.046 .011 -.068 .026 -.075* 
35 FINANCIALS .026 .199** -.046 -.055 .052 -.007 .028 .086* .004 -.015 -.044 .198** .004 -.030 .018 -.041 .022 -.055 
36 BIG4 .204** .094** .071* .137** -.001 .061 .140** .118** .046 .071 .055 .112** .177** 
-
.126** 
-.012 -.021 -.049 -.093* 
37 LONDON .323** .238** .152** .129** .058 -.059 .059 .159** .007 -.018 -.031 .204** .112** -.039 -.008 -.062 -.022 -.016 
38 DELAY -.118** -.020 
-
.094** 
-.069 .019 .005 -.045 -.063 -.032 -.039 -.055 .025 -.051 .028 .000 -.004 .010 .017 
39 LEGIST .464** .169** .064 .113** .005 .022 .040 .095** .014 .027 .037 .179** .025 -.008 .049 .061 .060 -.069 
40 TAX .511** 
-
.141** 
-
.114** 
-.056 .047 -.040 -.027 -.056 .071 .002 -.034 
-
.147** 
-.056 .022 -.040 .068 -.028 .056 
41 CORPFIN .251** -.031 .056 -.020 -.039 .036 -.002 -.059 -.057 -.040 -.020 -.014 .000 .018 .029 -.052 .028 -.011 
42 OTHERSERVIS .494** .048 .028 -.008 -.021 -.002 .000 .036 -.039 .009 .023 .032 .039 -.034 -.018 
-
.076* 
-.040 .002 
43 LOGTOTNONAUDIT .490** .267** .100** .160** -.084* .129** .032 .212** .022 .074* .071* .193** .061 
-
.120** 
-.038 -.031 -.062 -.062 
44 AUDITVSNON -.226** -.074* -.054 -.045 .044 .101** -.031 -.039 -.020 .004 .017 -.085* -.022 -.004 -.001 -.004 .022 -.022 
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Table 6.2 : Continued 
    19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
19 NOBLOCKS 1 
                 
20 ABLOCKOWN .529** 1 
                
21 ANEXSHARES -.098** .087* 1 
               
22 AEXESHARES -.137** .089* .055 1 
              
23 LOGTOTASSETS -.336** -.378** -.161** -.183** 1 
             
24 DEBTORS .000 -.068 .021 -.009 -.166** 1 
            
25 STOCK .106** -.007 .043 -.009 -.089* -.048 1 
           
26 ROA -.014 -.035 .056 .091* -.167** .064 .024 1 
          
27 3YEARSLOSS .049 .103** -.011 -.023 -.060 -.144** .043 -.326** 1 
         
28 GEARING -.034 -.071 -.027 -.133** .250** -.260** -.122** -.062 -.005 1 
        
29 LIQUIDITY -.015 -.011 -.010 .032 -.087* .013 .003 .002 .000 -.032 1 
       
30 BUSY -.088* -.103** .007 -.090* .174** .024 -.172** -.053 -.017 -.048 .033 1 
      
31 SUBS -.083* -.052 -.121** -.006 .237** .026 -.063 .031 -.086* .019 -.023 .081* 1 
     
32 USDUMMY .001 -.078* -.150** -.071 .148** .105** -.081* .006 -.092* -.125** -.007 .113** .347** 1 
    
33 FTSE350 -.157** -.266** -.165** -.089* .547** -.099** -.014 .151** 
-
.166** 
.136** -.085* .086* .169** .145** 1 
   
34 REG -.059 -.064 -.056 -.010 .312** -.112** -.216** -.077* .108** .098** -.027 .064 -.013 -.113** .084* 1 
  
35 FINANCIALS -.017 -.019 -.043 .013 .262** -.082* -.196** -.083* .142** .000 -.025 .033 -.014 -.114** .046 .929** 1 
 
36 BIG4 .027 -.071 -.100** -.104** .185** .060 .007 -.011 .024 .159** -.212** -.090* .023 .102** .183** .018 .005 1 
37 LONDON -.091* -.048 -.010 -.038 .262** -.051 -.092* -.004 -.044 -.063 -.020 .148** .143** .181** .202** .079* .089* -.112** 
38 DELAY .003 .046 .082* .042 -.130** .091* -.010 -.046 .009 -.081* -.009 -.068 -.023 -.073* 
-
.104** 
.068 .085* -.085* 
39 LEGIST -.046 -.017 -.030 -.009 .192** -.042 -.077* -.043 .057 -.003 .017 -.001 .011 .015 .051 .193** .181** .040 
40 TAX .053 -.033 .024 -.067 -.166** .128** .071 .036 -.017 -.055 -.011 -.007 .048 .047 -.076* 
-
.187** 
-.156** .005 
41 CORPFIN -.047 .055 .014 .114** .020 -.059 -.037 -.095** .010 .095* -.007 .021 -.057 -.079* -.001 -.024 -.055 -.052 
42 OTHERSERVIS .013 .003 -.013 -.013 .017 -.056 .011 .069 -.031 -.016 .005 -.008 -.012 .002 .043 .072 .073* .009 
43 LOGTOTNONAUDIT -.162** -.181** -.149** -.110** .408** .051 -.009 -.051 -.028 .095** -.062 .075* .166** .194** .291** .035 .024 .271** 
44 AUDITVSNON .007 .051 .030 .065 -.108** -.137** .079* -.044 .107** .072 .034 -.024 -.144** -.135** -.031 -.033 -.039 .058 
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Table 6.2 : Continued 
    37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 
37 LONDON 1 
       
38 DELAY -.018 1 
      
39 LEGIST .120** .022 1 
     
40 TAX -.056 -.043 -.341** 1 
    
41 CORPFIN -.005 .017 -.166** -.317** 1 
   
42 OTHERSERVIS -.025 .015 -.246** -.540** -.333** 1 
  
43 LOGTOTNONAUDIT .085* -.060 .050 -.108** .223** -.091* 1 
 
44 AUDITVSNON -.100** -.019 -.128** -.116** .293** -.015 .263** 1 
 
Variable definitions: 
Variable Definition 
LOGAUDITFEE Natural log of audit fee  
LOGTOTASSETS Natural log of total assets  
SUBS Number of subsidiaries  
USDUMMY Binary variable;= 1 if the company has US subsidiary ;= 0 otherwise 
REG Binary variable;= 1 if the company belongs to regulated industry;= 0 otherwise 
FTSE350 Binary variable;= 1 if the company belongs to FTSE 350;= 0 otherwise 
FINANCIALS Binary variable;= 1 if the company belongs to financial industry;= 0 otherwise 
NOBLOCKS The number of block share holders holding 3% or more shares. 
ABLOCKOWN % of block-holder  ownership 
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ANEXSHARES % of non-executive director ownership 
AEXESHARES % of executive director ownership 
ROA  Profit before interest and taxation (EBIT) /total asset (%)   
STOCK % total assets represented by stock  
DEBTORS % total assets represented by debtors  
GEARING % of long term liabilities / total assets 
3YEARSLOSS Binary variable;= 1 if the company incurred losses in (2005, 2006 or 2007) for 2007 or 
(2008, 2009 or 2010) for 2010  ;= 0 otherwise 
DELAY Numbers of days between financial year-end and audit report being signed by auditor 
(source: financial statements) 
LONDON Binary variable;= 1 if auditor has a London address;= 0 otherwise 
BIG4 Binary variable;= 1 if auditor is Deloitte & Touche,  Ernst & Young, KPMG or Price 
Waterhouse Coopers;= 0 otherwise 
BUSY Binary variable:= 1 if financial year-end is between 31 December and 31 March 
inclusive; = 0 otherwise 
BOARDSIZE No of directors on board 
DUALITY Binary variable:= 1 if CEO is Chairman of the Board and; = 0 otherwise 
%NEXEC % non-executive directors on board (source: financial statements) 
%INDDIRS % independent non-executive directors on board (source: financial statements) 
BOARDMEET Number of board meetings (source: financial statements) 
ACSIZE Number of members on audit committee (source: financial statements) 
ACSIZEDUM Binary variable;= 1 if audit committee members number more than 3;= 0 otherwise 
ACMEET Number of audit committee meetings 
ACMEETDUM Binary variable;= 1 if audit committee meetings are more than 3;= 0 otherwise 
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%ACCOMM % of audit committee commitment in attending audit committee meetings  
%ACNEXEC % of audit committee that are non-executives 
ACNEXECDUM Binary variable;= 1 if all audit committee members are non-executive directors;= 0 
otherwise 
%SUEXPERT % of financial experts on audit committee who are a CEO or chairman of a board of 
directors 
%ACCEXPERT % of Audit committee that have relevant accounting education, qualification and 
experience(CPA, CFO, finance director, financial controller, CIMA, auditor or chief 
accounting officer) 
%FINEXPERT % of Audit committee that are financial experts 
ACE Binary variable;= 1 if all audit committee members are non-executive directors, at 
least one member with relevant financial expertise, meet at least three times a year and 
have a minimum of three audit committee members;= 0 otherwise 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT Natural log of non-audit services fee ( source: financial statements ) 
LEGIST Non-audit services fee from other services pursuant to legislation (source: financial 
statements ) in Millions  
TAX Non-audit services fee from taxation (source: financial statements ) in Millions  
CORPFINANCE Non-audit services fee from corporate finance (source: financial statements ) in 
Millions  
OTHERSERVIS Non-audit services fee from any other services (source: financial statements ) in 
Millions  
AUDITVSNON Binary variable;= 1 if all non-audit fees exceeds audit fees;=0 otherwise  
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 higher audit fees. Most of the variables measuring client riskiness show a 
significant correlation with audit fees. Again as expected, return on assets 
(ROA) and liquidity ratio has a significant negative correlation with audit fees 
while gearing ratio shows a significant positive correlation with audit fees. The 
negative correlation between audit fee and the proportion of assets in the form of 
stocks or inventory may reflect the reality that stocks are now relatively easier to 
audit due to advancement in stock inventory system and auditing technology. 
The losses incurred within the last three years (3YEARSLOSS) show a 
significant negative correlation with audit fees. This could imply that the 
companies that have experienced continuous losses may have less funds and 
therefore lower audit fees are charged by their auditor. The significant 
correlation results for these variables are consistent with the argument that client 
riskiness is an important audit fees determinant, as highlighted by much of the 
earlier literature (e.g. Simunic, 1980; O’Sullivan, 2000; Hay et al., 2006). The 
correlation between audit fees and variables measuring complexity is also 
consistent with the prediction. Audit fees are found to be significantly correlated 
with number of subsidiaries. It is assumed that a bigger company that has many 
subsidiary companies will pay higher audit fees and this is reflected in the 
inclusion of the component of audit fees paid for audits of companies’ 
subsidiaries within the total audit fees category. Hence, it is understandable that 
the more subsidiary companies a group has, the more audit fees the auditor 
charges as remuneration for audit work. Further analysis of the subsidiaries 
reveals that audit fees are also significantly correlated with the existence of US 
subsidiaries since additional listing requirements of security commissions and 
SOX may demand more audit work. Similarly, companies listed on FTSE 350 
pay higher audit fees as compared to smaller capital companies listed on the 
London stock exchange. This study, however, does not find any significant 
correlation between audit fees and regulated companies, which signals that 
auditors do not treat regulated clients and their non-regulated counterparts 
differently. Accounting year ending during the busy period (BUSY) has a 
significant positive association with audit fees. This result suggests that the 
company whose accounting period is between 31
st
 December and 31
st
 March 
pays higher audit fees than do other companies as this is the busiest period for 
the auditor due to most companies’ accounting years ending during this period. 
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This study finds a significant negative correlation between audit fees and report 
lag (DELAY), which is counterintuitive as the period between the company’s 
financial year-end and the signing of the audit report could reflect the 
complexity of the account audited and thus affect audit fee charges. As expected, 
Log total non-audit fees, individual components of non-audit fees, big audit 
firms (BIG4) and auditors with London addresses (LONDON) have a significant 
positive association with audit fees. The study also documented a significant and 
negative correlation between the number of block holders and the equity owned 
by the block holders and audit fees, which is consistent with prior studies (e.g. 
Zaman et al., 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009). 
With respect to board characteristics, almost all variables show a correlation 
result, which is consistent with the prediction except for the number of board 
meetings. The board size, proportion of non-executive directors on the board and 
also the proportion of independent directors on the board are positively 
correlated with audit fees, suggesting that larger and independent boards are 
associated with more expensive audits. This is consistent with prior studies such 
as Adelopo and Jallow (2008) and O’Sullivan (2000). However, existence of 
CEO duality shows a significant negative correlation with audit fees only at  5% 
significant level. Similar to Zaman et al. (2011), this study fails to find any 
significant correlation between audit fees and number of board meetings. The 
study also finds the equity owned by non-executive directors and the equity 
owned by executive directors to be significant and to negatively correlate with 
audit fees. This is consistent with O’Sullivan’s (2000) finding of a significant 
positive correlation between audit fees and executive and non-executive share 
ownership. 
With regards to audit committee characteristics, a number of variables show 
significant and positive correlations with audit fees, for example, audit 
committee size, annual audit committee meetings, and the existence of effective 
audit committee members. This result suggests that larger, more diligent and 
effective audit committees are associated with more expensive audit. There is a 
significant negative association between audit fees and the proportion of finance 
expert on audit committees, suggesting that greater expertise on the committee 
reduces the need for more intensive and expensive audits. Splitting audit 
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committee finance experts into audit committee supervisory experts and audit 
committee accounting experts reveals that only audit committee accounting 
expertise has a significant negative association with audit fees. This is consistent 
with the argument that accounting experts provide better monitoring, resulting in 
the charging of lower audit fees by the auditor (Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2009). Only two proxies for audit committee effectiveness representing 
compliance with the four core components of present audit committee regulation 
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010), namely dummy variables representing 
the existence of 3 (2 in a smaller company) audit committee members and at 
least 4 meetings a year, have a positive and significant correlation with audit 
fees.  
A positive correlation between independent board and audit committee 
effectiveness variable could reflect that independent directors promote audit 
committee effectiveness to complement their own monitoring responsibilities 
towards good corporate governance. It is also interesting to see the association 
between other independent variables and client size. As expected, larger firms 
are associated with larger board size and dominance by independent non-
executive directors. In addition, they are associated with more effective audit 
committees which are also bigger in size and more diligent as measured by the 
annual frequency of audit committee meetings. However, these firms are 
associated with lesser proportion of finance experts, especially accounting 
finance experts, on their audit committees. Ownership wise, larger firms are 
associated with fewer numbers of block holders and also less block holder 
ownership, suggesting that their equity is more likely to be owned by small 
holdings. In addition, they are associated with lower executive and non-
executive share ownership, which might imply that bigger companies are more 
concerned with the issue of board independence. A positive correlation between 
company size and the number of subsidiaries and the existence of US 
subsidiaries is expected as larger firms are more likely to have more subsidiaries 
and some operate in bigger markets like the US. Riskiness wise, bigger firms are 
associated with lower debtor to total assets ratio; however, they are also 
associated with lower profitability, which is reflected by a lower return on asset 
ratio (ROA). It seems that bigger firms are also highly geared as the correlation 
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value shows a significant positive value with gearing ratio. Other correlation 
results show that bigger firms are positively and significantly associated with 
regulated industries, financial industries, big audit firms and also auditors with a 
London address. Correlation results also show that larger firms pay more in total 
non-audit fees, which is not surprising; however, maybe due to concern over 
auditor independence issues, they are less likely to obtain more non-audit 
services as compared to audit service from their auditors. Scanning the 
correlation results among the variables used in this study reveals only two 
correlation values that are considered high. The first correlation value is between 
company size and log audit fees, with a correlation value of 0.784. However, this 
value is considered acceptable as Hair et al. (1995) and Gujrati (2003) suggest 
that a correlation value below 0.80 is acceptable. In addition, other UK studies 
such as O’Sulivan (2000) and Zaman et al. (2011) have recorded the same high 
correlation for these two variables, with correlation values of 0.783 and 0.688 
respectively. Correlation between proportion of non-executives on audit 
committee (%ACNEXEC) and the dummy variable representing the existence of 
all non-executives on audit committee (ACNEXECDUMMY) is in fact very 
high, with a value of 0.993. Therefore, to avoid multicollinearity problems, these 
variables are not included in the same regression model. 
6.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis is devided into two parts, the relationship between audit fees 
and governance characteristics and the relationship between audit fees and 
detailed non-audit fees. The study uses Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models to 
explain the relationship existing between variables under study. Skewness and 
kurtosis values are presented in appendix 3, which indicates that some of the 
variables were transformed using natural logarithms in order to satisfy the 
normality assumption for OLS. This study also conducted analysis of residuals 
and Q-Q plot analysis to test for homoscedasticity and linearity. To deal with 
possible multicollinearity issues, especially due to the presence of significant 
correlations amongst some of the independent variables, as shown in table 6.2, 
this study calculates the variance inflation factors (VIF) for all regression models 
used. The variance inflation factors (VIF) values in all cases were significantly 
less than 10 (generally seen as the level of concern) as Gujrati (2003, p339) 
206 
 
states that a VIF value of less than 10 is acceptable. In addition, as presented 
earlier in the correlation matrix, the correlation values of the variables included 
in each of the regression models were at an acceptable level (Correlation value 
less than  8). 
6.4.1 Governance Characteristics and Ownership Structure on Audit Fees 
Table 6.3 contains the results of four main multivariate regression models that 
test the relationship between governance characteristics and ownership structure 
on audit fees. In all regression models, control variables are used to control for 
client characteristics such as client size, complexity level, industry, and client 
riskiness. Also included are variables to control for auditor characteristics such 
as the presence of big four audit firms and those with a London address. Control 
variables such as busy period, report lag and period to reflect the year dummies 
to control for the fact that the study uses the same sample of firms in each of the 
two years (2007 and 2010) are also included in the regression models.  
F-statistics of each model in table 6.3 are significant at one percent level, 
suggesting that the models are statistically valid. The R square values range 
between 73.6% and 74.4%, while the adjusted R square value for all models 
ranges between 72.7% and 73.4%. This shows that each model has a high 
explanatory power. The total number of observations is 768. The VIF values for 
all variables are mostly below 2 except for LOGTOTALASSETS, which shows 
a slightly higher value (2.899 in model 2). This indicates that there is no 
multicollinearity problem in the model. 
The results of the control variables in all four models are consistent with existing 
research. Both audit client size and complexity have a positive and significant 
impact on audit fees. In this respect, many studies (e.g. Low et al., 1990; Firth, 
1997; Carson et al., 2004; Lawrence et al., 2011) have found that the size of the 
client company as measured by their total assets is the major factor in 
determining the audit fee. Additionally, in his latest paper, Hay (2012) confirms 
that in research conducted between 1980 and 2007 client size was the most 
consistent and important audit fee determinant. This is consistent with the 
expectation that the auditor charges higher audit fees to a bigger company as 
more audit effort is needed in auditing the financial statements in the form of 
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testing and analysis of data and information (Simunic, 1980; Firth, 1985; Chan 
et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Simon, 1995; Firth, 1997; Adams et 
al., 1997).  
The level of audit effort is expected to increase with the increasing complexity 
of the audit task, thereby directly influencing audit fees. Past studies like Maher 
et al. (1992), Brinn et al. (1994),  Chan et al. (1993),  Pong and Whittington 
(1994),  Gist (1994a), O’Sullivan (1999), O’Sullivan (2000),  O’Sullivan and 
Diacon (2002) and Basioudis and Fifi (2004) have found that the number of 
subsidiaries had a significant positive impact on the audit fees in their sample 
companies. The finding is consistent with the expectation that more audit effort 
is needed as a result of consolidation and elimination of intra-group transactions. 
This study however further analyses the subsidiaries as number of UK 
subsidiaries (UKSUBS) and number of US subsidiaries (USSUBS), as suggested 
by O’Sullivan (2000). The result of the four models shows that the number of 
UK subsidiaries has a negative and significant relationship with audit fees at 
10% confidence level, while the number of US subsidiaries shows a positive and 
significant relationship at 1% confidence level. Taken together, the log total 
number of subsidiaries also shows a positive relationship with audit fees. The 
negative relationship between audit fees and number of UK subsidiaries may 
reflect that the auditor gives discount to companies with UK subsidiaries, 
probably because auditing these is less hassle as compared to overseas 
subsidiaries. The result for US subsidiaries is consistent with O’Sullivan (2000), 
who found a significant positive relationship between US subsidiaries and audit 
fees. The result could reflect that more audit work is required to audit companies 
with US subsidiaries due to cross listing and more complex regulation, such as 
SOX. Regulated industry (REG) is another complexity measure that has a 
significant negative impact on audit fees (significant at 1% confidence level). 
Studies have typically found reduced audit fees for companies operating in 
regulated industries (e.g. Ezzamel et al., 1996; O’Sullivan, 1999; O’Sullivan, 
2000). This could be due to less audit work being needed as regulated companies 
are closely governed by oversight bodies. This finding suggests that regulatory 
oversight partially substitutes for external auditors as a monitoring mechanism, 
which leads to lower audit fees. Only two variables measuring riskiness: ratio of 
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debtors to total assets (DEBTORS) and ratio of stocks to total assets (STOCK), 
show significant impact on audit fees. As expected, the ratio of debtors to total 
assets (DEBTORS) has a significant positive impact on audit fees, which 
suggests that auditors perceive companies with higher debtors to total assets 
ratios as risky and charge higher audit fees. This is supported by Carcello et al. 
(2002), who reported that the receivable to total asset ratio has a significant 
positive impact on audit fees in a study using data from 258 fortune 1000 US 
companies from 1992-93. However, contrary to the expectation and findings of 
past studies, the ratio of stock to total assets (STOCK) has a negative and 
significant relationship with audit fees. This result could reflect that the 
contemporary auditing practice, especially with the availability of modern 
auditing technologies to deal with auditing of stock, simplified the auditing 
process. Therefore, lower audit fees will be charged. It was expected that report 
lag (LOGDELAY) would have a significant positive impact on audit fees as the 
longer time taken is likely to be due to a need for more audit testing and 
investigation. The regression results show a significant positive relationship (at 
10% confidence level) between report lag and audit fees. The result is supported 
by other UK studies such as Chan et al. (1993), Ezzamel et al. (1996) and 
O’Sullivan (2000), which found a significant positive relationship between audit 
fees and lag between year end and date of the audit report. Although it is 
predicted that auditing during the auditing busy season (normally at the 
beginning of the calendar year) could lead to higher audit fees, there is no 
evidence that audits undertaken in this busy period (i.e. between 31
st
 December 
and 31
st
 March) do in fact lead to higher audit fees. This is supported by 
O’Sullivan (1999 and 2000), who also failed to find any evidence that auditing 
during the busy season has a significant impact on audit fees. This is further 
confirmed by Hay et al. (2006), who found that out of 32 studies between 1980 
and 2003 that examined the relationship between audit fees and busy season, 
only 5 reported a significant positive relationship, 2 reported negative results and 
the remaining results were insignificant. For auditor related variables, the current 
study provides evidence that the address of the audit firm could itself affect audit 
pricing. Consistent with prior research such as that of O’Sullivan (2000), this 
study finds that London-based auditors charge their audit clients higher audit 
fees than do their regional counterparts. Hay (2012) found that audit pricing 
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studies, especially those conducted in the UK, that use this measurement show a 
very consistent positive relationship with audit fee. It is widely hypothesized that 
large audit firms will demand higher fees (Cameran, 2005) due to higher level of 
audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981), higher litigation risk (Al-Harshani, 2008) and 
possession of a stronger brand name (Basioudis and Fifi, 2004). However, this 
study finds no evidence that Big Four (BIG4) auditors are more expensive 
auditors. This is consistent with studies in USA and UK that have found no 
significant difference between fees paid to big audit firms and non-big firms 
(Simunic, 1980 and Brinn et al., 1994).  However, further analysis reveals that 
the average total assets of the sample companies are £21,368 million.  Early 
studies conducted between the early and mid-1980s (Simunic, 1980; Simon, 
1986; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986) found that auditor size was not 
significant in cases of very large companies with assets of over $600 million. 
For relatively small companies, with mean assets of less than $100 million, 
auditor size had a positive relationship with audit fees (Francis, 1984; Francis 
and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Lee, 1996; 
McMeeking et al, 2006). One possible explanation for this result is that 
economies of scale offset the price premium for Big auditors in the large client 
segment (Francis and Stokes, 1986) and the positive relationship among smaller 
clients reflects the effect of product differentiation by the auditor rather than 
abuse of monopolistic power (McMeeking et al., 2006). Despite “knowledge 
spill-over” and “loss-leader” theories that could lead to a negative relationship 
between non-audit fees and audit fee, many studies have found that non-audit 
fees are positively related to audit fees ( e.g. Ezzamel et al., 2002; Firth, 2002; 
McMeeking et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2006; Che Ahmad et al., 2006; ). The results 
of this study support the positive relationship between non-audit fees and audit 
fee as a regression that shows a significant positive impact of non-audit fees on 
audit fees. A detailed discussion on this relationship is provided in the discussion 
of specific results that test the hypothesis on the impact of non-audit fees on 
audit fees. The dummy variable indicating the period shows an insignificant 
relationship with audit fees. 
Hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c test the relationship between audit fees and board 
independence. Contrary to the expectation that independent board will support 
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the purchase of higher quality audit, board independence variables, the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors (%INDDIRS) has an 
insignificant negative relationship with audit fees. The result is similar when the 
independence variable is substituted for the percentage of non-executive 
directors (%NEXEC). Therefore both H1a and H1b are rejected. The finding of 
this study is therefore inconsistent with those from prior studies in the UK, US, 
Hong Kong and Malaysia (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Tsui et al., 
2001 and Bliss et al., 2007), which found that the percentage of non-executive 
directors has a significant positive impact on audit fees. Two UK studies, Bliss 
et al. (2007) and Zaman et al. (2011), have documented that CEO/chairman 
duality has a significant impact on audit fees. However, the result of this study 
fails to document the same finding. Therefore, the third Hypothesis (H1c): that 
CEO duality has a significant negative impact on audit fees, is also rejected. The 
result of this study, however, is consistent with O’ Sullivan’s (2000) finding of 
an insignificant relationship between CEO/chairman duality and audit fees. The 
small variation in the incident of CEO duality ( 2%) as shown by descriptive 
statistics earlier might explain why the result is not significant. 
It is expected that more experienced and larger boards could enhance board 
effectiveness; thus a higher quality audit would be required that would lead to 
higher audit fees.  Therefore, model 2 tests the impact of board size 
(BOARDSIZE) on audit fees. To avoid multicollinearity effects, as these two 
variables have quite high correlation with each other, audit committee size 
(ACSIZE) is not included in the model.  Consistent with previous UK studies 
(e.g. Boo and Sharma, 2008 and Adelopo and Jallow, 2008), this study finds an 
insignificant positive relationship between board size and audit fees. 
Consequently, hypothesis H2, predicting a positive relationship between board 
size and audit fees, is rejected. Hypothesis H3 tests whether there will be a 
positive relationship between the number of board meetings and the audit fee. 
However, this study fails to find any significant relationship between board 
diligence and audit fees. While standard coefficient values show that board 
diligence, measured by the number of board meetings held during the year show 
a positive association, the relationship found is not statistically significant ( p = 
0.113). As a result, hypothesis H3 is also rejected. Overall, results show that 
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board characteristics, including board size, board independence and board 
diligence, have no significant impact on audit pricing decisions. This could be 
due to the fact that price discount as a result of improved internal control by 
having an effective board in place is offset by additional testing and audit work 
requested by an effective board to complement their monitoring role. This is 
because, in the wake of corporate scandal and failure, an effective board may 
encourage increased testing by the auditors so as to minimise the likelihood of 
future financial problems to the firm and to avoid subsequent criticism 
associated with it. 
Hypothesis H4 tests the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
audit fee. Four cornerstones of good audit committee as required by the Codes 
(e.g. UK Codes of Corporate Governance, 2010), comprising audit committee 
size (at least 3 or 2 for small companies), meeting frequency (a minimum of 3 
meetings a year), independence (all audit committee members should be non-
executive directors) and the presence of a financial expert, are used. A dummy 
variable is used to indicate the presence of an effective audit committee which 
fulfils all these conditions. It is expected that effective audit committee will 
request a higher quality audit to safeguard the shareholder against any financial 
fraud and irregularities. A similar composite measure of audit committee 
effectiveness is used by Zaman et al. (2011). However, contrary to the result of 
their study, this study fails to document the same significant positive relationship 
between effective audit committee (ACE) and audit fees. Therefore, hypothesis 
H4, predicting a positive relationship between audit committee effectiveness and 
audit fees, is rejected. The result may indicate that widespread adoption of the 
minimum requirements for an effective audit committee as set out by the Codes 
serves to eliminate fee reductions that were previously enjoyed by better 
governed companies.  
This study also tests the relationship between audit fees and individual audit 
committee characteristics. In models 1 to 3, the variables measuring audit 
committee independence, size, finance expertise, activity and commitment are 
tested against audit fees. Hypothesis H5 predicts that there will be a positive 
relationship between audit committee independence (measured by the 
percentage of non-executive directors on audit committee) and audit fee. The 
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study, however, fails to document any significant positive impact of the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee on audit fees. The 
result of this study is inconsistent with those found in Zaman et al. (2011). 
Descriptive statistics show that 99% of the sample companies have 100% non-
executive membership on their audit committees and the average percentage of 
non-executive directors on audit committees is 99.7%. Again, widespread 
adoption of the requirements of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
(2003) and also the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) has reduced the 
empirical power, leading to an insignificant result. Therefore, Hypothesis H5 is 
also rejected. 
Hypothesis 6 tests the impact of audit committee size on audit fee. The study 
documents a significant positive relationship between audit committee size and 
audit fees. Therefore, Hypothesis H6 is accepted. This finding is supported by 
Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), who suggest that a large audit committee is more 
likely to enhance the status and power of the committee within the organisation 
and demand higher quality audits. The enhanced status and access to more 
resources enable the audit committee to function effectively, thereby increasing 
quality of internal governance (Zaman et al., 2011; Pincus et al., 1989). A UK 
study (Zaman et al., 2011) and US study (Vafeas and Waegelein, 2007) also 
produced evidence that audit committee size is positively associated with audit 
fees.  
Hypothesis H7 tests the relationship between the proportion of audit committee 
finance experts on audit committee and audit fees. Models 1 and 2 test the 
relationship between the proportion of audit committee finance expertise and 
audit fees. Model 3 provides detailed analysis of finance expertise, which is 
divided into supervisory expertise and accounting expertise. However, this study 
fails to find any significant relationship between audit fees and any of the 
measures of audit committee expertise. The result indicates that audit committee 
expertise is not an important factor in determining audit pricing decision. 
Therefore, hypotheses H7a, H7b and H7c are not supported. The result of this 
study is supported by Zaman et al. (2011), who also found an insignificant 
relationship. 
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Hypotheses H8a and H8b test the relationship between audit committee 
diligence and audit committee commitments and audit fee. It was expected that 
there would be a positive relationship between number of audit committee 
meetings (measuring audit committee diligence) and audit fee. The study finds 
enough evidence to conclude that there is a significant positive relationship 
between audit fees and audit committee diligence. Therefore Hypothesis H8a is 
supported. The result of this study is also supported by a US study (Abbott et. al, 
2004) and an Australian study (Goodwind-Steward and Kent, 2006). The result 
implies that active audit committees support the purchase of higher quality 
audits to complement their monitoring function to safeguard the shareholders 
against any financial irregularities and fraud. Related to this, hypothesis H8b 
tests the relationship between audit committee commitment and audit fee. 
Commitment is measured by the weighted percentage of audit committee 
members’ attendance at the scheduled audit committee meetings. It is expected 
that audit committee commitment will have a significant positive relationship 
with audit fees since committed audit committee members will demand higher 
quality audit from the auditor which will lead to a higher audit fee. As expected, 
the study finds that audit committee commitment has a significant positive 
relationship with audit fees at 10% confidence level. Therefore, hypothesis H8b 
is accepted.  This is an important contribution of the study as no previous audit 
pricing studies have considered audit committee commitment.  
This study also considers ownership structure in an audit pricing model. 
Hypothesis H9a tests the relationship between large blockholder share 
ownership and audit fee. It is expected that share ownership by large 
blockholders will have a negative impact on audit fee. This is based on the 
argument that major shareholders in companies with more concentrated 
ownership are more likely to be actively involved in monitoring managerial 
behaviour thus reducing the need for more extensive audit, which will then lead 
to a lower audit fee. However, this study fails to find any evidence that share 
ownership by large blockholders has a significant impact on audit fees. The 
insignificant result is supported by another UK study (O’Sullivan, 2000). 
Hypotheses H9b and H9c test the relationship between the percentage of 
executive share ownership and non-executive share ownership and audit fee. It is 
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predicted that both types of ownership will have a negative relationship with 
audit fees. As expected, both types of ownership have a significant negative 
impact on the audit fee. The regression results show that proportion of non-
executive director share ownership has a very significant negative relationship 
with audit fees (at 1% confidence level) while proportion of executive director’s 
share ownership shows a significant negative relationship with audit fees at 10% 
confidence level. Therefore, both hypothesis H9b and H9c are accepted. The 
result of this study is supported by O’Sullivan’s (2000) finding of a significant 
negative relationship between both types of share ownership (non-executive and 
executive share ownership) and audit fee. The result of the study pertaining to 
executive share ownership implies that insider ownership reduces agency cost as 
it acts as a substitute for external audit effort in monitoring management and 
therefore leads to lower audit fee. In the same vein, non-executive directors 
possessing significant equity shares may have business or family links with the 
company and consequently behave in a similar manner to their executive 
director colleagues. 
6.4.2 Non-Audit and Audit Fees 
Hypothesis H10 tests the relationship between non-audit and audit fees. 
Additional analysis is run to test the relationship between audit fees and 
individual components of non-audit service. In earlier models, Log total non-
audit fee was used as a control variable to assess the impact of governance and 
ownership structure on audit fees. Consistent throughout all the models, it is 
found that log non-audit fees have a very significant and positive impact on audit 
fees (p=000). Therefore, Hypothesis H10, predicting a positive relationship 
between non-audit fees provided by the auditor and the audit fee, is accepted. 
This finding is strongly supported by Hay et al. (2006), who affirm that the 
majority of studies undertaken between 1977 and 2003 found a positive 
relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees. Joint provision of non-audit 
and audit services reduces the price per unit of audit services and triggers the 
purchase of more audit services (Simunic, 1984; Firth, 2002). In addition, client 
specific events such as mergers and acquisitions, share issues, implementation of 
new accounting and information services generate demand for consultancy 
services and this increases the amount of audit work (Ezzamel et al., 2002; Firth, 
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2002). A client’s financial position and weaknesses are exposed as a result of 
joint provision of audit and non-audit services; consequently, the auditor may 
price the risk identified by charging higher audit fees for problematic clients. 
Monopolistic power over non-audit services also allows the auditor to charge an 
audit fee premium (Hay et al., 2006), especially with accounting firms 
increasingly promoting themselves as “one stop” service providers (McMeeking, 
2006). The finding of a significant positive relationship contradicts the 
theoretical logic of a negative relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees 
as a result of knowledge spillover (Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 1997; Whisenant 
et al., 2003; Clatworthy et al., 2002; Antle et al., 2006) and loss leader theory 
(Hillison and Kennelley, 1988; Hay et al., 2006a). This finding does not support 
the total prohibition of non-audit service which is proposed by the Green Paper 
on audit policy (European Commission, 2010) as the provision of non-audit 
services actually increases the quality of audit service (at least when higher audit 
fees means more intensive audits). 
As additional analysis, individual component of non-audit is tested against audit 
fees. Individual investigation is possible as the Companies (Disclosure of 
Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) Regulations 2005 require 
listed companies to disclose individual non-audit services in their annual report. 
First, the study predicts a positive relationship between other services supplied 
pursuant to legislation and audit fees. This study supports the finding that non-
audit services supplied pursuant to legislation are an important audit fee 
determinant. The regression result in model 5 shows that other non-audit 
services pursuant to legislation have a significant positive impact on audit fees. 
This is supported by Beattie et al. (1996), who stated that most of the non-audit 
services provided by auditors are not management consultancy tasks, but instead 
are essential accounting services that enable listed companies to comply with 
legal and regulatory requirements. Second, this study predicts a positive 
relationship between other services relating to taxation and audit fees. The 
regression results show that non-audit services relating to taxation have a 
significant positive relationship with audit fees, therefore hypothesis 10c is 
supported. This is supported by Davis et al. (1993), who found a significant 
positive relationship between tax services and their measures of audit efforts: 
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unweighted audit hours, audit hours weighted by billing rate ratios, and audit 
hours weighted by billing rate. Similarly, Palmrose (1986a) documented that 
audit fees are even higher when the client purchases non-accounting advisory 
and tax services from the incumbent auditor. This study also predicts a positive 
relationship between services relating to corporate finance transactions and audit 
fees, while a positive relationship between other non-audit services and audit 
fees is predicted.  However, the result for non-audit services relating to corporate 
finance (LOGCORPFIN) shows no significant impact on audit fees. This is 
inconsistent with Firth (2002), who predicts that corporate restructuring will 
result in more audit effort as the auditor will have to learn the new organisational 
structure and its impact on the financial accounts. Using survey questionnaires to 
obtain information on the different categories of non-audit services provided by 
auditors and by non-auditors, Ezzamel et al. (1999) concluded that corporate 
finance provided by incumbent auditors significantly and positively correlated 
with audit fees. The regression result shows that other non-audit services have a 
significant positive impact on audit fees. Other non-audit services here is a 
combination of many non-audit services, such as services related to pension 
scheme, information system, actuarial service, SOX related services and other 
services. As discussed earlier, a client’s financial position and weaknesses are 
exposed as a result of joint provision of audit and non-audit services. As a result, 
the auditor may price the risk identified by charging higher audit fees for 
problematic clients. The regression results for other variables are broadly 
consistent with the results in the main models except for audit committee 
meetings and audit committee commitment, which are found not significant in 
model 5. In addition, big four auditor (BIG4) is found to have a significant 
positive relationship with audit fees. 
In addition, this study also tests the relationship between audit fees and the 
instance where non-audit fee is more dominant than audit fee. A dummy variable 
(AUDITVSNON) is used to measure this. The regression result in model 6 
shows that audit fees has a significant negative relationship with the variable. 
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Table 6.3 OLS Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for FTSE All Shares for the Years 2007 and 2010  
  Model 1 (Pool Data) Model 2 (Pool Data) Model 3 (Pool Data) Model 4 (Pool Data) 
  (n=768) (n=768) (n=768) (n=768) 
  
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
(Constant)  .138 .890   .384 .701   .132 .895   .533 .594  
BOARDSIZE     .042 1.586 .113 1.834 
        %INDDIRS -.024 -1.084 .279 1.307 -.004 -.190 .849 1.432 -.024 -1.069 .286 1.313 -.011 -.497 .619 1.269 
DUALITY -.013 -.647 .518 1.066 -.013 -.641 .521 1.066 -.013 -.653 .514 1.078 -.014 -.698 .486 1.044 
BOARDMEET -.021 -.996 .319 1.160 -.020 -.964 .335 1.167 -.021 -1.003 .316 1.159 -.011 -.539 .590 1.099 
ACSIZE .052 2.285 .023 1.353 
    
.052 2.272 .023 1.354     
%ACNEXEC -.006 -.320 .749 1.070 -.007 -.352 .725 1.070 -.006 -.319 .750 1.071 
    ACMEET .076 3.325 .001 1.364 .076 3.306 .001 1.379 .076 3.318 .001 1.366 
    %ACCOMM .036 1.754 .080 1.074 .020 .909 .364 1.248 .036 1.757 .079 1.074 
    %ACFINEXPERT .022 .996 .320 1.238 .029 1.461 .144 1.052     
    %ACSUEXPERT         .017 .732 .465 1.417 
    %ACACCEXPERT         .022 .867 .386 1.648 
    ACE             .012 .583 .560 1.081 
ABLOCKOWN .027 1.229 .219 1.266 .026 1.190 .234 1.267 .027 1.245 .214 1.268 .020 .908 .364 1.255 
ANEXSHARES -.060 -2.897 .004 1.127 -.061 -2.944 .003 1.128 -.060 -2.878 .004 1.132 -.057 -2.718 .007 1.115 
AEXESHARES -.035 -1.673 .095 1.127 -.035 -1.703 .089 1.126 -.035 -1.673 .095 1.127 -.037 -1.759 .079 1.124 
3YEARSLOSS -.009 -.392 .695 1.332 -.011 -.498 .619 1.349 -.009 -.385 .701 1.333 .004 .173 .863 1.310 
DEBTORS .141 6.526 .000 1.220 .142 6.557 .000 1.221 .141 6.514 .000 1.221 .151 6.948 .000 1.202 
STOCK -.055 -2.643 .008 1.120 -.051 -2.433 .015 1.144 -.055 -2.636 .009 1.120 -.061 -2.913 .004 1.112 
ROA .003 .134 .893 1.230 .004 .173 .862 1.229 .003 .129 .897 1.232 .013 .606 .545 1.211 
GEARING -.009 -.386 .699 1.273 -.008 -.344 .731 1.280 -.009 -.388 .698 1.273 -.019 -.852 .395 1.253 
BUSY .025 1.181 .238 1.133 .024 1.144 .253 1.133 .025 1.188 .235 1.135 .027 1.309 .191 1.116 
REG -.172 -7.914 .000 1.240 -.169 -7.708 .000 1.250 -.172 -7.896 .000 1.241 -.173 -7.873 .000 1.235 
BIG4 .022 1.010 .313 1.229 .022 1.030 .303 1.229 .022 1.019 .309 1.231 .022 1.020 .308 1.236 
LONDON .120 5.527 .000 1.241 .119 5.420 .000 1.252 .120 5.522 .000 1.241 .128 5.857 .000 1.220 
LOGDELAY .037 1.717 .086 1.183 .035 1.622 .105 1.181 .037 1.719 .086 1.184 .040 1.885 .060 1.175 
LOGTOTASSETS .635 20.733 .000 2.450 .624 18.690 .000 2.899 .635 20.654 .000 2.466 .673 23.294 .000 2.124 
UKSUBS -.036 -1.704 .089 1.149 -.035 -1.648 .100 1.148 -.036 -1.707 .088 1.155 -.036 -1.709 .088 1.146 
USSUBS .178 8.405 .000 1.167 .178 8.402 .000 1.168 .178 8.387 .000 1.169 .182 8.515 .000 1.161 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT .160 7.079 .000 1.338 .161 7.092 .000 1.338 .160 7.065 .000 1.338 .159 6.924 .000 1.341 
PERIOD (2010) .019 .871 .384 1.188 .021 .985 .325 1.221 .019 .864 .388 1.211 .012 .590 .555 1.115 
R square 0.744 
   
0.743 
   
0.744 
   
.736 
   Adj.R square 0.734 
   
0.733 
   
0.733 
   
0.727 
   F Value 74.734 
   
74.33 
   
71.84 
   
85.23 
   Durbin Watson 2.034 
   
2.027 
   
2.033 
   
2.037 
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This result implies that when non-audit service is dominant, the auditor will give 
a price discount to their audit client. Both models produce a high R square value 
of 0.743 and 0.734 and F value  of 66.264 and 70.96 respectively, showing that 
the models are statistically valid and have high explanatory power. 
Table 6.4: OLS Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees 
(Details of Non-Audit) for FTSE All Shares for the Years 2007 and 2010  
 
Model 5 (n=768) Model 6(n=768) 
  
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
(Constant)  .938 .349   -.234 .815  
BOARDSIZE -.023 -1.014 .311 1.308 -.024 -1.059 .290 1.307 
%INDDIRS -.020 -.967 .334 1.066 -.017 -.817 .414 1.065 
BOARDMEET .000 -.022 .982 1.152 .006 .284 .776 1.155 
ACSIZE .053 2.305 .021 1.359 .060 2.569 .010 1.352 
%NEXEC -.004 -.185 .854 1.070 -.002 -.097 .923 1.069 
ACMEET .029 1.167 .244 1.596 .066 2.834 .005 1.361 
%ACCOMM .030 1.447 .148 1.078 .037 1.781 .075 1.074 
%ACFINEXPERT .020 .921 .357 1.239 .016 .732 .464 1.240 
ABLOCKOWN .038 1.698 .090 1.273 .030 1.318 .188 1.266 
ANEXSHARES -.080 -3.791 .000 1.140 -.068 -3.207 .001 1.122 
AEXESHARES -.038 -1.785 .075 1.152 -.022 -1.051 .294 1.135 
3YEARSLOSS -.006 -.276 .782 1.331 .000 .002 .999 1.334 
DEBTORS .158 7.293 .000 1.219 .142 6.396 .000 1.231 
STOCK -.047 -2.274 .023 1.124 -.048 -2.252 .025 1.124 
ROA .009 .396 .692 1.231 .003 .128 .898 1.231 
GEARING .004 .185 .853 1.292 -.006 -.271 .787 1.275 
BUSY .031 1.488 .137 1.137 .029 1.369 .171 1.134 
REG -.164 -7.446 .000 1.258 -.179 -8.085 .000 1.236 
BIG4 .052 2.446 .015 1.178 .061 2.792 .005 1.181 
LONDON .117 5.328 .000 1.245 .116 5.234 .000 1.244 
LOGDELAY .029 1.366 .173 1.195 .038 1.771 .077 1.183 
LOGTOTASSETS .611 18.902 .000 2.702 .689 23.009 .000 2.255 
UKSUBS -.020 -.968 .334 1.151 -.029 -1.370 .171 1.146 
USSUBS .176 8.268 .000 1.173 .178 8.228 .000 1.172 
LEGIST(M) .050 1.982 .048 1.646 
    TAX(M) .105 4.298 .000 1.556 
    CORPFIN(M) .000 .007 .995 1.122 
    OTHERSERVICE(M) .064 2.711 .007 1.422 
    AUDITVSNON     -.100 -4.806 .000 1.099 
PERIOD .013 .588 .557 1.186 -.009 -.429 .668 1.186 
R square .743 
   
0.734 
   Adj.R square .731 
   
0.724 
   F Value 66.264 
   
70.96 
   Durbin Watson 
2.07       1.976       
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6.4.3 Economic Crisis Effect 
Hypothesis H11a tests whether the relationship between governance 
characteristics and audit fees is stronger after the economic crisis. Table 6.5 
shows the regression results of two models testing the relationship between 
various audit fees determinants and audit fee. Model 7 is for the regression result 
for the year 2007 (pre-economic crisis period) while model 8 shows the 2010 
result (post-economic crisis period). The regression results show that the impact 
of board independence and board activity on audit fee remains insignificant for 
both periods, with p value of more than 0.1. With regards to the audit committee 
characteristics, it is found that audit committee size and audit committee activity 
or diligence have significant positive impact on audit fees before the economic 
crisis (2007). However, the significant positive relationships found earlier (2007) 
between audit fees and two of audit committee characteristics, audit committee 
size (ACSIZE) and audit committee activity (ACMEET) disappear in the year 
2010. Taken together, the regression results show that the relationship between 
governance characteristics (board characteristics and audit committee 
characteristics) is weaker after the economic crisis as compared to before the 
economic crisis. Therefore, Hypothesis H11a is rejected. The insignificant result 
in 2010 is inconsistent with Zaman et al. (2011), who found a significant 
relationship between governance characteristics (especially audit committee 
characteristics and audit fees). The significant relationship found in Zaman et al. 
(2011) may be because the study utilised governance data from 2001 to 2004, 
before the full implementation of the Smith Report (2003), when some of the 
recommendations had not yet been enforced. This study (for the 2010 analysis) 
uses data produced seven years after the publication of the report (Smith Report, 
2003). Hence, it is believed that Smith’s recommendations regarding audit 
committee effectiveness have been widely adopted by UK listed companies. 
This is confirmed by descriptive statistics showing that in 2010, 89% of the 
sample firms had effective audit committees as compared to the finding of 16% 
by Zaman et al. (2011) a year after the implementation of Smith Report (2003). 
The economic crisis and consequently the failure of many companies puts  
additional pressures on the companies to follow the requirement of the Codes 
and also guidance on the audit committee as close as possible to avoid being 
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blamed by the shareholders for ineffective Corporate Governance. Therefore, the 
variation between companies, especially after the economic crisis, is likely to be 
small and this weakens the power of the empirical tests. In a study on the impact 
of governance characteristics during the post-Cadbury period, O’Sullivan (1999) 
also found an insignificant relationship, whereby none of his board and audit 
committee characteristics had a significant impact on audit fees, despite the 
increased emphasis on internal governance mechanisms. Hypothesis 11b tests 
whether the relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees is stronger after 
the economic crisis. The results in table 6.4 show that non-audit fees remain as a 
very significant audit fee determinant, even after the economic crisis. Therefore, 
hypothesis H11b, predicting that the relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees is stronger after the economic crisis, is rejected. 
For the control variable, table 6.4 shows that company size (LOGTOTASSETS) 
continues to have a significant impact on audit fees in 2010. This is supported by 
many prior audit pricing studies, such as those of Low et al. (1990), Firth (1997), 
Carson et al. (2004) and Lawrence et al. (2011), which find that the size of the 
client as measured by their total assets is the major factor in determining the 
audit fee. It seems that economic factors do not have any impact on the 
relationship between audit fees and company size, as company size continues to 
significantly affect audit pricing. This is consistent with the expectation that the 
bigger the company, the more audit effort is needed in auditing the financial 
statements in the form of testing and analysis of data and information (Simunic, 
1980; Firth, 1985; Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Simon, 1995; 
Firth, 1997; Adams et al., 1997). For 2010, the variables measuring client 
complexity, USSUBS, consistent with the 2007 result, show a positive 
significant impact on audit fees. This proves that in 2010 auditors continued to 
consider companies with many subsidiaries, especially those with US 
subsidiaries, as more complex, and were charging higher audit fees. This is 
because audits of accounts of companies with many subsidiaries require a 
greater degree of testing and effort across all subsidiaries, involving a variety of 
statutory and disclosure requirements, and hence incurring higher fees. In 
addition, the auditor also has to bear inquiry costs and to deal with intra group 
transactions, which could complicate the auditing process. The industry in which 
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the client operates also determines the audit fees charged by an auditor. This 
study finds evidence that in 2010, regulated industries (REG) paid less in audit 
fees than their non-regulated counterparts. This finding is consistent with the 
2007 result and with the finding by Ezzamel et al. (1996), O’Sullivan (1999) and 
O’Sullivan (2000) that audit fees are typically lower among companies operating 
in regulated industries. The results on variables measuring company risk are 
mixed with the inventory over total assets ratio (STOCK), existence of loss in 
the current year (LOSS10) and gearing ratio (GEARING), showing an 
insignificant relationship. The results on both gearing ratio (GEARING) and 
LOSS10 are consistent with 2007.  It could be concluded that in 2010 there is no 
evidence to suggest that auditors saw the stock to total assets ratio and the 
incidence of loss in the current year as an important indicator of client riskiness 
or charged higher audit fees accordingly. This is supported by the finding of 
Carcello et al. (2002) that stock to total assets ratio has no significant 
relationship with audit fees. It seems that since the economic crisis the gearing 
ratio has become less important in auditors’ determination of pricing. This 
finding is inconsistent with studies in the Netherlands, Australia and Bahrain 
(Langendijk, 1997; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Joshie and Al-Bastaki, 2000), 
which reported a significant positive relationship between gearing ratio and audit 
fees. The debtors to total assets ratio (DEBTORS) shows a significant positive 
impact on audit fees. This result is consistent with the result for 2007 and 
supported by Simunic (1980), who considered receivables as “risky” balance 
sheet items that generally represent a material portion of the balance sheet figure 
and could increase the level of audit effort and also the risk of a material 
misstatement due to items being missed by the auditor. Similar to the results of 
the 2007 analysis, this study finds that in 2010 the length of delay between a 
company’s financial year-end and the signing of the audit report had a positive 
impact on the audit fees; however, the relationship is not significant. This 
finding is inconsistent with the prior expectation that report lag would have a 
significant positive impact on audit fees as a longer time is taken, most likely 
because of the need for more audit testing and investigation. This result does not 
support the finding by Chan et al. (1993), Ezzamel et al. (1996) and O’Sullivan 
(2000) of a significant positive relationship between report lag and audit fees. 
Similarly, no evidence is found in either period that audits undertaken in the 
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busy period (i.e. between 31
st
 December and 31
st
 March) attract an audit fee 
premium, although it was predicted that auditing during the auditing busy season 
(normally at the beginning of the calendar year) could lead to higher audit fees. 
This finding is supported by O’Sullivan (1999 and 2000), who also failed to find 
any evidence that auditing during the busy season has a significant impact on 
audit fees. In respect to auditor-related variables, this study finds no evidence 
that big audit firms (BIG4) have a significant positive impact on audit fees in 
both periods. Like the 2007 analysis, this study also finds evidence that in 2010 
the location of the auditor affected audit pricing. It is found that auditors with a 
London address (LONDON) charge significantly higher audit fees to their audit 
clients than their regional counterparts. This is consistent with other UK studies, 
such as those of Chan et al. (1993), Ezzamel et al (1996), O’Sullivan (2000) and 
Chaney et al. (2004), who found a significant positive relationship between audit 
fees and whether the auditor was based in London.  
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Table 6.5: OLS Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees for 
FTSE All Shares for the Year 2007 (Pre Economic Crisis) and 2010 (Post 
Economic Crisis) 
  model  7 (Pre-crisis 2007) Model 8 (Post crisis 2010) 
   (n=384)  (n=384) 
  
Stand. 
Coeff 
t-
value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff 
t-
value 
sig 
value VIF 
(Constant)  .430 .668   -.415 .678  
%INDDIRS .002 .082 .934 1.318 -.053 -1.548 .123 1.332 
DUALITY -.027 -.988 .324 1.101 .003 .083 .934 1.210 
BOARDMEET -.021 -.739 .461 1.167 -.019 -.574 .566 1.217 
ACSIZE .066 2.065 .040 1.525 .033 .957 .339 1.340 
%ACNEXEC -.007 -.247 .805 1.144 -.006 -.183 .855 1.332 
ACMEET .094 3.057 .002 1.414 .057 1.638 .102 1.371 
%ACCOMM .031 1.067 .287 1.235 .010 .335 .738 1.072 
%ACFINEXPERT .028 1.018 .309 1.128 .048 1.538 .125 1.105 
ABLOCKOWN .014 .490 .624 1.261 .041 1.192 .234 1.322 
ANEXSHARES -.048 -1.728 .085 1.170 -.070 -2.225 .027 1.124 
AEXESHARES -.050 -1.748 .081 1.223 -.020 -.641 .522 1.118 
3YEARSLOSS -.013 -.465 .642 1.183 -.012 -.320 .749 1.507 
DEBTORS .150 5.117 .000 1.285 .133 4.047 .000 1.213 
STOCK -.054 -1.921 .056 1.161 -.054 -1.668 .096 1.165 
ROA -.015 -.531 .596 1.192 .017 .503 .615 1.332 
GEARING -.002 -.067 .947 1.324 -.020 -.599 .550 1.296 
BUSY .042 1.528 .127 1.130 .000 -.003 .998 1.172 
REG -.195 -6.692 .000 1.271 -.137 -3.983 .000 1.325 
BIG4 .005 .178 .858 1.301 .034 1.029 .304 1.204 
LONDON .119 4.073 .000 1.270 .123 3.672 .000 1.259 
LOGDELAY .034 1.212 .227 1.175 .042 1.281 .201 1.232 
LOGTOTASSETS .607 14.098 .000 2.758 .656 14.659 .000 2.245 
UKSUBS -.039 -1.394 .164 1.145 -.039 -1.170 .243 1.264 
USSUBS .179 6.314 .000 1.194 .182 5.627 .000 1.176 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT .165 5.086 .000 1.568 .165 4.933 .000 1.255 
R square 0.783 
   
0.713   
    
Adj.R square 0.766 
   
0.690 
   F Value 46.684 
   
31.958 
   Durbin Watson 2.093       2.004   
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6.4.4 Test of Robustness 
As a robustness measure and to improve understanding, this study re-runs the 
main regression model to test for the impact of using other measures of company 
size, industry effect and client complexity on the audit fee. Table 6.6 presents 
details of the regression models. In model 9, a dummy variable FINANCIALS 
(indicating whether the company is a financial company or not) has been 
included in the model to replace variable REG which indicates whether the 
companies are in regulated industries. The regression result shows that variable 
FINANCIALS has a significant negative relationship with audit fee. The result 
indicates that financial companies enjoy price discounts from the auditor. As 
stated earlier in the discussion of main regression models, less audit work is 
needed for financial institutions as regulated companies are closely governed by 
oversight bodies. In addition, regulatory oversight partially substitutes the 
external auditors as a monitoring mechanism, which leads to lower audit fees.  
Model 9 also substitutes the variable USSUBS (the number of US Subsidiaries) 
with OSSUBS (the number of over-sea subsidiaries). As expected, the number of 
overseas subsidiaries has significant positive impact on audit fees, similar to the 
impact of the number of US subsidiaries on audit fees. Other variables show 
consistent results with the main regression models. 
Model 10 replaces the measure of company size, log total assets with log 
turnover. As expected, log turnover also has a very significant positive 
relationship with audit fee (p=0.000). The result is consistent with other studies 
like Chan et al. (1993), Collier and Gregory (1996) and Owusu-Ansah et al. 
(2010). It is interesting that one of the board variables, the annual number of 
board meetings, now shows a very significant positive impact on audit fees. In 
addition, return on asset ratio and busy period also show a very significant 
impact on audit fees. Contrary to other models, it is found that the variable 
measuring regulated industries no longer has a significant impact on audit fee. 
Other variables behave similarly to the main model. The F-statistics for both 
models are significant at one percent level, suggesting that the models are 
statistically valid. Table 5.4 also shows that both models 9 and 10 have a very 
high R square value at 0.746 and 0.744 respectively, showing that each model 
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has a high explanatory power. There are no heteroscedasticity problems as 
Durbin Watson values show a figure around 2 (2.071 and 2.034 respectively). 
This study also re-ran the regression using different variations of ownership 
structure variables (see Appendix 3). The regression model used the number of 
multiple large shareholders or the number of shareholders holding 3% or more 
shares and the proportion of non-executive and executive directors holding 
company shares. Contrary to expectation, the regression result shows that the 
number of blockholders or large shareholders has significant positive impact on 
audit fees. The result is inconsistent with Adelopo et al. (2012), who found a 
significant negative relationship between audit fees and number of blockholders. 
Proportion of non-executive and executive directors holding company shares are 
both found to be not significantly related to audit fees. The results of other 
variables are consistent with results for the main models. 
It is argued that larger firms behave differently as compared to smaller firms in 
terms of their demand for audit quality. Following the example of a previous UK 
study (e.g. Zaman et al., 2011) that separated the sample into small and larger 
firms, this study also runs separate regressions for larger and smaller firms by 
splitting the sample companies into two parts, based on the median of total 
assets. Models 11 and 12 represent small and big companies respectively. For 
small companies, the log total asset shows a very significant positive impact on 
audit fees. The same significant positive relationship with audit fee is found for 
log total non-audit fees and the number of US subsidiaries. As expected, this 
study finds enough evidence to argue that the proportion of assets represented by 
debtors and regulated companies has a very significant positive impact on audit 
fees in smaller companies. Contrary to the result of the pooled data (main 
models), it is found that the proportion of assets represented by stocks is not 
significantly related to audit fee. Other measures of client riskiness and 
profitability (3 YEARSLOSS, ROA and GEARING) show consistent results 
with the main model based on pooled data. In terms of auditor related variables, 
this study documents a very interesting finding on big four audit firms (BIG4). 
Contrary to the finding in the main model, this study finds enough evidence to 
conclude that big four audit firms charge higher audit fees to their small audit 
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clients (p=0.031). This result is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Francis, 
1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Lee, 
1996; McMeeking et al, 2006) that have documented that relatively small 
companies had a positive relationship with audit fees. The positive relationship 
among smaller clients reflects the effect of product differentiation of the auditor 
rather than abuse of monopolistic power (McMeeking et al., 2006). Similar to 
the main models, auditor with a London address (LONDON) has a very 
significant positive impact on audit fees. This result implies that auditors with a 
London address also charge higher audit fees to their smaller size clients. None 
of the board variables show any significant impact on audit fees. As for audit 
committee characteristics, the regression results show that audit committee 
diligence, measured by annual number of audit committee meetings (ACMEET), 
has a very significant impact on audit fees. Besides diligence, this study also 
documents that audit committee commitment (ACCOMM) has a positive and 
significant relationship with audit fees. These two regression results imply that 
diligent and committed audit committees in the small companies segment 
require higher quality audits that lead to higher audit fees. 
For big companies, the log total asset also shows a very significant positive 
impact on audit fees. Similar to the small companies segment, the same 
significant positive relationship with audit fee is found for log total non-audit 
fees and number of US subsidiaries. For client riskiness variables, this study 
finds enough evidence to conclude that the proportion of assets represented by 
debtors has a very significant positive impact on audit fees. Contrary to the 
result for the small companies segment, it is found that the proportion of assets 
represented by stocks is negative and significantly related to audit fee. This 
negative relationship could be the result of the relative ease of auditing with the 
availability of auditing technology, which enables the auditor to give price 
discounts to their audit clients in the big companies segment. Another interesting 
finding for the big companies segment is that incidence of any loss in the past 
three years (3YEARSLOSS) shows a significant positive impact on audit fee. 
This result implies that auditors charge higher audit fees for big companies that 
have experienced any loss in the past three years. Similar to the small companies 
segment and the main models, other measures of client riskiness and profitability 
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show insignificant impact on audit fee. Similar to small companies, regulated 
companies among big companies are paying less audit fees as a result of closer 
supervison by regulatory bodies. For auditor characteristics, it is found that only 
auditor with London address has a significant positive impact on audit fees while 
Big4 auditor has no significant impact on audit fee. The insignificant impact of 
Big4 auditors on audit fees in the big companies segment could be explained by 
the fact that price discount as a result of economies of scale is offset by the price 
premium for Big four auditors (Francis and Stokes, 1986). This is supported by 
Simunic (1980), Simon (1986), Francis and Stokes (1986) and Palmrose (1986), 
who found that auditor size was not significant in cases of very large companies. 
Governance characteristics and ownership structure wise, it is found that 
contrary to the result for the small companies segment and also the main models, 
CEO duality shows a very significant negative impact on audit fees. The result is 
consistent with Bliss (2011), who claimed that CEO duality constrains board 
independence. In addition, in the presence of a dominant CEO, non-executive 
directors are expected to have reduced influence in seeking an intensive audit 
and this leads to lower audit fees (Desender et al., 2009; O’Sullivan, 2000). For 
audit committee characteristics, only audit committee size and annual number of 
audit committee meetings are found to have significant and positive impact on 
audit fees. The results imply that in the big companies segment, audit 
committees which are bigger in size and more diligent require higher quality 
audits and this leads to higher audit fees. In contrast to the result in the small 
companies segment and the main models, none of the ownership structure 
variables show a significant impact on audit fee. 
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Table 6.6 OLS Regressions Explaining the Determinants of Audit Fees For FTSE All Shares for the Years 2007 and 2010 (Robustness Test) 
  Model 9 (Pool Data) Model 10 (Pool Data) Model 11(Small companies) Model 12 (Big companies) 
  (n=768) (n=768)  (n=384)  (n=384) 
  
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
(Constant)  1.146 .252   3.103 .002   -1.304 .193   1.028 .305  
%INDDIRS -.021 -.952 .341 1.306 .031 1.336 .182 1.271 -.030 -.740 .460 1.231 -.022 -.605 .546 1.362 
DUALITY -.018 -.897 .370 1.067 -.015 -.719 .473 1.067 .036 .919 .359 1.163 -.092 -2.726 .007 1.201 
BOARDMEET -.023 -1.085 .278 1.160 -.063 -2.886 .004 1.148 .007 .189 .850 1.183 -.039 -1.141 .255 1.220 
ACSIZE .044 1.957 .051 1.355 .056 2.366 .018 1.353 .007 .170 .865 1.240 .072 2.082 .038 1.242 
%ACNEXEC -.013 -.630 .529 1.069 -.006 -.308 .758 1.069 -.006 -.161 .872 1.109 
    ACMEET .081 3.578 .000 1.361 .116 4.970 .000 1.321 .085 2.109 .036 1.230 .114 3.100 .002 1.419 
%ACCOMM .034 1.682 .093 1.070 .029 1.356 .176 1.073 .078 2.045 .042 1.096 .035 1.075 .283 1.093 
%ACFINEXPERT .018 .821 .412 1.238 .004 .167 .868 1.230         
%ACSUEXPERT         .019 .428 .669 1.479 -.017 -.461 .645 1.456 
%ACCEXPERT         .044 .976 .330 1.544 -.001 -.034 .973 1.681 
ABLOCKOWN .018 .817 .414 1.268 -.022 -.991 .322 1.227 .067 1.705 .089 1.173 .012 .349 .727 1.299 
ANEXSHARES -.059 -2.852 .004 1.126 -.067 -3.124 .002 1.126 -.122 -3.072 .002 1.208 -.045 -1.396 .164 1.096 
AEXESHARES -.044 -2.124 .034 1.129 -.028 -1.282 .200 1.135 -.113 -2.856 .005 1.192 -.023 -.680 .497 1.242 
3YEARSLOSS -.003 -.121 .904 1.351 .024 1.008 .314 1.378 -.027 -.631 .529 1.437 .062 1.799 .073 1.260 
DEBTORS .139 6.434 .000 1.223 .034 1.535 .125 1.185 .188 4.694 .000 1.216 .149 4.219 .000 1.309 
STOCK -.043 -2.095 .037 1.120 -.076 -3.507 .000 1.151 -.005 -.134 .894 1.112 -.111 -3.147 .002 1.295 
ROA -.014 -.637 .524 1.240 -.080 -3.590 .000 1.207 -.021 -.497 .620 1.362 -.039 -1.070 .286 1.397 
GEARING -.012 -.559 .576 1.285 .035 1.555 .120 1.245 .045 1.116 .265 1.245 .006 .163 .870 1.192 
BUSY .017 .841 .400 1.133 .050 2.346 .019 1.123 -.002 -.059 .953 1.188 .056 1.617 .107 1.249 
FINANCIALS -.154 -7.198 .000 1.205     -.105 -2.641 .009 1.209 -.263 -7.418 .000 1.310 
REG     -.001 -.058 .953 1.229         
BIG4 .021 .980 .327 1.229 .025 1.114 .266 1.229 .092 2.170 .031 1.359 -.026 -.751 .453 1.261 
LONDON .125 5.745 .000 1.243 .141 6.256 .000 1.227 .182 4.404 .000 1.296 .091 2.681 .008 1.197 
LOGDELAY .020 .930 .353 1.200 .000 .011 .991 1.184 .060 1.550 .122 1.159 .007 .204 .838 1.199 
UKSUBS -.031 -1.513 .131 1.131 -.036 -1.682 .093 1.138 -.029 -.726 .468 1.244 -.029 -.883 .378 1.149 
OSSUBS .206 9.635 .000 1.201             
USSUBS     .178 8.402 .000 1.168 .196 5.055 .000 1.143 .197 5.759 .000 1.223 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT .171 7.614 .000 1.331 .202 8.742 .000 1.293 .128 3.129 .002 1.265 .223 6.510 .000 1.227 
LOGTOTASSETS .590 19.148 .000 2.506     .512 11.752 .000 1.443 .438 10.342 .000 1.873 
TURNOVER     .482 16.912 .000 1.967         
PERIOD .016 .744 .457 1.190 -.004 -.201 .841 1.200         
R square 0.746 
   
0.744 
   
0.564 
   
0.702 
   Adj.R square 0.736 
   
0.734 
   
.529 
   
.678 
   F Value 75.68 
   
74.734 
   
16.489 
   
29.358 
   Durbin Watson 2.071    2.034    1.938    1.941    
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
The chapter discusses empirical results of the study. The empirical results are 
divided into descriptive analysis, correlation coefficients and regression results. 
Descriptive statistics are used to explore the data. In descriptive analysis, details 
of sample firms are first presented. The study focuses on 384 final samples of 
FTSE companies, with all shares listed on the London Stock Exchange on 31
st
 
December 2007, drawn from 10 different industries. This is followed by 
descriptive statistics on all variables used in the regression models, including 
control variables. For each variable, mean, median, standard deviation, min and 
max values are presented in table 6.1 and this is followed by a write-up 
describing the values found.  
The analysis chapter continues with correlation coefficient results based on 
Pearson correlations. Table 5.2 presents correlation results for all variables used 
in the regression models. The analysis is important to selection of suitable 
variables for later inclusion in the regression models. Any highly correlated 
independent variables (r=0.8 and above) are excluded from regression models, to 
avoid multicollinearity problems. No significant correlation is found between 
independent variables. However, significant correlation (r=0.8 and above) is 
found between some related variables due to singularity (e.g. between REG and 
FINANCIAL). Singularity occurs when one independent variable is actually a 
combination of other independent variables.  As multiple regression does not 
relate well to multicollinearity or singularity, variables with high singularity 
problems are not included in the same regression model. 
The relationship between audit fees and governance as well as ownership 
structure is tested using four main regression models. The first model is 
developed to test the relationship between the dependent variable LOGAUDIT 
and board characteristics, audit committee characteristics, ownership structure 
variables. Included in the models are control variables to control for client-
related variables, auditor-related variables and engagement related variables. 
This is followed by another model where the audit committe size is replaced by 
board size since both variables cannot be included in the same model due to the 
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quite high correlation coefficient between the two variables. The third model 
splits the audit committee expertise into supervisory finance expertise and 
accounting finance expertise. Finally, the last model tests the relationship 
between audit fees and audit committee effectiveness (ACE), replacing 
individual audit committee characteristics with composite variables measuring 
audit committee effectiveness. The relationship between audit fees and non-audit 
fees is tested in models 5 and 6. Model 5 tests the relationship between audit 
fees and individual non-audit fees while model 6 tests the relationship between 
audit fees and instances where non-audit services cost more than audit fees. It 
can be summarised from the regression results that the R square value of all 
models ranges from 0.736 to 0.908, while the F value is significant at 1% 
confidence level, with a minimum value of 16.7 and a maximum value of 85.23. 
The results for all models are broadly consistent with existing research. Both 
audit client size and complexity have a positive and significant impact on audit 
fees. However, the variables measuring client riskiness show mixed results, with 
the ratio of debtors to total assets (DEBTORS) having a positive and significant 
impact on audit fees, while the stock to total assets ratio (STOCKS) shows a 
significant negative impact on audit fees. The variables measuring client 
profitability/loss show an insignificant impact on audit fees. Consistent with 
prior research, such as that of O’Sullivan (2000), this study finds that London-
based auditors charge their audit clients higher audit fees than their regional 
counterparts. Consistent with most prior literature, this study finds that non-audit 
fees have a significant positive impact on audit fees. It is also found that 
management ownership and non-executive share ownership has a significant 
negative impact on audit pricing. None of the board characteristics variables, 
including board size, board independence (%NEXEC and %INDIRS) and board 
diligence (BOARDMEET), is found to have a significant impact on audit fees 
across the four main models tested. On the other hand, three audit committee 
characteristics variables: audit committee size, audit committee diligence 
(ACMEET) and audit committee commitment, are found to have a significant 
impact on audit fees. As for the detailed non-audit fees variable, it is found that 
other services supplied pursuant to legislation (LEGIST(M)), other services 
relating to taxation (TAX(M) ) and other non-audit services 
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(OTHERSERVICE(M)) have a significant positive impact on audit fees while 
other services relating to corporate finance are not significant.  
Additional analysis reveals that when total non-audit fees are greater than the 
audit fees (AUDITVSNON) this has a significant negative impact on audit fees, 
signalling that auditor independence might be affected when non-audit services 
provided by the auditor to their audit client exceed the audit service itself. The 
regression results and the hypotheses tested are summarised in Table 6.7. This 
study runs separate analyses to test the impact of economic crisis on the 
relationship between audit fees and governance characteristics and the 
relationship between audit fees and non-audit. The regression results show that 
the economic crisis has not had any significant impact on either relationship.  
Finally, robustness is tested by splitting the sample into small and big company 
segments; the use of variations of client size, industry and ownership structure 
variables is employed to increase understanding of the relationship between 
audit fees and various audit fee determinants.  
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Table 6.7:  Summary of Results  
Research objective / Hypothesis Characteristics 
measured 
Significance Accepted/Rejected 
Research Objective 1 
 
H1a: There will be a positive relationship between 
the proportion of non-executives serving on a 
company’s board and the audit fee. 
H1b: There will be a positive relationship between 
the proportion of independent non-executives serving 
on a company’s board and the audit fee. 
H1c: There will be a positive relationship between 
the existence of CEO duality and the audit fee. 
 
Board independence 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
 
 
Rejected 
 
 
Rejected 
 
H2: There will be a positive relationship between the 
board size and the audit fee. 
 
Board Size 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
 
H3:  There will be a positive relationship between 
the number of board meetings and the audit fee. 
 
Board diligence 
 
Yes 
 
Accepted 
Research Objective 2    
H4:  There will be a positive relationship between 
audit committee effectiveness and the audit fee. 
 
Audit committee 
effectiveness 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
 
H5:  There will be a positive relationship between 
audit committee independence and the audit fee. 
 
Audit committee 
independence 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
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H6:  There will be a positive relationship between 
audit committee size and audit fee. 
 
Audit committee size 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
 
H7 : There will be a positive relationship between 
the number of financially qualified members of audit 
committee and the audit fee. 
 
 
Audit committee expertise 
 
No 
 
Rejected 
 
H8 a: There will be a positive relationship between 
the number of audit committee meetings and the 
audit fee 
H8 b: There will be a positive relationship between 
the percentage of attendance by members of the 
audit committee attending all meetings and the audit 
fee. 
 
Audit committee diligence 
 
 
Audit committee 
commitment 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Accepted 
 
 
Accepted 
Research Objective 3    
 
H9a: There will be a negative relationship between 
ownership by large blockholders and the audit fee. 
H9b: There will be a negative relationship between 
the percentage of executive ownership and the audit 
fee. 
 
H9c: There will be a negative relationship between 
the percentage of non-executive ownership and the 
audit fee. 
 
Blockholder ownership 
 
 
Management ownership 
 
 
 
Non-executive ownership 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Rejected 
 
 
Accepted 
 
 
 
Accepted 
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Research Objective 4 
 
H10: There will be a positive relationship between 
total non-audit fees provided by the auditor and the 
audit fee 
 
Non-audit fees 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Accepted 
 
 
 
Research Objective 5 and 6 
H11a: The relationship between governance 
characteristics and audit fees is stronger after the 
economic crisis. 
H11b:  The relationship between non-audit fees and 
audit fees is stronger after the economic crisis. 
 
Economic effect 
 
 
Economic effect 
 
The relationship is 
weaker after the 
economic crisis. 
The relationship 
remain strong before 
and after economic 
crisis 
Rejected 
 
 
Rejected 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Following the increase in concern regarding corporate governance, especially due 
to the numerous corporate scandals and collapses (e.g. Enron, WorldCom and 
Lehman Brothers in the US and Northern Rock in the UK), understanding the role 
of external auditors in ensuring the transparency of Financial Statements and the 
relationship between relevant governance characteristics and audit quality, 
typically proxied by audit fees, has become more relevant.  A few studies (e.g. 
O’Sullivan 1999; O’Sullivan, 2000; Goddard and Master, 2000; Peel and 
Clatworthy, 2001; O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2002; Zaman et al., 2011 and Adelopo 
et al., 2012) based on the UK have examined the relationship between governance 
characteristics and audit fees. With the exception of Adelopo et al. (2012) and 
Zaman et al. (2011), who utilise data from the years 2005/2006 and the period 
between 2001-2004 respectively, most of the research in the UK concerning 
governance characteristics and audit pricing has used data from the 1990s. 
Governance reforms, and particularly those introduced in the 2000s, may have 
created a different relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees 
from that found in earlier studies. In addition, prior studies only focus on certain 
aspects and do not include comprehensive governance characteristics in their 
study (e.g. Zaman et al. only focused on audit committee effectiveness while 
Adelopo focused on multiple large shareholders). Therefore, the aim of this study 
was to fill the research gap by providing more contemporary data based on the 
years 2007 and 2010 and to include more comprehensive governance 
characteristics.  
The controversial corporate collapses and scandals that have occurred since the 
early 2000s have negatively affected the reputation of auditors, especially as most 
of the companies failed shortly after receiving a clean report from their auditors. 
The issue of independence in appearance and independence in fact of the auditors 
is now subject to increased discussion and investigation (e.g., Srinidhi and Gul, 
2007; Lim and Tan, 2008; Krishnan et al., 2005; Francis and Ke, 2006). The 
provision of non-audit services may tarnish the independence of the auditor in 
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terms of passing judgment on whether a financial statement is a true and fair view 
and disclosing any risk or possibility of going concern issues. This being the case, 
the payment of higher non-audit fees to auditors is expected to reduce the amount 
of audit work and investigation, leading to lower audit fees. Responding to this 
scenario, this study investigates the impact of total non-audit fees on total audit 
fees. The relationship between audit fees and non-audit fees and whether the 
provision of non-audit fees actually has a negative relationship with audit fees and 
consequently affects auditor independence are extremely interesting areas for 
investigation. 
In addition, on a more specific level, the new requirement for disclosure of details 
of audit fees in companies’ annual reports in The Companies (Disclosure of 
Auditor Remuneration and Liability Agreements) Regulations 2005, later 
superseded by The companies (Disclosure of Auditor Remuneration and Liability 
Agreements) Regulations 2008 provides the opportunity for this study to 
investigate individual relationships between audit fees and specific components of 
non-audit fees.  
The conclusion chapter next presents a summary of the results from the previous 
chapter. This is followed by discussion of the theoretical and policy implications 
of the study. Finally, limitations of the current study and avenues for future 
research are highlighted. 
7.2 Summary of the Empirical Findings 
The first research objective is to investigate the relationship between companies’ 
internal governance characteristics, which comprise the board of directors and the 
audit committee and audit quality, proxied by the audit fees paid by listed 
companies in the United Kingdom. The data are drawn from 384 companies listed 
in the FTSE All Shares Index, excluding investment holdings, which remained in 
the FTSE All Shares Index until 2010.  
The first step of the analysis was to assess the impact of an effective board of 
directors on audit fees. Results of this study show that the presence of 
Independent non-executive directors on the board (based on % of non-executive 
directors, % of independent non-executive directors) had no significant impact on 
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the total fee paid to external auditors. This finding does not support the 
recommendation by the Cadbury Committee and the combined codes that non-
executive directors should play a crucial role in the oversight of management and 
that non-executive directors tend to purchase more services from external auditors 
as a sign of their competence and possibly of their diligent attitude towards 
reporting and auditing quality. The presence of more independent non-executives 
may mean more coverage in the auditing and reporting sense. This result is 
inconsistent with Lee and Mande (2004) and Collier and Gregory (1999) but is 
supported by  O’Sullivan (1999) and Peel and Clatworthy (2001), who also found 
no evidence that board independence influences auditors’ pricing decisions in 
their studies covering large UK companies in the post-Cadbury period. 
Inconsistent with Bliss et al. (2007) and Zaman et al. (2011), this study finds no 
evidence that CEO/chairman duality (for either year) has a significant impact on 
audit fees. This result is, however, consistent with another UK study, based on 
402 UK quoted companies in 1992 (O’Sullivan, 2000). Similar to previous studies 
(e.g. Boo and Sharma, 2008 and Adelopo and Jallow, 2008), this study finds that 
board size has no significant impact on audit fees. This is inconsistent with the 
notion that more experienced and larger boards could enhance board 
effectiveness; thus a higher quality audit would be required, leading to higher 
audit fees. The results of the remaining board characteristics, such as board 
diligence also show no significant impact on audit fees in either 2007 or 2010.  
Audit committees have come under scrutiny from many interested parties, 
especially the regulators. It has been suggested that the main board should 
delegate its financial oversight functions to the audit committee. However, other 
writers have argued that the committee is no more than a ceremonial group and 
that it is not an effective means of constraining management and may be even less 
effective in ensuring reporting and audit quality (Sommer 1991; Menon and 
Williams, 1994). Therefore, the second research objective is to analyse the impact 
of an effective audit committee on audit fees. This study finds that audit 
committee size has a significant positive impact on audit fees. This is consistent 
with the notion that larger audit committees are likely to flex their power and 
status and demand higher quality audit to reflect their effective monitoring role. 
This result is supported by Vafeas and Waegelein (2007), Boo and Sharma (2009) 
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and Zaman et al. (2011). This study also documents that audit committee meetings 
have a significant positive impact on total fees paid to auditors. This is consistent 
with prior studies by such as Abbott et al. (2003a), Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006), Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Zaman et al. (2011).  Hoitash and Hoitash 
(2009) suggest that increased audit committee activity could signal an effort to 
resolve financial irregularities and thus lead to higher audit fees. Another 
explanation could be that diligent audit committees are more effective and require 
higher quality audits to safeguard the shareholder, which will also lead to higher 
audit fees. This study highlights the significant positive impact of audit committee 
commitment on audit fees. This is one of the contributions of the study as 
previous audit pricing study did not include this variable. The finding supports the 
expectation that committed audit committees demand higher audit quality to 
complement their monitoring function. However, this study fails to find evidence 
that other audit committee characteristics, such as audit committee effectiveness, 
independence and finance expertise have any significant impact on audit fees. 
These results are similar to the findings of O’Sullivan 1999, Collier and Gregory 
1996, Lee and Mande 2004, Adelopo and Jallow, 2008.  
The third research objective is to analyse the impact of ownership structure on 
audit fees. The results on the impact of ownership structure on audit quality are 
mixed. The study finds that average executive director shareholding or 
management shareholding have a significant negative impact on audit fees.  This 
is supported by prior studies by O’Sullivan (2000) in the UK and Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) and Mitra et al. (2007) in the US, who also document an 
inverse significant relationship between audit fee level and insider ownership. The 
results indicate that auditors possibly view executive shareholding as reducing 
agency conflict and involvement of management in earnings management, thereby 
incurring lower audit fees. This study also documents a significant negative 
relationship between average non-executive director shareholding and audit fees. 
This finding is consistent with O’Sullivan’s (2000) finding for his model I of a 
significant negative relationship between non-executive share-ownership and 
audit fees. He concluded that non-executives possessing significant equity 
interests might have business or family links with the company and behave 
similarly to executive directors. Another explanation could be that non-executive 
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shareholdings reduce the independence of non-executive directors, and therefore, 
a lower quality audit is required from the auditor. However, contrary to 
expectation, large blockholder ownership has insignificant impact on audit fees.  
The fourth research objective is to establish the relationship between non-audit 
fees and audit fees. Consistent with other UK studies (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2000; 
Ezzamel et al., 1996; Firth, 1997; Firth, 2002; Hay et al., 2006; Che Ahmad et al., 
2006) it is found that log total non-audit fees have a significant positive impact on 
audit fees at 1% confidence level in all models tested, for both 2007 and 2010. 
This is further supported by a result from a meta-analysis covering audit fee 
literature up to 2007 (Hay, 2012), which confirms that audit fees and non-audit 
fees have a significant positive association. This finding is inconsistent with 
knowledge-spillover theory and also could counter the claim that the provision of 
non-audit services may affect auditor independence. However, it should be 
highlighted that this study finds that when total non-audit fees are dominant over 
total audit fees this indeed has a significant negative impact on audit fees. There 
could be an implication that auditors might give discount to clients to gain more 
non-audit work from them and this could hence affect auditor independence. The 
availability of published data relating to details of non-audit fees in annual 
reporting, effective from the year ending on 31
st
 December 2005, enabled this 
study to investigate the relationship between individual components of non-audit 
services and audit fees. The regression results show that non-audit services related 
to legislation, tax and other non-audit services have a significant positive impact 
on audit fees. However, there is not enough evidence to conclude that non-audit 
fees related to corporate finance services have a significant impact on audit fees. 
This is consistent with Palmrose (1986b) and Davis et al. (1993), who found a 
significant positive relationship between audit fees and accounting-related 
management services, non-accounting management services and tax services. 
Analysis of 2010 data shows a consistent result with 2007 regarding the 
relationship between details of non-audit services and audit fees. These findings 
reflect that increasing the provision of tax services and services relating to 
legislation increases the audit fees that auditors charge their audit clients. The 
reason could be that these two kinds of non-audit service expose the real financial 
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position and weaknesses of the client and consequently the auditor may price the 
relevant risk identified by charging higher audit fees to problematic clients.  
The fifth research objective is to analyse the impact of economic crisis on the 
relationship between governance characteristics and audit fees. The study 
documents a significant relationship between audit committee size, audit 
committee diligence and commitment and audit fees in 2007. However, this study 
fails to find any significant relationship between most of the board characteristics 
and the audit committee and audit fees in 2010. This insignificant result may be 
due to a number of reasons. First, while improvements in internal governance 
characteristics (both board and audit committees) are expected to indicate stronger 
internal controls and reduced demand for extensive audit testing, the increased 
independence of the audit function from the control of management may allow the 
undertaking of more extensive audits that would consequently incur higher fees 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). Moreover, as the expectations of the users of the Financial 
Statements, particularly the shareholders, in terms of the monitoring responsibility 
of the board and audit committee have increased, the audit committee might 
transfer some of this responsibility to auditors by requiring them to carry out more 
thorough and higher quality audit work. Finally, since the recommendations of the 
various versions of the Code of Corporate Governance (1998-2010) have been 
widely adopted by UK listed companies, the variation between companies in 
respect of governance characteristics is likely to be small, therefore weakening the 
power of the empirical tests. This is especially true in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis (2010) as companies have become more aware that good 
corporate governance is essential to maintaining effective overall corporate 
monitoring mechanisms and company success. For ownership structure, a 
comparison analysis shows that in 2007 both executive and non-executive director 
share ownership had a significant negative impact on audit fees. However, after 
the economic crisis, only non-executive director share ownership still has a 
significant impact on audit fees. The significant result for non-executive share 
ownership could imply that in the aftermath of the economic crisis, auditors see 
non-executive share-ownership as a way to offset the potential drawbacks of Non-
executive directors, especially those who are former employees of the firm or 
have personal relationships with the management. This is because, through having 
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substantial share ownership in the company, non-executive directors become more 
motivated to enhance the company’s performance and thus audit risk is reduced. 
Finally, the study also provides evidence consistent with most prior audit pricing 
literature regarding control variables. First, firm size (LOGTOTASSETS) 
consistently shows a significant positive impact on audit fees at 1% confidence 
level in all models tested. This has been confirmed in previous studies (e.g. Hay et 
al., 2012; Hay et al., 2006; Collier and Gregory, 1996). This study also documents 
evidence that client complexity, proxied by Log total subsidiaries, number of 
overseas subsidiaries and the number of US subsidiaries and regulated industry, is 
an important determinant of the total fees paid to external auditors. However, the 
control variables measuring client riskiness produce mixed results. From the 
results it could be concluded that only the ratio of debtors to total assets 
(DEBTORS) and the ratio of stocks to total assets (STOCKS) are important 
determinants of audit fees. Consistent with other UK studies, such as Chan et al. 
(1993), Ezzamel et al. (1996), O’Sullivan (2000) and Chaney et al. (2004), this 
study finds a significant positive relationship between audit fees and whether the 
auditor was based in London. Splitting the sample into small and big companies 
segments reveals the existence of a Big Four audit premium among small audit 
clients. Finally, the study finds no evidence that an audit carried out during the 
busy period (31
st
 December to 31
st
 March), report lag, company listing on the 
FTSE 350 and company profitability have significant impact on audit fees. 
7.3 Theoretical and Policy Implications 
The results of the study have some general implications for the current debate on 
corporate governance issues, especially in relation to the role of the audit 
committee in promoting good corporate governance. First, this study finds that 
audit committee size has significant positive impact on audit fees. Therefore, it 
supports the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance (2006) and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010), which suggests that the audit committee 
should have at least three members in order to provide necessary strength and 
diversity of expertise and views to ensure appropriate monitoring. In addition, this 
study supports the recommendation of the Smith Report (2003) for audit 
committees to hold a minimum of 3 meetings per year as it is found that the 
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annual number of audit committee meetings has a positive impact on audit fees. In 
addition, the study contributes to the literature on the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and audit pricing as it is found that audit committee 
commitment also has a significant positive impact on audit fees. This study also 
supports the notion that executive share ownership and non-executive share 
ownership could help reduce agency costs by reducing the scope and intensity of 
audit work. 
Finally, the findings on the impact of non-audit fees on audit fees have 
implications for the current debate on whether regulators should ban all non-audit 
services. This study finds that total non-audit fees have a significant positive 
impact on audit fees, despite its theoretical expectation of a negative relationship. 
Therefore, the total prohibition of non-audit services is not supported. Financial 
directors of the FTSE 100 also believe that there is no real threat to independence 
and that a ban on auditors undertaking non-audit services would have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of UK companies (Christodoulou, 2010). In 
addition, the study contributes by providing further understanding on the 
relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees. This study unbundles the total 
non-audit fees into nine types of non-audit service. However, as some of the 
services are not widely used, the study finally proceeded with four types of non-
audit service. This study finds that tax services, other services relating to 
legislation and other non-audit services significantly contribute to the creation of a 
positive relationship between non-audit and audit fees. This is supported by the 
finding of Beattie et al. (1996) that most of the Non-audit services provided by 
auditors are not management consultancy tasks, but instead are essential 
accounting services that enable listed companies to comply with legal and 
regulatory requirements. Beattie et al. (1996) suggested that the unbundling of 
non-audit fees is beneficial to the Accounting Profession since previous practice 
invited unnecessary criticism by bundling essential compliances services with a 
limited amount of consultancy work for disclosure as one fee figure. 
7.4 Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Future Research 
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, the study relies heavily on 
published data, hand collected from annual reports. Therefore, the quality of the 
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data collected is dependent on the disclosure quality of companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. In addition, even though care has been taken to avoid 
errors during data collection, it is possible that small mistakes might have been 
made. However, the study makes a worthwhile contribution to audit pricing 
literature by providing empirical results using a unique data set, hand collected 
from the annual reports of the sample firms.  
Second, the data collected generally relate to large firms fully listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. Future research should expand the study to AIM listed 
companies to explore whether the impact of governance characteristics of such 
firms on audit fees differs significantly from that of fully listed companies. 
Third, although this study tried to fit in as many control variables as possible and 
also test as many governance characteristics as possible, some important variables 
might have been omitted and some have been intentionally ignored: mainly due to 
time limitations as manual data collection is a time consuming process. It is 
suggested that future research should include important variables ignored in this 
study, such as auditor tenure and audit committee tenure, in the audit-pricing 
model. 
Fourth, the study is based purely on quantitative data. It is found that most of the 
governance characteristics, including audit committee characteristics, have no 
significant impact on audit pricing. Therefore, future research should complement 
the current findings by undertaking qualitative research to further explore the role 
of governance mechanisms, in particular the audit committee. The use of 
qualitative research methods might also shed light on concerns raised by Spira 
(1999) regarding the ceremonial role of audit committees. It seems that this issue 
is still relevant in the post-governance reform period. A qualitative study 
undertaken in 2007 (Fearnley et al., 2011) revealed the fact that neither audit 
committees nor audit committee chairs are fully engaged in all aspects of 
decision-making on financial reporting therefore supporting the claim by Beasley 
et al. (2009) and Cohen et al. (2010) that audit committee is regarded as just a 
symbolic endeavour. Therefore, the following research questions adopted from 
Gafran and O’Sullivan (2013) might be particularly useful in obtaining additional 
data to further understand the relationship identified through quantitative analysis:  
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How do audit committee members decide whether to continue with or replace the 
external auditor? 
How do audit committees members decide on the extent and type of non-audit 
services to be requested from their incumbent auditor? 
How do audit committee members decide on the balance between audit and non-
audit work done by external auditors? 
At what point do they believe the independence of the audit could become 
impaired? 
How are audit and non-audit fee negotiations undertaken between the audit 
committee and the auditor?  
What factors influence audit committee members/non-executive directors in 
deciding the extent and scope of the audit?  
Finally, whilst this study investigates the impact of governance characteristics 
using data for the years 2007 and 2010, a study using longitudinal data from 2007 
to 2011 might be useful in explaining the relationship between governance 
characteristics and audit quality when proxied by audit fees. In addition, future 
studies could expand the governance characteristics to include the internal audit 
function and qualitative research methods such as interviews and questionnaire 
surveys could be usefully applied in gathering data, as the data currently published 
are not adequate for this purpose.   
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: A Summary of Empirical Studies Examining the Influence of Non-Audit Fees on Audit Fees since the 1990s
2
  
                                                          
2 Even though the table focuses on the analysis of literature starting from 1990, Simunic (1984) and Palmrose (1986) are included as these are the studies most commonly 
quoted by much of the audit pricing literature. 
 Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings  
 
Simunic (1984) 
 
(JAR) 
 
Analyses a client’s decision to purchase 
MAS and audit services when their 
production functions are interdependent 
as well as testing for the existence and 
pricing effects of knowledge spill-over. 
 
Data from 263 publicly-held companies in 
1977. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Audit fees of clients who purchase MAS from their 
auditors are significantly higher than audit fees of 
clients who do not do so. 
 While efficiencies from joint production may exist, this 
does not imply that joint performance of MAS and 
auditing is necessarily desirable. 
 
Palmrose (1986b) 
 
(JAR) 
 
Investigates the effect of non-audit 
services on the pricing of audit services. 
 
1980-1981 data from 298 public and 
closely-held companies with big 8 firms as 
the incumbent auditor. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Provides evidence of a positive relationship between 
fees for audit services and fees for three categories of 
non-audit services (accounting-related MAS, non-
accounting MAS and tax). 
 
Abdel-Khalik (1990) 
 
(CAR) 
 
 
Provides a method to evaluate directly 
the cost (benefits) of knowledge spill-
over arising from purchasing MAS from 
the incumbent auditor 
 
 
84 survey responses from different audit 
regions in five states (excluding financial 
companies but includes private firms), 
study undertaken in early 1987. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Purchasing MAS from the incumbent auditor does not 
have an impact on audit fees. 
 
Davis et al. (1993)  
 
(AR) 
 
Investigates whether the provision of 
non-audit services results in knowledge 
spillover and audit production 
efficiencies that could produce 
economic rents for the auditor. 
 
98 clients of one large public accounting 
firm. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Finds a weak, positive relationship between tax services 
and audit effort measures and between accounting-
related consulting services and audit hours weighted by 
billing rate ratios. 
 Provides no empirical evidence that provision of non-
audit services will affect auditor objectivity. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Ezzamel,et al. (1996)  
 
(ABR) 
 
To report on the extent and nature of the 
provision of non-audit services to audit 
clients and to ascertain the association 
between fees for audit and for non-audit 
services in the UK. 
 
1992/93 data from 314 UK Quoted Firms 
 
 
(UK) 
 
 Income earned by audit firms from non-audit work for 
quoted clients averaged nearly 90% of the levels of audit 
fee earnings in 1992/93 –more than a quarter of clients 
paid more for non-audit services than for the audit 
 The extent of voluntary disclosure of the breakdown of 
non-audit services was limited and the existing 
disclosure requirement allowed considerable variety in 
the manner in which non-audit services fees incurred or 
paid abroad were disclosed. 
 There was a significant positive association between 
fees for audit and non-audit services, similar to that 
reported in the majority of US and Australian studies 
 Four of the nine interaction terms introduced were 
significant, implying that non-audit services fees may 
moderate the association between other explanatory 
variables and audit fees. 
 
Firth (1997b) 
 
(JBFA) 
 
Examination of audit fees paid by 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
 
 
Data on 157 listed companies on the Oslo 
stock exchange in 1991-1992 
 
(Norway) 
 
 
 Arthur Andersen and KPMC Peat Marwick have the 
largest market shares, together accounting for more than 
50% of audit fees, consultancy fees, and total fees. 
 75% of clients received consultancy services from their 
auditors. 
 There is a positive relationship between audit fees and 
consultancy fees. 
 
Firth (1997a) 
 
(CAR) 
A model is developed that seeks to 
explain a company's decision to 
purchase non-audit services from the 
auditor,  proposing that companies that 
face potentially high agency costs 
purchase relatively smaller amounts of 
non-audit services from their auditor. 
 
 
1992 and 1994 data on 500 largest British 
industrial, listed companies as ranked in 
The Times 1000 
 Results indicate that companies that have higher agency-
cost proxies are associated with smaller purchases of 
non-audit services from their auditors. 
 Director shareholdings, the shareholdings of the largest 
owner, and the debt-to total assets ratio affect the 
amount of consultancy services bought from the auditor. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Lennox (1999) 
(EAR) 
Investigates the effect of non-audit 
services on audit quality 
Data from 537 listed companies  in 1988-
1994  
 
(UK) 
 Following the announcement of the requirement to 
disclose non-audit fees, approximately 1/3 
of UK quoted companies disclosed before the 
requirement became effective. 
 Auditor size, directors’ shareholdings and non-audit 
fees were not significantly correlated 
with early disclosure. 
 Indicates a positive weakly significant relationship 
between disclosed non-audit fees and audit 
qualifications- suggests that when non-audit fees are 
disclosed, the provision of non-audit services does not 
reduce audit quality. 
Clatworthy et al. (2002) 
 
(JBFA) 
Investigate the market for audit services 
for UK National Health Service (NHS) 
trusts. 
459 NHS Trust for the year ended 31st 
March 1997 
(UK) 
 
 A negative association between audit and non-audit fees 
in the UK National Health Service sector consistent with 
knowledge spillover. 
Firth (2002) 
 
(JBFA) 
To examine the provision of non-audit 
services (also termed here as 
consultancy services) to audit clients 
using data from  UK 
1,112 observations of company listed on 
International Stock Exchange in 1996 
 Positive association between audit and non-audit fees 
observed in the UK is primarily driven by company 
specific events (e.g. mergers and acquisitions, 
restructuring, new finance, change in management) that 
result in the demand for more consultancy and audit 
services. 
O’Sullivan, and Diacon (2002) 
 
(IJA) 
Compare the pricing of audits in mutual 
and proprietary insurance companies  
(including audit committees and non-
audit fees) 
 
1992 data from 117 UK insurance 
companies 
(UK) 
 
 
 
 
 There is weak evidence of the relationship between 
provision of non-audit service and audit fees. No 
evidence between audit fees and nature of non-audit 
service. Company size and complexity are the most 
important determinants of audit pricing in insurance 
companies, with significant price reductions earned by 
insurers specializing in either general or life insurance 
business 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Frankel et al. (2002)  
(AR) 
Examines whether auditor fees are 
associated with earnings management 
and investigates the market reaction to 
the disclosure of auditor fees. 
 
 
2001 data from 3,074 proxy statements on 
the SEC”S EdGAR database with filing 
date between February 5, 2001 and June 
15 2001. 
 
(USA) 
 Presents evidence that non-audit fees are positively 
associated with small earnings surprise and the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals 
 Found that audit fees are negatively associated with 
these earnings management indicators. 
 Also found a negative association between non-audit 
fees and share values on the date the fees were 
disclosed, although the effect is small in economic 
terms. 
 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003)  
 
(AR) 
Further investigation of the association 
between non-audit fees and biased 
financial reporting. 
 
 
2001 data from 3,170 U.S. registrant firms 
for which 2,000 proxy statements were 
available on EDGAR or Global Access 
during November and December 2001 
(excluding financial institutions) 
 
(USA) 
 
 Finds no relationship between positive discretionary 
accruals and any of the auditor fee metrics when 
discretionary accruals are adjusted for firm performance 
and sample firms are partitioned by income-increasing 
versus income decreasing accruals 
 In the earnings benchmark tests, they find no relation 
between fee ratio and the likelihood that firms beat 
analysts' forecasts. 
 Also finds no evidence that the market reacts to the 
magnitude of non-audit fees relative to total fees 
 
 
Whisenant et al. (2003)  
 
(IJA) 
Investigates whether the characteristics 
of clients, auditors, and the auditor-
client relationship simultaneously 
determine audit and non-audit fees. 
2001 data from 2,666 listed firms 
disclosing fiscal year 2000 audit and non-
audit fee data in proxy statements filed at 
the SEC from January 1 to August 31 
2001. 
 
 
(USA) 
 
 The results of the study show that audit and non-audit 
fees are endogenous. 
 It was found that inferences are different on the relation 
between audit and non-audit fees after considering the 
simultaneity of audit and non-audit services compared 
with those inferences from single-equation estimations. 
 Estimating the system of fee equations simultaneously, 
they find that provision of audit and non-audit services 
leads to no relation with audit fees, with suggestion that 
single-equation estimations suffer from simultaneous-
equation bias. 
 Findings also suggest that either there is no knowledge 
spillover or equal knowledge spillover exists between 
audit and non-audit services. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Abbott et al. (2003b) 
(CAR) 
 
Examine the association between audit 
committee characteristics and the ratio 
of non-audit service(NAS)  fees to audit 
fees 
 
538 companies filing proxies with SEC 
between Feb 5, 2001 and June 30 2001      
( excluding mutual funds and other 
financial registrants) 
(USA) 
 
 
 Audit committee comprised solely of independent 
directors meeting at least four times annually has 
significant negative association with the NAS fee ratio. 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) 
 
(JAR) 
 
 
To examine the relationship between 
the fees paid to audit firms for audit and 
non-audit services and the behaviour of 
accounting accruals. 
2000-2001 data from 5,815 firm-years  
 
(USA) 
 The ratio of non-audit fees to total fees has a positive 
relation with the absolute value of accruals 
 Using latent class mixture models to identify clusters of 
firms with a homogenous regression structure reveals 
that the positive association only occurs for about 8.5% 
of the sample  
 Find consistent evidence of a negative relation between 
the level of fees (both audit and non-audit) paid to 
auditors and accruals (i.e. higher fees are associated with 
smaller accruals) 
 The latent class analysis also indicates that this negative 
relation is strongest for client firms with weak 
governance 
 
 
Felix et al. (2005)  
 
(CAR) 
Investigates how external auditor 
provision of significant non-audit 
services and client pressure to use the 
work of internal auditor influence 
external auditors’ use of internal 
auditors’ work. 
 
Audit engagements for 1996 
were obtained from the same data set used 
in Felix et al (2001) and gathered through 
matched surveys completed by internal 
and external auditors for 74 Fortune 1000 
firms 
 
(USA) 
 It was found that when significant non-audit services are 
not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the 
level of internal-external auditor coordination positively 
affect auditors’ internal audit reliance decisions 
 However, when the auditor provides significant non-
audit services to the client, internal audit quality and the 
extent of internal-external auditor coordination do not 
significantly affect auditors’ reliance decisions 
 When significant non-audit services are provided, client 
pressure significantly increases extent of internal audit 
reliance. 
 External auditors appear to be more affected by client 
pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality 
and coordination when making internal audit reliance 
decisions for clients for whom significant non-audit 
services are also provided. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
Lee and Mande (2005) 
(QJBE) 
 
Examine the association between the 
fees paid to the external auditor and 
effective audit committees 
2000 data from  792 firms from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center’s 
(IRRC) database 
(US) 
 
 Initial results also suggest that effective audit 
committees seek to increase audit quality by reducing 
the non-audit services provided by the external auditor.  
 Once the non-audit fee is modelled endogenously the 
results show that there is no statistically significant 
association between the non-audit fees and audit 
committee effectiveness. 
Jeong et al. (2005)  
 
(IJOA) 
Investigate the relationship among audit 
fees, mandatory auditor assignment and 
the joint provision of Non-audit and 
auditor services. 
Data from 2025 firm year observations of 
companies listed on Korean Stock 
Exchange for the period between 1999 and 
2002. 
 
(Korea) 
 Assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees 
than freely selected auditors. 
 Joint provision of audit fees and non-audit fees does 
intensify the relationship between auditor assignment 
and audit fees. 
 Suggest that mandatory auditor assignment may 
improve auditor independence. 
Antle et al. (2006) 
 
(RQFA) 
Addresses the endogeneity issue by 
modelling the confluence of audit fees, 
fees for non-audit services and abnormal 
accruals in a system of simultaneous 
equations. 
 
Data from 2,294 Firm year observations 
from 25 industries for fiscal year 1994-
2000 and 1,570 USA firms’ year 
observations for fiscal year 1994. 
 
(UK) 
 Finds evidence consistent with knowledge spillover (or 
economies of scope) from auditing to non-audit services 
and from non-audit services to auditing. 
 Do not find support for the assertion that fees for non-
audit services increase abnormal accruals. 
 Found that non-audit fees decrease abnormal accruals, 
which is attributed to the productive effects of non-audit 
services. 
Hay et al. (2006)  
 
(JBFA) 
Examines evidence in New Zealand as 
to whether auditors providing more non-
audit services are less independent.  
1999-2001 data from top companies in 
New Zealand (177 for 1999, 224 in 2000 
and 243 in 2001). 
 
(New Zealand) 
 Found positive relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees. 
 No significant relationship between audit qualification 
or modification and non-audit fees. 
 There is no significant relationship between auditor 
change and non-audit fees.  
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Wu  (2006) 
 
(CAR) 
 
Presents a model in which both markets 
for audit services and non-audit services 
are oligopolistic. 
 
Data from two oligopolistic markets: the 
audit market ( CPA firms or auditors) and 
the consulting market (consulting firms or 
consultants) 
 
(USA) 
 
 The empirical implication of the result is that because of 
competition-crossover effects between the auditing and 
consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence 
for knowledge spillover benefit is likely to be difficult. 
 Control variables for “audit market concentration” 
concerned with competition-crossover effects and 
“auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge spillover 
benefits should be included in audit fee regressions to 
increase the power of empirical tests. 
 With regard to policy implications, the analyses help 
explain the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
“market segmentation” and hence the profitability of 
accounting firms. 
 
Stein (2006) 
 
(CAR) 
 
To explain the theory/empirical 
evidence gap on the knowledge spill-
over.  
 
2001 data from 
3,053 firm year observations of publicly 
traded companies 
 
(USA) 
 
 The results suggest that knowledge spillover benefits 
may be difficult to find because of the intermediating 
effect of competition crossover. 
 Control variable for audit “market concentration” 
concerned with knowledge spillover benefit should be 
included in audit fee regressions to increase the power 
of empirical testing. 
 
Che Ahmad et al. (2006) 
 
( AAMJAF) 
 
To examine the effect of non-audit 
services on audit fees, to investigate the 
relationship between non-audit fees and 
the issuance of qualified audit opinion 
and to analyse the proportion of non-
audit fees to total fees paid by a client to 
its auditor. 
 
2002 data of 819 public listed companies. 
 
(Malaysia) 
 
 Found significant positive relationship between audit 
fees and non-audit fees and significant relationship 
between non-audit fees and qualified audit opinions.  
 Finally, the descriptive analysis presents a worrying 
development regarding the high ratio of non-audit fees 
to total fee. 
Srinidhi and Gul (2007) 
 
(CAR) 
 
This study examines linkages between 
the audit and non-audit fees and accrual 
quality.  
 
2000-2001 data from a database compiled 
by Standard & Poors from proxy 
statements 
 
(USA) 
 Results show that accrual quality has a significant 
negative association with the magnitude of non-audit 
fees but a significant positive association with audit 
fees. 
 This latter result is consistent with the proposition that 
higher audit fee reflects higher audit effort and better 
judgments about the propriety of accruals, but is not 
consistent with the proposition that audit fee is 
associated with economic bonding. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Mitra and Hossain (2007)  
 
(JBR) 
Examines the empirical relationship 
between the institutional stock 
ownership and the relative level of non-
audit service fees. 
Data from 335 firms listed on NYSE that 
are non-regulated, non-financial and non-
service in nature and which have their 
year-end on 31/12/2000. 
 
(USA) 
 There is a significant negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and non-audit ratio. 
 
Joe and Vandervelde (2007) 
 
(CAR) 
 
Investigate whether knowledge gained 
from working on a non-audit task can be 
transferred to enhance the performance 
of the audit task and whether any 
knowledge transfer can be achieved if 
the auditor only reviews the non-audit 
work papers prepared by non-audit staff 
in the same audit firm or a different 
audit firm. 
 
 
2005 data from 84 in-charge auditors from 
a “Big 4” public accounting firm in   US 
who were attending a firm-wide in-charge 
auditor training program. 
 
Method: Experiment 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 Results shows that auditor-provided non-audit services 
can be beneficial in that knowledge transfer aids audit 
risk assessments when the same auditor performs both 
non-audit and audit services-higher risk assessments 
were made by auditors who performed both services 
than were made by auditors who performed  only audit 
services and had no access to the non-audit service work 
papers. 
 
Bigus and Zimmermann (2008) 
 
(IJA) 
 
Analyses auditors’ market shares and 
concentration in Germany on the basis 
of audit fees. 
 
2005 data from  175 listed companies 
 
(Germany) 
 
 Non-audit fees amount to 41.9% of the total fees and are 
nearly as important as audit fees. 
 The Big 4 firms obtained 87% of all the audit fees and 
90% of the total fees. 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers is the market leader, based on 
the total fees and the audit fees. 
 KPMG earns the most in the sub-market for tax 
consultancy. 
 Audit firms specialize in certain industries or stock 
market segments. 
 Market concentration increases over time 
 
 
Lim and Tan (2008) 
 
(JAR) 
 
 
Investigates whether the relationship 
between the provision of non-audit 
services and the impairment of audit 
quality is conditional on auditor 
specialization. 
 
2000-2001 data from 1,692 financially 
distressed firms 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 It was found that audit quality, measured by increased 
propensity to issue going-concern opinion, increased 
propensity to miss analysts’ forecast, as well as that 
higher earnings-response coefficients increase with the 
level of non-audit services acquired from industry 
specialist auditors compared to non-specialist auditors. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Lee et al. (2009) 
(IJA) 
 
To examine whether audit report lags 
decrease as auditor tenure increases and 
to study whether the provision of non-
audit services by external auditor 
reduces report lags 
 
2000-2005 data from 
18,473 firms-years representing 15 
industries 
 
(USA) 
 
 Both audit tenure and non-audit services are negatively 
significantly associated with ARLs. 
 Indicates that the longer the audit tenure, the more 
efficient auditors are in auditing their clients and the 
more non-audit services they supply, meaning more 
learning, thus reducing audit delays. 
 
Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2009)   
 
(IJA) 
 
Investigate the influence of NAS on the 
perceived auditor independence. 
 
2006 data from 98 survey responses from 
“Borsen-Team” an academic investment 
club at Darmstadt University of 
Technology 
 
(Germany) 
 
 Shareholders generally perceive a negative effect on 
auditor’s independence if NAS are provided, especially 
if NAS is provided by separate department of audit firm 
 
Griffin et al. (2009) 
 
( A&F) 
 
 
Examines the association between 
overseas and New Zealand governance 
regulatory reforms and New Zealand 
companies’ audit and non-audit fees 
 
 
Data from 653 company-year observations 
for the period 2002-2007. 
 
(New Zealand) 
 
 Found that audit fees increased in New Zealand over 
2002–2006 and such increases associate reliably with the 
transition to and adoption of NZ IFRS and not with 
earlier overseas governance reforms. 
 Also document a decrease in non-audit fees over the 
same period, but find no IFRS effect for non-audit fees. 
 
 
Lu and Sapra (2009)  
 
(AR) 
Develop a theoretical framework to 
investigate the determinants and 
consequences of auditor Conservatism 
in a capital market and implications of 
Section 201 of SOX for auditor 
conservatism and investment efficiency. 
A theoretical paper: Model the interactions 
between corporate decisions and investors’ 
decisions and assess how auditing 
mediates these interactions. 
 By adjusting the mix of audit and non-audit fees, 
companies with high business risk induce auditor 
conservatism, while companies with low business risk 
induce auditor aggressiveness.  
 The nature of investment inefficiency (over or under) 
depends on its auditor attestation (conservative or 
aggressive)  
 Mandatory restriction of non-audit services imposed by 
section 201 increases audit conservatism, decreases a 
conservative auditor’s audit quality and increases an 
aggressive auditor’s audit quality, increases 
overinvestment and decreases under-investments and 
increases the audit fees. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Ghosh et al. (2009) 
 
(JAPP) 
 
Examine the relationship between audit 
and non-audit fees and capital market 
perceptions of auditor independence 
 
2001 - 2006 data of 21,797 firm-year 
Observations (client of Big 5 auditor). 
 
(USA) 
 
 
 
 Found that earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are 
negatively associated with client importance, but there is 
no evidence of an association between ERCs and non-
audit fee ratio- investors perceive client importance, and 
not non-audit fee ratio, as compromising auditors’ 
independence.  
 Further, when they decomposed client importance into 
two components: audit fees and non-audit fees, from a 
given client as percentages of the total revenues of the 
audit firm, they found that only the audit fee component 
is significantly negatively related to ERCs- investors are 
concerned about perceived auditor independence when 
client importance increases because of audit fees, but 
not because of non-audit fees. 
 
Lai and Krishnan (2009) 
 
(A&F) 
 
Study the association of non-audit 
services with firm value. 
 
 
Data from 562 firm-year observations for 
sample 1 firms (mixture of companies 
buying/not buying the service) and 408 for 
sample 2 firms that buy FIS-related 
services from the incumbent auditors in 
year 2000 or 2001. 
 
(USA) 
 
 Found that the market value of equity is greater for 
firms that purchase FIS-related services from their 
incumbent auditors relative to firms that do not.  
 The levels of FIS fees are found positively related to 
firm value after controlling for total other fees, or total 
other non-audit fees.  
 Implication: Despite the negative perception associated 
with non-audit services, investors regard FIS-related 
services as value-adding activities. 
 
Duh et al. (2009) 
 
(RQFA) 
 
Examines whether non-audit service 
provision impairs auditor independence 
and whether the degree of auditor 
independence in Taiwan changed in the 
wake of the 2004 Procomp scandal 
 
Data from 37 companies listed on the TSE 
and the GreTai securities market for 2003 
and 2004. 
 
(Taiwan) 
 
 The results indicate that the non-audit fees ratio was 
significantly and negatively associated with audit 
adjustment in 2003 (prior to the Procomp event) but not 
in 2004 (after the event).  
 The coefficient of manipulation for 2004 was 
significantly smaller than that for 2003. Using non-audit 
fees (rather than non-audit fees ratio) as an independent 
variable yields similar results.  
 These findings have implications for the amendment of 
the CPA Law currently under deliberation in that 
proscribing non-audit service may not be the only route 
to strengthening auditor independence. 
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Author(s) 
(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Abidin et al. (2010)  
 
(BAR) 
Study the audit market structure, fees 
and choices in a period of structural 
change (1998-2003) in UK 
Data from UK companies listed on Main 
and AIM market of London stock 
exchange (9,006 observations) for the 
period 1998-2003. 
 
(UK) 
 There has been significant upward pressure on audit fees 
since 2001 for smaller auditees and audit fee income for 
Big 4/5 did not change significantly, while the number 
of auditees fell significantly. 
 Andersen’s demise reduced the level of inequality 
among top tier firms, with PWC retaining its position as 
the dominant firm. Former Andersen clients experienced 
an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation. 
 There are significantly lower Non-audit fees among the 
companies. 
 
Craswell et al. (2010) 
 
(Conference Paper) 
To estimate a supply and demand 
system for the audit of Australian listed 
companies by combining publicly 
available data and proprietary data on 
audit hours (using simultaneous 
equation). 
Data from 136 Australian listed 
companies.  
 
(Australia)  
 The results from the study suggest that the higher audit 
fees obtained by suppliers of non-audit services result 
from two influences: a shift to the right in the demand 
curve and an upward shift in the supply-price function. 
 The benefits of any knowledge spillovers are offset by 
higher prices representing economic rents. 
 
Zaman et al. (2011) 
 
(JBFA) 
Examines the influence of audit 
committee effectiveness as a proxy for 
governance quality on audit fees and 
non-audit fees using a new composite 
measure comprising audit committee 
independence, expertise, diligence and 
size. 
Data from 135 companies (540 company 
year observations) of UK FTSE-350 in 
2001-2004 
(UK) 
 ACE has positive association with Non-audit service fee 
(NASF)  
 NASF is negatively associated with audit committee 
financial expertise and audit committee independence 
and positively associated with audit committee size. 
 Board meeting, CEO-duality, board independence, 
company size and Big 4 has positive association with 
NASF. 
 
Knechel et al. (2012) 
 
(JBFA) 
Examines whether auditor-provided 
non-audit services generate 
knowledge spillover, using a sample of 
audits from New Zealand 
2004-2005 data of 230 Firm year 
observations of New Zealand listed 
companies. 
 A negative association between non-audit fees and audit 
lag, thus suggesting the presence of knowledge 
spillover. However, the knowledge spillover effect is 
limited to the city office providing both the audit and 
non-audit services 
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(Publication) 
Objective(s) of study Details of study 
(Country) 
Main findings 
 
Chan et al (2012) 
 
(AF) 
 
Examines whether independent audit 
committee members’ board tenure 
affects audit fees 
 
1524 firm-year observations for the years 
2005 and 2006.  
(USA) 
 
 Find that audit fees are negatively associated 
with the proportion of long board tenure directors on the 
independent audit committee, consistent with the notion 
that audit committee members’ long board  tenure 
results in lower audit effort.  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics on audit committee characteristics for FTSE 350 and 
Non FTSE 350 
Descriptive 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minimum 
Maximu
m 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
ACSIZE 0 605 3.45 .913 .037 3.38 3.53 1 9 
1 162 3.73 1.052 .083 3.57 3.89 0 7 
Total 767 3.51 .950 .034 3.44 3.58 0 9 
%ACNEXEC 0 605 99.85 2.17 0.09 99.68 100.02 66.67 100.00 
1 160 99.79 2.64 0.21 99.38 100.20 66.67 100.00 
Total 765 99.84 2.27 0.08 99.68 100.00 66.67 100.00 
ACMEET 0 604 3.85 1.375 .056 3.74 3.96 1 15 
1 160 4.59 1.864 .147 4.30 4.88 2 17 
Total 764 4.00 1.520 .055 3.90 4.11 1 17 
%ACCOMM 0 603 96.14 5.47 .22 95.70 96.57 66.67 100.00 
1 160 95.22 5.29 .42 94.39 96.05 75.00 100.00 
Total 763 95.94 5.44 .20 95.56 96.33 66.67 100.00 
ACSUEXPERT 0 605 .38 .728 .030 .32 .44 0 5 
1 160 .51 .752 .059 .40 .63 0 4 
Total 765 .41 .735 .027 .35 .46 0 5 
%ACSUEXPERT 0 605 9.52 19.46 0.79 7.96 11.07 0.00 100.00 
1 160 10.70 15.73 1.24 8.25 13.16 0.00 75.00 
Total 765 9.77 18.73 0.68 8.44 11.10 0.00 100.00 
ACCEXPERT 0 605 .95 .659 .027 .90 1.00 0 3 
1 160 .93 .714 .056 .81 1.04 0 3 
Total 765 .95 .671 .024 .90 .99 0 3 
%ACCEXPERT 0 605 24.57 19.24 0.78 23.04 26.11 0.00 100.00 
1 160 21.09 17.74 1.40 18.32 23.86 0.00 75.00 
Total 765 23.85 18.97 0.69 22.50 25.19 0.00 100.00 
ACFINEXPERT 0 605 1.32 .681 .028 1.27 1.38 0 5 
1 160 1.44 .791 .063 1.31 1.56 0 4 
Total 765 1.35 .707 .026 1.30 1.40 0 5 
%ACFINEXPERT 0 605 33.98 20.06 0.82 32.38 35.59 0.00 100.00 
1 160 31.79 17.29 1.37 29.09 34.49 0.00 100.00 
Total 765 33.53 19.53 0.71 32.14 34.91 0.00 100.00 
ACE 0 605 .87 .353 .014 .84 .90 0 3 
1 160 .90 .301 .024 .85 .95 0 1 
Total 765 .87 .343 .012 .85 .90 0 3 
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ANOVA 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
ACSIZE Between 
Groups 
9.699 1 9.699 10.880 .001 
Within Groups 681.957 765 .891     
Total 691.656 766       
ACSIZEDUM Between 
Groups 
.115 1 .115 1.694 .194 
Within Groups 51.797 765 .068     
Total 51.911 766       
ACSIZEDUMMY Between 
Groups 
.003 1 .003 .126 .723 
Within Groups 16.620 765 .022     
Total 16.623 766       
%ACNEXEC Between 
Groups 
.408 1 .408 .079 .779 
Within Groups 3937.500 763 5.161     
Total 3937.909 764       
ACNEXECDUM Between 
Groups 
.007 1 .007 1.091 .297 
Within Groups 4.960 764 .006     
Total 4.967 765       
ACMEET Between 
Groups 
70.408 1 70.408 31.698 .000 
Within Groups 1692.581 762 2.221     
Total 1762.988 763       
ACMEETDUM Between 
Groups 
.025 1 .025 .338 .561 
Within Groups 56.105 762 .074     
Total 56.130 763       
ACALLMEET Between 
Groups 
.005 1 .005 .006 .939 
Within Groups 673.182 761 .885     
Total 673.187 762       
%ACCOMM Between 
Groups 
105.535 1 105.535 3.577 .059 
Within Groups 22452.234 761 29.504     
Total 22557.769 762       
ACSUEXPERT Between 
Groups 
2.272 1 2.272 4.224 .040 
Within Groups 410.296 763 .538     
Total 412.567 764       
%ACSUEXPERT Between 
Groups 
177.336 1 177.336 .505 .478 
Within Groups 267966.982 763 351.202     
Total 268144.317 764       
ACCEXPERT Between 
Groups 
.082 1 .082 .181 .670 
Within Groups 343.612 763 .450     
Total 343.694 764       
%ACCEXPERT Between 
Groups 
1536.485 1 1536.485 4.286 .039 
Within Groups 273538.358 763 358.504     
Total 275074.844 764       
ACFINEXPERT Between 
Groups 
1.631 1 1.631 3.276 .071 
Within Groups 379.877 763 .498     
Total 381.508 764       
%ACFINEXPERT Between 
Groups 
608.750 1 608.750 1.598 .207 
Within Groups 290655.770 763 380.938     
Total 291264.521 764       
EXPERTDUM Between 
Groups 
.003 1 .003 .097 .756 
Within Groups 26.044 763 .034     
Total 26.047 764       
ACE Between 
Groups 
.131 1 .131 1.117 .291 
Within Groups 89.821 763 .118     
Total 89.953 764       
* 0= non FTSE 350        **1= FTSE 350 
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APPENDIX 3: Skewness and Kurtosis for variables used. 
  Skewness 
Std. Error of 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
AUDITFEE 5.583 .088 37.736 .176 
BOARDSIZE 1.018 .088 1.418 .176 
%NEXEC -.133 .088 .080 .176 
%INDNEXEC -.941 .088 .649 .176 
%INDDIRS -.032 .088 .139 .176 
DUALITY 6.131 .088 35.686 .176 
BOARDMEET 1.851 .088 8.255 .176 
ACE -1.778 .088 4.422 .176 
ACSIZE 1.057 .088 3.177 .176 
%ACNEXEC -18.875 .088 407.591 .176 
ACMEET 2.466 .088 13.599 .177 
%ACCOMM -1.341 .088 1.736 .177 
%ACFINEXPERT 1.255 .088 2.031 .176 
%ACSUEXPERT 2.606 .088 8.123 .176 
%ACCEXPERT .774 .088 1.024 .176 
NOBLOCKS .301 .089 -.245 .178 
ABLOCKOWN .158 .089 -.391 .178 
ANEXSHARES 5.479 .089 34.774 .177 
AEXESHARES 3.836 .089 16.531 .177 
LOSS050607 1.540 .088 .373 .176 
TOTASSETS 9.980 .088 106.536 .176 
LOGTOTASSETS 1.073 .088 1.669 .176 
DEBTORS 2.160 .090 6.875 .179 
STOCK 3.232 .088 13.339 .176 
ROA 1.622 .088 16.409 .176 
GEARING .772 .090 .447 .180 
LIQUIDITY 20.063 .089 433.490 .177 
BUSY -1.189 .088 -.587 .176 
SUBS 4.276 .088 34.687 .177 
UKSUBS 2.362 .088 7.436 .177 
FTSE350 -.759 .088 -1.428 .176 
REG 1.420 .088 .016 .176 
FINANCIALS 1.604 .088 .576 .176 
BIG4 -4.100 .088 14.850 .176 
LONDON -.455 .088 -1.798 .176 
DELAY 19.036 .089 459.373 .177 
LEGIST 7.788 .088 76.948 .176 
%LEGIST 1.810 .090 2.855 .179 
TAX 5.906 .088 47.946 .176 
%TAX .371 .090 -1.175 .179 
CORPFIN 7.027 .088 63.258 .176 
%CORPFIN 1.941 .090 2.513 .179 
OTHERSERVICE 4.955 .088 28.913 .176 
%OTHERSERVICE .897 .090 -.461 .179 
TOTNONAUDIT 4.791 .088 29.864 .176 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT -2.865 .088 10.365 .176 
AUDITVSNON .905 .088 -1.185 .176 
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APPENDIX 4: OLS regressions explaining the determinants of audit fees for FTSE all 
shares for the year 2007 and 2010 (Robustness test- Ownership variation) 
  
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
Stand. 
Coeff t-value 
sig 
value VIF 
(Constant)  -.146 .884   -.146 .884  
%INDDIRS -.019 -.858 .391 1.305 -.019 -.858 .391 1.305 
DUALITY -.016 -.773 .440 1.060 -.016 -.773 .440 1.060 
BOARDMEET -.016 -.761 .447 1.148 -.016 -.761 .447 1.148 
ACSIZE .055 2.411 .016 1.358 .055 2.411 .016 1.358 
%ACNEXEC -.001 -.056 .955 1.067 -.001 -.056 .955 1.067 
ACMEET .076 3.324 .001 1.362 .076 3.324 .001 1.362 
%ACCOMM .032 1.555 .120 1.069 .032 1.555 .120 1.069 
%ACFINEXPERT .019 .880 .379 1.245 .019 .880 .379 1.245 
NOBLOCKS .043 1.950 .052 1.227 .043 1.950 .052 1.227 
ANEXWITHSHARES .013 .614 .539 1.111 
    AEXEWITHSHARES -.004 -.179 .858 1.094 
    NEXWITHSHARES     .013 .614 .539 1.111 
EXEWITHSHARES     -.004 -.179 .858 1.094 
3YEARSLOSS -.007 -.299 .765 1.334 -.007 -.299 .765 1.334 
DEBTORS .140 6.474 .000 1.200 .140 6.474 .000 1.200 
STOCK -.061 -2.903 .004 1.145 -.061 -2.903 .004 1.145 
ROA -.001 -.037 .971 1.229 -.001 -.037 .971 1.229 
GEARING -.010 -.456 .648 1.272 -.010 -.456 .648 1.272 
BUSY .027 1.272 .204 1.145 .027 1.272 .204 1.145 
REG -.173 -7.888 .000 1.241 -.173 -7.888 .000 1.241 
BIG4 .021 .944 .345 1.247 .021 .944 .345 1.247 
LONDON .119 5.423 .000 1.243 .119 5.423 .000 1.243 
LOGDELAY .029 1.384 .167 1.163 .029 1.384 .167 1.163 
LOGTOTASSETS .643 20.948 .000 2.434 .643 20.948 .000 2.434 
UKSUBS -.030 -1.447 .148 1.144 -.030 -1.447 .148 1.144 
USSUBS .180 8.476 .000 1.166 .180 8.476 .000 1.166 
LOGTOTNONAUDIT .167 7.352 .000 1.340 .167 7.352 .000 1.340 
PERIOD .019 .900 .369 1.182 .019 .900 .369 1.182 
R square 
0.741 
   
0.741 
   Adj.R square 
0.731 
   
0.731 
   F Value 
73.559 
   
73.559 
   Durbin Watson 
2.041       2.041       
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Appendix 5: Abbreviations Used in the Literature Summary 
Abbreviation Journal 
AAMJAF Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting And Finance 
A&F Accounting & Finance 
AFR Accounting and Finance Research 
AA Advances in Accounting 
ABR Accounting and Business Research 
ABRv Accounting and Business Review 
ABACUS A Journal of Business Finance and Accounting Studies 
AIA Advances in International Accounting 
AJPT Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 
AR The Accounting Review 
ARA Asian Review of Accounting 
ARJ Accounting Research Journal 
BAR British Accounting Review 
CAR Contemporary Accounting Research 
CGIR Corporate Governance: An International Review 
EAR European Accounting Review 
FAM Financial Accountability & Management 
FCS Finance Contrôle Stratégie 
FE Financial Executive 
GAJ Government Accountants Journal 
HBR Harvard Business Review 
ICFAI ICFAI Journal of Audit Practice 
IJA International Journal of Accounting 
IJAu International Journal of Auditing 
IJCM International Journal of Commerce and Management 
IJRM International Journal of Research in Marketing 
JAAF Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 
JAE Journal of Accounting & Economics 
JAPP Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
JAR Journal of Accounting Research 
JAAR Journal of Applied Accounting Research 
JBFA Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 
JBR Journal of Business Research 
JCAE Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 
JEMS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 
JIAAT Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation 
JIFMA Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 
JMG Journal of Management and Governance 
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JSM Journal of Strategic Marketing 
MAJ Managerial Auditing Journal 
MSE Management Science and Engineering 
PAR Pacific Accounting Review 
QJBE Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 
RAEE Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies 
RAR Research in Accounting Regulation 
RIGNA Research in Governmental and Nonprofit Accounting 
RAF Review of Accounting and Finance 
RQFA Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
SMJ Strategic Management Journal 
TaiAR Taiwan Accounting Review 
 
 
 
 
